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THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D. EDITED BY +T. E. PAGE, o.n., wirr.p. +E. CAPPS, Pu.p., LL. +W. H. Ὁ. ROUSE, trrt.p. L. A. POST, μα. E. H. WARMINGTON, M.a., ¥.B.HIST.SOC.

EPICTETUS

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meerCTETUS

THE DISCOURSES AS REPORTED BY ARRIAN, THE MANUAL, AND FRAGMENTS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY W. A. OLDFATHER

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I

DISCOURSES, BOOKS I AND II

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD MOCMLYI

First printed 1925 Reprinted 1946, 1956

Printed in Great Britain

INTRODUCTION

Slave, poor as Irus, halting as I trod, 7, Epictetus, was the friend of God.

Epicretus was a slave woman’s son, and for many years a slave himself.2 The tone and temper of his whole life were determined thereby. An all- engulfing passion for independence and freedom so

1 Δοῦλος Ἐπίκτητος γενόμην καὶ σῶμ᾽ ἀνάπηρος καὶ πενίην Ἶρος καὶ φίλος ἀθανάτοι. An anonymous epigram (John Chrys., Patrol. Gr. LX. 111; Macrob. Sat. 1. 11, 45; Anth: Pal, Vil. 676), as translated by H. Macnaghten. The ascrip- tion to Leonidas is merely a palaeographical blunder in part of the MS. tradition, that to Epictetus himself (by Macrobius) a patent absurdity.

This is the explicit testimony of an undated but fairly early inscription from Pisidia (J. R. S. Sterrett: Papers ζ the Amer. School of Class. Stud. at Athens, 1884-5, 3, 315f. ;

. Kaibel: Hermes, 1888, 23, 542 8), and of Palladius (Ps.—Callisthenes, III. 10, ed. C. Miiller), and is distinctly implied by a phrase in a letter professedly addressed to him by one of the Philostrati (Ep. 69: ἐτλανθάνεσθαι tis εἶ καὶ τίνων γέγονας). I see, therefore, no reason to doubt the statement, as does Schenkl (2nd ed., p. xvi). The phrase δοῦλος...γενόμην in the epigram cited above cannot be used as certain evidence. because γίγνεσθαι, as Schenkl observes, too frequently equals εἶναι in the poets, but, in view of the other testimony, it is probable that servile origin was what the author of it had in mind.—There is little reason to think, with Martha (Les Moralistes, etc., 159), that Epictetus was not his real name, and that the employment of it is indicative of a modesty so real that it sought even a kind of anonymity, since the designation is by no means restricted to slaves, while his modesty, because coupled with Stoic straightforwardness, is far removed from the shrinking humility that seeks self-effacement.

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preoccupied him in his youth, that throughout his life he was obsessed with the fear of restraint, and tended to regard mere liberty, even in its negative aspect alone, as almost the highest conceivable good. It is perhaps no less noteworthy that he came from Hierapolis in Phrygia. From of old the Phrygians had conceived of their deities with a singular intensity and entered into their worship with a passion that was often fanaticism, and sometimes downright frenzy. It is, therefore, not unnatural that the one Greek philosopher who, despite the monistic and necessitarian postulates of his philosophy, conceived of his God in as vivid a fashion as the writers of the New Testament, and almost as intimately as the founder of Christianity himself, should have inherited the passion for a per- sonal god from the folk and land of his nativity,+ Beside these two illuminating facts, the other details of his life history are of relatively little im- portance. He was owned for a time by Epaphro- ditus, the freedman and administrative secretary of Nero, and it was while yet in his service that he began to take lessons from Musonius Rufus, the greatest Stoic teacher of the age, whose influence was the dominant one in his career.2 He was of

1 It is noteworthy, as Lagrange, p. 201, observes, that Montanus, who soon after the time of Epictetus ‘‘ threatened Christianity with the invasion of undisciplined spiritual graces,” was also a Phrygian.

2 So many passages in Epictetus can be paralleled closely from the remaining fragments of Rufus (as Epictetus always calls him) that there can be no doubt but the system of thought in the pupil is little more than an echo, with changes of emphasis due to the personal equation, of that of the master.

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feeble health, and lame, the latter probably because of the brutality of a master in his early years ;*

1 This is generally doubted nowadays, especially since Bentley's emphatic pronouncement (cf. Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc., 1921, 53, 42) in favour of the account in Suidas, to the effect that his lameness was the result of rheumatism. Ceteris paribus one would, of course, accept as probable the less sensational story. But it requires unusual powers of credulity to believe Suidas against any authority whomso- ever, and in this case the other authorities are several, early, and excellent. In the first place Celsus (in Origen, contra Celswm, VII, 53), who was probably a younger contemporary of Epictetus and had every occasion to be well informed ; further, Origen (/.c.), who clearly accepted and believed the story, since his very answer to the

ent admits the authenticity of the account, while the easiest or most convincing retort would have been to deny it; then Gregory of Nazianzus and his brother Caesarius (in a number of places, see the testimonia in Schenkl*, pp viii-ix ; of course the absurdities in Pseudo- Nonnus, Cosmas of Jerusalem, Elias of Crete, εἰ id genus omne, have no bearing either way). Now the fact that such men as Origen and Gregory accepted and propagated the account (even though Epictetus, and in this particular instance especially, had been exploited as a pagan saint, the equal or the superior of even Jesus himself) is sufficient to show that the best-informed Christians of the third and fourth centuries knew of no otber record. To my feeling it is distinctly probable that the denial of the incident may have emanated from some over-zealous Christian, in a period of less scrupulous apologetics, who thought to take down the Pagansa notch or two. The very brief statement in Simplicius, ‘‘that he was lame from an early period of his life” (Comm. on the Encheiridion, 102b Heins.), establishes nothing and would agree perfectly with either story. The connection in which the words occur would make any explanatory oe unnatural, and, whereas similar conciseness in Plutarch might perhaps argue ignorance of further details, such an inference would be false for Simplicius, the dullness of whose commentary is so por- tentous that it cannot be explained as merely the unavoidable

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long unmarried, until in his old age he took a wife to help him bring up a little child whose parents, friends of his, were about to expose it ;1 so simple in his style of living, that in Rome he never locked the doors of a habitation, whose only furniture was said to be a pallet and a rush mat, and in Nicopolis (in Epirus, opposite Actium) contented himself with an earthenware lamp after the theft of his iron one.

Of the external aspects of his career it should be noted that he had a recognized position as a philosopher when Domitian banished all such persons from Rome (presumably in a.p. 89 or 92); that he settled in Nicopolis, where he conducted what seems to have been a fairly large and well- regarded school ; that he travelled a little, probably to Olympia, and certainly once to Athens.* In

1 He had been stung, no doubt, by the bitter and in his case unfair gibe of Demonax, who, on hearing Epictetus’ exhortation to marry, had sarcastically asked the hand of one of his daughters (Lucian, Demon. 55).

2 Philostratus, Epist.69; Lucian, Demon. 55 would not be inconsistent with the idea of such a visit, but does not necessarily presuppose it.

concomitant of vast scholarship and erudition, but must have required a deliberate effort directed to the suppression of the elements of human interest. Epictetus’ own allusions to his lameness are non-committal, but of course he would have been the last person to boast about such things. And yet, even then, the references to the pe of one’s master, or tyrant, to do injury by means of chains, sword, rack, scourging, prison, exile, crucifixion, and the like (although the general theme is a kind of Stoic commonplace). are so very numerous as compared with the physical afflictions which come in the course of nature, that it is altogether reasonable to think of his imagination having been profoundly affected during his impressionable years by a personal experience of this very sort.

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this connection it should also be observed that his general literary education was not extensive— Homer, of course, a little Plato and Xenophon, principally for their testimony about Socrates, a few stock references to tragedy, and the professional’s acquaintance with the philosophy of the later schools, and this is practically all. It can scarcely be doubted, as Schenkl observes (p. xci), that this literary apparatus comes almost entirely from the extensive collections of Chrysippus. And the same may be said of his aesthetic culture. He seems to have seen and been impressed by the gold-and- ivory statues of Zeus and Athena, at Olympia and Athens respectively, but he set no very high value upon the work of artists, for he allowed himself once the almost blasphemous characterization of the Acropolis and its incomparable marbles as “ pretty bits of stone and a pretty rock.” Epictetus was merely moralist and teacher, but yet of such tran- scendent attainments as such that it seems almost impertinent to expect anything more of him.

The dates of his birth and of his death cannot be determined with any accuracy. The burning of the Capitol in a.p. 69 was yet a vivid memory while he was still a pupil of Musonius;1 he enjoyed the personal acquaintance of Hadrian, but not of Marcus Aurelius, for all the latter's admiration of him; and he speaks freely of himself as an old man, and is characterized as such by Lucian (Adv.

1 The Capitol was burned in 69 and again in a.p. 80, but the reference to the event (I. 7, 32) as a crime suggests that the earlier date should be understood, since the burning then was due to revolution, while that in a.p 80 was accidental.

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Indoctum, 13) ; accordingly his life must have covered roughly the period ca. a.v. 50-120, with which limits the rare and rather vague references to contemporary events agree. He was, accordingly, an almost exact contemporary of Plutarch and Tacitus.

Like Socrates and others whom he admired, he wrote nothing for publication, and but little memory would have survived of him had not a faithful pupil, successful as historian and adminis- trator, Flavius Arrian, recorded many a discourse and informal conversation. These are saved to us in four books of Avatp:Bai, or Discourses,? out of the original eight, and in a very brief compendium, the Ἐγχειρίδιον, a Manual or Handbook, in which,

1 Although he must have written much for his own purposes in elaborating his argumentation by dialectic, since he lauds Socrates for such a practice and speaks of it as usual for a ‘‘philosopher.” Besides, in his own discourses he is always looking for an interlocutor, whom he often finds in the person of pupil or visitor, but, failing these, he — on both sides of the debate himself. Cf. Colardeau,

. 2941. τὰ Some, especially Schenkl, have believed in the existence of other collections, and it was long thought that Arrian had composed a special biography. But the evidence for the other works seems to be based entirely upon those variations in title and form of reference which ancient methods of citation freely allowed, and it is improbable that there ever existed any but the works just mentioned. See the special study by R. Asmus, whose conclusions have been accepted by Zeller, 767, n., and many others.

3 This has occasionally been translated by Pugio, or Dagger, in early modern editions, possibly with a half- conscious memory of Hebrews iv. 12: For the word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of sowl and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts

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for the sake of a general public which could not take time to read the larger ones, the elements of his doctrine were somewhat mechanically put together out of verbatim, or practically verbatim, extracts from the Discourses. That Arrian’s report is a stenographic! record of the ipsissima verba of the master there can be no doubt. His own compositions are in Attic, while these works are in the Koine, and there are such marked differences in style, especially in the use of several of the prepositions, as Miicke has pointed out, that one is clearly dealing with another personality. Add to that the utter difference in spirit and tempo, and Arrian’s inability when writing propria persona to characterize sharply a personality, while the conversations of Epictetus are nothing if not vivid. We have, accordingly, in Arrian’s Discourses a work which, if my knowledge does not fail me, is really unique in literature, the actual words of an extraordinarily gifted teacher upon scores, not to say hundreds, of occasions in his own class-room, conversing with visitors, reproving, exhorting, encouraging his pupils, enlivening the dullness of the formal instruction, and, in his own parable, shooting it through with the red stripe of a conscious moral purpose in preparation for the

1 Hartmann, p. 252 ff., has settled this point.

and intents of the heart. But despite the not inappropriate character of such a designation, and the fact that Simplicius himself (preface to his commentary) misunderstood the application, there can be no doubt but the word βιβλίον is to be supplied and that the correct meaning is Handbook or Compendium ; cf. Colardeau’s discussion, p. 25.

INTRODUCTION

problem of right living.t The regular class exer- cises were clearly reading and interpretation of characteristic portions of Stoic philosophical works, somewhat as in an oral examination; problems in formal logic, these apparently conducted by assistants, or advanced pupils ; and the preparation of themes or essays on a large scale which required much writing and allowed an ambitious pupil to imitate the style of celebrated authors. The Master super- vised the formal instruction in logic, even though it might be conducted by others, but there is no indication that he delivered systematic lectures, although he clearly made special preparation to criticize the interpretations of his pupils (1. 10, 8). From the nature of the comments, which presuppose a fair elementary training in literature, we can feel sure that only young men and not boys were ad- mitted to the school, and there are some remarks which sound very much like introductions to the general subject of study, while others are pretty clearly addressed to those who were about to leave —constituting, in fact, an early and somewhat rudimentary variety of. Commencement Address.” Some of the pupils were preparing to teach, but the majority, no doubt, like Arrian, were of high social position and contemplated entering the public service.

For a proper understanding of the Discourses it is important to bear in mind their true character,

1 Colardeau, pp. 71-113, has an admirable discussion of the method and technique of instruction employed. In view of the singularly valuable nature of the material it seems strange that more attention has not been paid to Epictetus in the history of ancient education.

* See Halbauer, p. 45 ff., for a good discussion of these points and a critique of the views of Bruns, Colardeau, and Hartmann,

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which Halbauer in a valuable study has most clearly stated thus (p. 56): “The Diatribae are not the curriculum proper, nor even a part of that curricu- lum. On the contrary, this consisted of readings from the Stoic writings, while the Diatribae accompany the formal instruction, dwell on this point or on that, which Epictetus regarded as of special importance, above all give him an oppor- tunity for familiar discourse with his pupils, and for discussing with them in a friendly spirit their personal affairs.” They are not, therefore, a formal presentation of Stoic philosophy, so that it is unfair to criticize their lack of system and their relative neglect of logic and physics, upon which the other Stoics laid such stress, for they were not designed as formal lectures, and the class exercises had dwelt satis superque, as Epictetus must have felt, upon the physics and logic, which were after all only the foundation of conduct, the subject in which he was primarily interested. They are class-room comment, in the frank and open spirit which was characteristic of the man, containing not a little of what we should now be inclined to restrict to a private conference, often closely connected, no doubt, with the readings and themes, but quite as often, apparently, little more than obier dicta.

1 Cf. Bonhéffer, 1890, 22. The arrangement of topics by Arrian is a point which seems not to have been discussed as fully as it deserves. Hartmann’s view, that the order is that of exact chronological sequence, seems to be an exaggeration of what may be in the main correct, but I think I can trace evidences of a somewhat formal nature in some of the groupings, and it seems not unlikely that a few of the chapters contain remarks delivered on several oc- casions. However, thisis a point which requires an elaborate investigation and cannot be discussed here.

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They constitute a remarkable self-revelation of a character of extraordinary strength, elevation, and sweetness, and despite their frequent repetitions and occasional obscurity must ever rank high in the literature of personal portrayal, even were one inclined to disregard their moral elevation. For Epictetus was without doubt, as the great wit and cynic Lucian calls him, “a marvellous old man.”

It may not be amiss to dwell a few moments upon the outstanding features of his personality, before saying a few words upon his doctrines, for his doctrines, or at all events the varying emphasis laid on his doctrines, were to a marked degree influenced by the kind of man that he was.

And first of all I should observe that he had the point of view of a man who had suffered from slavery and abhorred it, but had not been altogether able to escape its influence. He was predisposed to suffer, to renounce, to yield, and to accept whatever burden might be laid upon him.' He was not a revolutionist, or a cultured gentleman, or a statesman, as were other Stoics before and after. Many of the good things of life which others enjoyed as a matter of course he had grown accus- tomed never to demand for himself ; and the social obligations for the maintenance and advancement of order and civilization, towards which men of higher station were sensitive, clearly did not weigh heavily upon his conscience. His whole teaching was to make men free and happy by a severe restriction of effort to the realm of the moral

1 Compare the excellent remarks of Εἰ. V. Arnold upon this point, Hncyclop., etc., 324.

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nature+ The celebrated life-formula, ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου, which one feels inclined to retranslate as “Endure and Renounce,” in order to give it once more the definite meaning of which the cliché, ‘Bear and Forbear,’ has almost robbed it, is, to speak frankly, with all its wisdom, and humility, and purificatory power, not a sufficient programme for a highly organized society making towards an envisaged goal of general improvement.

And again, in youth he must have been almost consumed by a passion for freedom. 1 know no man upon whose lips the idea more frequently occurs. The words “free” (adjective and verb) and “freedom” appear some 130 times in Epictetus, that is, with a relative frequency about six times that of their occurrence in the New Testament and twice that of their occurrence in Marcus Aurelius, to take contemporary works of somewhat the same general content And with the attain- ment of his personal freedom there must have come such an upwelling of gratitude to God as that which finds expression in the beautiful hymn of praise concluding the sixteenth chapter of the first book, so that, while most Stoics assumed or at least recognized the possibility of a kind of immortality, he could wholly dispense with that desire for the survival of personality after death which even Marcus Aurelius felt to be almost necessary for his own austere ideal of happiness.”

' See Zeller’s admirable discussion of this topic, p. 776.

2 **Sich aber als Menschheit (und nicht nur als In- dividuum) ebenso vergeudet zu fiihlen, wie wir die einzelne Bliithe von der Natur vergeudet sehen, ist ein Gefiihl iiber alle Gefiihle.— Wer ist aber desselben fahig?” F. Nietzsche: Menschlich:s, Allzwmcnschliches, 1. 51.

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Almost as characteristic was his intensity. He speaks much of tranquillity, as might be expected of a Stoic, but he was not one of those for whom that virtue is to be achieved only by Henry James’s formula of successive accumulations of “endless” amounts of history, and tradition, and taste. His was a tranquillity, if there really be such a thing, of moral fervour, and of religious devotion. His vehemence gave him an extraordinarily firm and clean-cut character, and made him a singularly impressive teacher, as Arrian in the introductory epistle attests. For he was enormously interested in his teaching, knowing well that in this gift lay his single talent; made great efforts to present his material in the simplest terms and in well- arranged sequence ; and sharply reproved those who blamed the stupidity of their pupils for what was due to their own incompetence in instruction. It also gave a notable vigour to his vocabulary and utterance, his παρρησία, or freedom of speech, suo quamque rem nomine appellare, as Cicero (Ad. Fam. 1X. 22, 1) characterizes that Stoic virtue, which few exemplified more effectively than Epictetus; but it also, it must be confessed, made him some- what intolerant of the opinions of others, were they philosophic or religious, in a fashion which for better or for worse was rapidly gaining ground in his day.

But he was at the same time extremely modest. He never calls himself a “ philosopher,” he speaks frankly of his own failings, blames himself quite as much as his pupils for the failure of his instrue- tion ofttimes to produce its perfect work, and quotes

1 See Bonhiffer’s remarks upon this point (1911, 346). XViii

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INTRODUCTION

freely the disrespectful remarks of others about him. He is severe in the condemnation of the unrepentant sinner, but charitable towards the naive wrong- doer, going so far, in fact, in this direction as to advocate principles which would lead to the abolition of all capital punishment.1 He is much more an

el of mercy than a messenger of vengeance.” And this aspect of his character comes out most clearly perhaps in his attitude towards children, for with them a man can be more nearly himself than with his sophisticated associates. No ancient author speaks as frequently of them, or as sympathetically. They are one of his favourite parables, and though he is well aware that a child is only an incomplete man, he likes their straightforwardness in play, he claps his hands to them and returns their “ Merry Saturnalia!” greeting, yearns to get down on hands and knees and talk baby talk with them. There is, of course, a sense in which Pascal’s stricture of Stoic pride applies to Epictetus, for the Stoic virtues were somewhat self-consciously erected upon the basis of self-respect and self- reliance; but a more humble and charitable Stoic it would have been impossible to find, and what pride there is belongs to the system and not to the man. Towards God he is always devout,

1 Το 18, especially sections 5 ff.

2 See Colardeau, p. 209 ff., and Zeller, p. 780 f.

3 Cf. Renner’s interesting study.

4 Pascal’s judgment (to say nothing of the grotesque misconceptions of J. B. Rousseau) was undoubtedly in- fluenced by his preoccupation with the Encheiridion, which, as necessarily in such a compendium of doctrine, is more Stoic than Epictetean, and suppresses many of the more amiable traits of personality. The actual man of the

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grateful, humble, and there is a little trace in him of that exaltation of self which in some of the Stoics tended to accord to the ideal man a moral elevation that made him sometimes the equal if not in certain aspects almost the superior of Godt

His doctrines were the conventional ones of Stoicism, representing rather the teaching of the early Stoics than that of the middle and later schools, as Bonhéffer has elaborately proven. There is, accordingly, no occasion to dwell at length upon them, but for the sake of those who may wish to fit a particular teaching into his general scheme, a very brief outline may here be attempted.?

Every man bears the exclusive responsibility himself for his own good or evil, since it is im- possible to imagine a moral order in which one person does the wrong and another, the innocent, suffers. Therefore, good and evil can be only those things which depend entirely upon our moral purpose, what we generally call, but from the Stoic’s point of view a little inaccurately, our free

1 As expressed, e.g., in Seneca, De Prov. VI. 6: Hoe est quo deum antecedatis: ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos supra patientiam. Cf. also Zeller, 257.

* I am following here in the main, but not uniformly, Von Arnim’s admirable summary.

Discourses is ἃ very much more attractive figure than the imaginary reconstruction of the man from the abstracted principles of the Manual; there he is a man, here a statue (Martha, 162 f.). It would go hard with many to have their personal traits deduced from the evidence supplied by the grammars, indices, or even confessions of faith that they have written; especially hard if the compendium were drawn up somewhat mechanically by another’s hand. xX

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will; they cannot consist in any of those things which others can do either to us or for us. Man's highest good lies in the reason, which distinguishes him from other animals. This reason shows itself in assent or dissent, in desire or aversion, and in choice or refusal,1 which in turn are based upon an external impression, φαντασία, that is, a prime datum, a “constant,” beyond our power to alter. But we remain free in regard to our attitude towards them. The use which we make of the external impressions is our one chief concern, and upon the right kind of use depends exclusively our happiness. In the realm of judgement the truth or falsity of the external impression is to be decided. Here our concern is to assent to the true impression, reject the false, and suspend judgement regarding the uncertain. This is an act of the moral purpose, or free will. We should never forget this responsibility, and never assent to an external impression without this preliminary testing. In order to escape from being misled by fallacious reasoning in the formation of these judgements we need instruction in logic, although Epictetus warns against undue devotion to the subtleties of the subject.

Corresponding to assent or dissent in the realm of the intellectual are desire or aversion in the realm of good and evil, which is the most important

1 This triple division of philosophy, with especial but not exclusive application to ethics, is the only notably original element which the minute studies of many investi- gators have found in Epictetus, and it is rather a peda- gogical device for lucid presentation than an innovation in

thought. See Bonhdéffer, 1890, 22 ff. ; Zeller, p. 769; especi- ally More, p. 107 f.

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thing for man, since from failing to attain one’s desire, and from encountering what one would avoid, come all the passions and sorrows of man- kind. In every desire or aversion there is implicit a value-judgement concerning the good or evil of the particular thing involved, and these in turn rest upon general judgements (δόγματα) regarding things of value. If we are to make the proper use of our freedom in the field of desire or aversion we must have the correct judgements concerning good and evil. Now the correct judgement is, that nothing outside the realm of our moral purpose is either good or evil. Nothing, therefore, of that kind can rightly be the object of desire or aversion, hence we should restrict the will to the field in which alone it is free, and cannot, therefore, come to grief. But herein we need not merely the correct theoretical conviction, but also continual practice in application (ἄσκησις), and it is this which Epictetus attempts to impart to his pupils, for it is the foundation of his whole system of education. Finally, in the field of choice or refusal belongs the duty? (τὸ καθῆκον) of man, his intelligent action in human and social relations. Externals, which are neither good nor evil, and so indifferent (ἀδιά- dopa), because not subject to our control, play a certain réle, none the less, as matters with which we have to deal, indeed, but should regard no more seriously than players treat the actual ball with which they play, in comparison with the game itself. It is characteristic of Epictetus that, although he recognizes this part of Stoic doctrine in which the theoretical indifference of externals is in practice

1 On the use of this term, cf. More, p. 116, 12. xxii

INTRODUCTION

largely abandoned, he manifests but slight interest in it.

Among duties he is concerned principally with those of a social character. Nature places us in certain relations to other persons, and these de- termine our obligations to parents, brothers, children, kinsmen, friends, fellow-citizens, and mankind in general. We ought to have the sense of fellowship and partnership (κοινωνικοῦ, that is, in thought and in action we ought to remember the social organiza- tion in which we have been placed by the divine order. The shortcomings of our fellow-men are to be met with patience and charity, and we should not allow ourselves to grow indignant over them, for they too area necessary element in the universal plan.

The religious possibilities of Stoicism are de- veloped further by Epictetus than by any other representative of the school. The conviction that the universe is wholly governed by an all-wise, divine Providence is for him one of the principal supports of the doctrine of values. All things, even apparent evils, are the will of God, compre- hended in his universal plan, and therefore good from the point of view of the whole. It is our moral duty to elevate ourselves to this conception, to see things as God sees them. The man who reconciles his will to the will of God, and so recognizes that every event is necessary and reason- able for the best interest of the whole, feels no discontent with anything outside the control of his free will. His happiness he finds in filling the réle which God has assigned him, becoming thereby a voluntary co-worker with God, and in filling this réle no man can hinder him.

INTRODUCTION

Religion as reconciliation to the inevitable—éxovra δέχεσθαι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (frg. 8), in gratiam cum fato revertere \—is almost perfectly exemplified in Epic- tetus, for with him philosophy has definitely turned religion, and his instruction has become less secular than clerical. But it is astonishing to what heights of sincere devotion, of intimate communion, he attained, though starting with the monistie pre- conceptions of his school, for the very God who took, as he felt, such personal interest in him, was after all but “a subtle form of matter pervading the grosser physical elements... this Providence only another name for a mechanical law of ex- pansion and contraction, absolutely predetermined in its everlasting recurrences.’”’* Of his theology one can scarcely speak. His personal needs and his acquiescence with tradition led him to make of his God more than the materials of his philo- sophical tenets could allow. The result is for our modern thinking an almost incredible mixture of Theism, Pantheism, and Polytheism, and it is im- possible, out of detached expressions, to construct a consistent system. As a matter of fact, with a naive faith in God as a kind of personification of the soul’s desire, he seems to have cherished simultaneously all of these mutually exclusive views of his nature. His moral end was eudaemonism,

1 Seneca, Hp. 91,15. ‘* Dass der Mensch ins Unvermeid- liche sich fiige, darauf dringen alle Religionen; jede sucht auf ihre Weise mit dieser Aufgabe fertig zu werden.”— Goethe.

2 Cf. Lagrange, p. 211.—‘‘ The school of the philosophers is a hospital” (¢/. Bpict. IIT. 23, 30).

* More, p. 167, and οὖ the whole brilliant passage, p. 162 ff.

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INTRODUCTION

to which, in a singularly frank expression (I. 4, 27), he was ready to sacrifice even truth itself. No wonder, then, he cared little for logic as such and not at all for science.1 “The moralist assumes that what lies upon his heart as an essential need, must also be the essence and heart of reality... . In looking at everything from the point of view of happiness men bound the arteries of scientific research.” Though spoken of the Socratic schools in general, this word of Nietzsche's? seems especi- ally apt of Epictetus. He was of an age when the search for happiness by the process of consulting merely the instincts of the heart was leading rapidly to an alienation from scientific truth and a prodigious decline in richness of cultural ex- ence,

Yet even in his happiness, which we cannot dismiss as a mere pose, there was something wanting. The existence of evil was in one breath denied, and in another presumed by the elaborate preparations that one must make to withstand it. “ And having done all,tostand?”” No, even after having done all, “ the house might get too full of smoke,” the hardships of life too great any longer to endure; the ominous phrase, “ the door is open,” or its equivalent, the final recourse of suicide, recurs at intervals through his pages like a tolling bell. And beyond? Nothing. Nothing to fear indeed ; “‘ the dewdrop sinks into the shining sea.’ “ When He provides the necessities no longer, He sounds the recall ; He opens the door and says, ‘Go.’ Where? To nothing you need fear, but back to that from which you came, to what

1 Cf. Zeller, p. 770. 3 Menschliches, Allzwmenschliches, I. 21 ; 23.

XXV

INTRODUCTION

is friendly and akin to you, to the physical elements” (III. 13,14). But at the same time there is nothing to hope for.*

That Epictetus was influenced by the writings of the New Testament has often been suggested. There were those in late antiquity who asserted it,2 and it was natural enough in an age when Tertullian and Jerome believed that Seneca had conversed with Paul, and in Musonius Rufus, the teacher of Epictetus, Justin (II. 8) recognizes a kindred spirit. But despite the recrudescence of the idea from time to time, and the existence of a few scholars in our own generation who seem yet to believe it, this question can be regarded as definitely settled by the elaborate researches of Bonhéffer (1911). Of course Epictetus knew about the existence of Christians, to whom he twice refers, calling them once Jews (II. 9, 19 ff.), and a second time Galilaeans (IV. 7, 6), for there was an early community at Nicopolis (Paul’s Epistle to Titus, iii. 12), but he shared clearly in the vulgar prejudices against them, and his general intolerance of variant opinion, even when for conscience’ sake, makes it certain that he would never have bothered to read their literature. The linguistic resemblances, which are occasionally striking, like “ Lord, have mercy!” κύριε, ἐλέησον, are only accidental, because Epictetus was speaking the common language of ethical exhortation in which the evangelists and apostles wrote; while the few specious similarities are counterbalanced by as many striking differences In the field of doctrine, the one notable point of

1 See More, p. 168 ff. * A Byzantine scholiast in Schenkl? xv. “XXvi

INTRODUCTION

disregard for the things of this world? is offset by so many fundamental differences in presupposition, if not in common ethical practice, that any kind of a sympathetic understanding of the new religion on the part of Epictetus is inconceivable. A certain ground-tone of religious capability, a fading of interest in the conventional fields of human achieve- ment, a personal kindliness and “ harmlessness” of character, a truly pathetic longing as of tired men for a passive kind of happiness, an_ ill-defined yearning to be “saved” by some spectacular and divine intervention, these things are all to be found in the Discourses, yet they are not there as an effect of Christian teaching, but as a true reflection of the tone and temper of those social circles to which the Gospel made its powerful appeal.”

His influence has been extensive and has not yet waned. Hadrian was his friend, and, in the next generation, Marcus Aurelius was his ardent disciple. Celsus, Gellius, and Lucian lauded him, and Galen wrote a special treatise in his defence. His merits were recognized by Christians like Chrysostom, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Augustine, while Origen rated him in some respects even

1 “T find in Epictetus,” says Pascal, ‘‘an incomparable art to disturb the repose of those who seek it in thin external, and to force them to recognize that it is impossible for them to find anything but the error and the suffering which they are seeking to escape, if they do not give themselves without reserve to God alone.”

2 «For it is doubtful if there was ever a Christian of the early Church,” remarks von Wilamowitz (Kultur der Gegenwaré, I. 8, 244), ““ who came as close to the real teaching of Jesus as it stands in the synoptic gospels as did this Phrygian.”

Xxvii

INTRODUCTION

above Plato. His Manual, with a few simple changes, principally in the proper names, was adapted by two different Christian ascetics as a rule and guide of monastic life.

In modern times his vogue started rather slowly with translations by Perotti and Politian, but ver- nacular versions began to appear in the sixteenth century, and at the end of that century and the first part of the subsequent one, Epictetus was one of the most powerful forces in the movement of Neo-Stoicism, especially under the protagonists Justus Lipsius and Bishop Guillaume Du Vair.2 His work and the essays of Montaigne were the principal secular readings of Pascal, and it was with Epictetus and his disciple Marcus Aurelius that the Earl of Shaftesbury “was most thoroughly conversant.” 4 Men as different as Touissant L’Ouverture and Landor, Frederick the Great and Leopardi, have been among his admirers. The number of editions and new printings of his works, or of portions or translations of the same, averages considerably more than one for each year since the invention of printing. In the twentieth century, through the inclusion of Crossley’s Golden Sayings of Epictetus in Charles William Eliot’s Harvard Series of Classics, and of the Manual in Carl Hilty’s Glick, of which two works upwards of three hundred and

1 The same was done again in the seventeenth century for the Carthusians by Matthias Mittner (1632), who took the first 35 of his 50 precepts Ad conservandam animi pacem from the Encheiridion. See Acta Erudit, 1726, 264.

2 See Zanta’s elaborate work upon the share taken by these men in the movement.

3B. Rand: The Life, etc., of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury (author of the Characteristics), (1900), p. xi.

KXViii

INTRODUCTION

fifty thousand copies had, at a recent date, been sold, it may safely be asserted that more copies of portions of his work have been printed in the last two decades than ever existed all told from his own day down to that time.

In concluding one can hardly refrain from trans- lating a portion of the sincere and stirring passage in which Justus Lipsius, a great man and a dis- tinguished scholar, paid Epictetus the tribute of his homage :

“So much for Seneca; another brilliant star arises, Epictetus, his second in time, but not in merit; comparable with him in the weight, if not in the bulk, of his writings; superior in his life. He was a man who relied wholly upon himself and God, but not on Fortune. In origin low and servile, in body lame and feeble, in mind most exalted, and brilliant among the lights of every age.... “ But few of his works remain: the Encheiridion, assuredly a noble piece, and as it were the soul of Stoic moral philosophy; besides that, the Dis- courses, which he delivered on the streets, in his house, and in the school, collected and arranged by Arrian. Nor are these all extant... . But, so help me God, what a keen and lofty spirit in them! a soul aflame, and burning with love of the honourable! There is nothing in Greek their like, unless I am mistaken; I mean with such notable vigour and fire. A novice or one unacquainted with true philosophy he will hardly stir or affect, but when a man has made some progress or is already far advanced, it is amazing how Epictetus stirs him up, and though he is always touching some tender

xxix

INTRODUCTION

spot, yet he gives delight also.... There is no one who better influences and shapes a good mind. 1 never read that old man without a stirring of m soul within me, and, as with Homer, 1 think the more of him each time I re-read him, for he seems always new; and even after I have returned to him I feel that I ought to return to him yet once more.”

xxx

BIBLIOGRAPHY :

Tue editio princeps of Epictetus was prepared by Victor Trincavelli at Venice, in 1535, from a singu- larly faulty MS., so that it is valueless for the purposes of textual criticism. The first substantial work of a critical character was done by Jacob Schegk, a distinguished professor of medicine at Tiibingen, in the edition of Basel, 1554. Although few changes were made in the Greek text, Schegk employed his admirable Latin version as a medium for the correction of hundreds of passages. Even greater were the services of Hieronymus Wolf, whose edition, with translation and commentary, Basel, 1560, is perhaps the most important landmark in Epictetean studies, but for some reason failed to influence markedly the common tradition, which long thereafter continued to reproduce the inferior Greek text of Schegk (Trincavelli).

The next advance is connected with the name of John Upton, whose work appeared in parts, London, 1739-41. Upton had some knowledge of a number of MSS., and in particular a “ codex,” which was a copy of the Trincavelli edition that contained in the margins numerous readings of a MS. now in Mutina, and possibly other MSS., together with notes and emendations from Wolf, Salmasius, and others, so that one cannot be certain always just what “authority” is behind any particular reading whose

1 For details see my ioatemniitg Contributions toward a Bibliography of Epictetus. Xxxi VOL. L B

BIBLIOGRAPHY

source is otherwise not accounted for. He had, moreover, the annotations of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, and the assistance of the learned James Harris, and his contributions to the interpretation of Epictetus in the elaborate commentary are numerous. Richard Bentley’s sagacious and often brilliant emendations entered in the margins of his copy of the Trincavelli edition remained unfortunately un- known until quite recently, as also the ingenious and stimulating, but on the whole less carefully considered, annotations of J. J. Reiske (in H. Schenkl’s edition).

Appropriately designated Monumenta (Epicteteae Philosophiae Monumenta) is the great work in five large volumes by Johannes Schweighauser, Leipzig, 1799-1800, immediately following a notable edition, in fact the only really critical edition, of the Enchei- ridion (1798), which, despite its imperfections, subse- quent editors have been content merely to reprint. Schweighauser’s work is characterized by acumen, industry, and lucidity, and it will be long before it is entirely superseded. The edition by A. Koraes, Paris, 1826, although its author was a learned and ingenious scholar, is marred by a number of unneces- sary rewritings.

A substantial critical edition we owe to the pains- taking labours of Heinrich Schenk] (Leipzig, 1894; editio minor, 1898; second edition, 1916). This is based upon the Bodleian MS. Misc. Graec. 251, 8. xi/xii, which Schenk] and, it would appear, J. L. G. Mowat before him (Journ, of. Philol, 1877, 60 ff. ; οὐ J. B. Mayor, Cl. Rev. 1895, 31 ἢ, and Schenk, ed. minor, 1898, p. iv; ed. 1916, p. iv) have shown to be the archetype of all the numerous existing MSS. of

Xxxii

BIBLIOGRAPHY

the Discourses.1 For the edilio minor (1898) a new collation was prepared by the skilled hand of W. M. Lindsay, and for the second edition (1916) Schenkl himself had photographs of the complete MS. to work with, while T. W. Allen furnished an expert's transcription of the Scholia, with the result that, although the first edition by Schenkl left something to be desired in the accuracy and fullness of its MS. readings, one can approach the apparatus criticus of the second edition with all reasonable confidence. Schenkl’s own contributions to the constitution of the text by way of emendation are considerable, the number of emendations, however, wisely somewhat reduced in the latest printing. A very full index verborum greatly facilitates studies of all kinds.

Of the Encheiridion scores of editions have appeared, but hardly any that deserve mention either for critical or exegetical value, except those that form parts of the above-mentioned editions by Wolf, Upton, and Schweighauser (a better text in his separate edition of the Encheiridion, Leipzig, 1798). But a few necessary remarks about that work and the Fragments will be given in the intro- duction to the second volume of the present work.

A brief list of some of the most important titles bearing upon the criticism of Epictetus :—

H. von Arnim, article “Epiktetos,” in Pauly’s Realencyclopidie, etc., Zweite Bearbeitung, VI.

1 For some account of a large number of these, see Schenk] 2, LY-LVIII. Their value is very slight indeed, and only for purposes of emendation, since as yet there seem to exist no authentic traces of the existence of a second early MS. of Epictetus, so that the Discourses must have survived the Middl e Ages in only a single exemplar.

XXxXiii

BIBLIOGRAPHY

126-31. Contains an ectotienit ccigiptpie 2 of his teaching.

E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism. Catibhider; 1911: Article “ “Epictetus,” in Hastings, Enc. of Rel. VI, 323 ἢ.

R. Amine: Quaestiones Epicteteae. Freiburg i. B. 1888.

R. Bentley’ 5 eitient notes on Arrian’s “ Discourses of Epictetus” ; Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc. 1921, 53, 40-52 (by W. A. Oldfather).

A. Bonhéffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, Stuttgart, 190. Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet. Stuttgart, 1894. Epiktet und das Neue Testament. Giessen, 1911. “Epiktet und das Neue Testament,” Zeitschr. fiir die neutest, Wiss. 1912, 13, 281-92. These are incomparably the most important critical works on the subjects which they cover, and on many points have reached definitive conclusions.

R. Bultmann, Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe. Marburg, 1910. Das religidse Moment in der ethischen Unterweisung des Epiktets und das Neue Testament,” Zeitschr. Suir die neutest, Wiss. 1912, 13, 97 ff, 177 ff,

Th. Colardeau, Etude sur Epictéte. Paris; 1903.

F. W. Farrar, Seekers after God. London, 1863, and often reprinted.

H. Gomperz, Die Lebensauffassung der griechischen Philosophen und das Ideal der inneren Freiheit. Jena, 1904. P. 186, and especially 195 ff. 2nd ed. 1915.

O. Halbauer, De diatribis Epicteti. Leipzig, 1911.

K. Hartmann, “ Arrian und Epiktet,’ Neue Jahrb. 1905, 15, 248-75.

E. Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church. Sixth ed., London, 1897.

XXxiv

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fr. M. J. Lagrange, “La philosophie religieuse d@’Epic- téte, ete.” Revue Biblique, 1912, 91 ff. ; 192 ff.

W. 5. Landor, Imaginary Conversations of Greeks and Romans. London, 1853, and often reprinted. *« Epictetus and Seneca.”

J. Lipsius, Manuductio ad Sioicam philosophiam. 1. xix, pp. 62-64. ed. Antwerp, 1604. Vol. IV, p. 681 f., ed. Wesel, 1625.

C. Martha, Les moralistes sous [empire romain, phalo- sophes et poéies, Paris, 1865, and often re- printed.

J. B. Mayor, Rev. of H. Schenkl’s “ Epictetus,” Class. Rev., 1895, 9, 31-7.

P. E. H. Melcher, “De sermone Epicteteo quibus

, tebus ab Attica regula discedat,’ Diss. philol. Hallenses, 17, 1905.

G. Misch, Geschichte der Autobiographie. Leipzig and Berlin, 1907. Pp. 257-65.

P. E. More, Hellenistic Philosophies. Princeton, 1923. Epictetus, pp. 94-171.

R. Miicke, Zu Arrians und Epiktets Sprachgebrauch. Nordhausen, 1887.

B. Pascal, Eniretien avec de Saci sur Epictéte et Mon- taigne. First published in authentic form in M. Havet: Pensées de Pascal, Paris, 1852, and fre- quently since that time. For discussions of Pascal’s very interesting views see especially M. J. Guyau: Pascal, ete., Paris, 1815. C. A. Saint-Beuve: Port Royal, fitth edition. Paris, 1888 ff., Vol. 11. pp. 381 f F.Strowski: Histoire du sentiment religieux en France au xviii siécle, fourth edition. Paris, 1909.

R. Renner. Zu Epziktets Diatriben. Amberg, 1904. Das Kind. — Ein Gleichnismittel aes Epiktets Miinchen, 1905.

XXXV

BIBLIOGRAPHY

D. S. Sharp, Epictetus and the New Testament. Lon- don, 1914.

Rt. Rev. J. L. Spalding, Glimpses of Truth, with essays on Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Chicago, 1903. Third edition, 1913.

L. Stein, Die Psychologie der Stoa. Berlin, 1886, 1888.

J. Stuhrmann, De vocabulis notionum philosophicarum in Epicteti libris. Neustadt, 1885.

K. Vorlander, “Christliche Gedanken eines heid- nischen Philosophen,” Preuss. Jahrb., 1897, pp. 89, 193-222. t

Louis Weber, “ La morale d’Epictéte et les besoins présents de l’enseignement moral,’ Rev. de Metaph. et de Moral, six articles, 1905-1909.

U. von Wilamowitz-Méllendorff, “Die griechische

Literatur des Altertums,” in Kultur der

Gegenwart®, I. 8 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1912), 244.

Compare also the admirable statement in his

Griechisches Lesebuch, I. (Berlin, 1902), pp. 230-1.

Zahn, Der Stoker Epiktet und sein Verhiltnis zum

Christentum. Erlangen, 1894. Second edition,

Leipzig, 1895. The thesis, that Epictetus was

acquainted with the New Testament, has been

very generally rejected, but the address has value apart from that contention.

L. Zanta, La renaissance du stoicisme au xvi’ siécle. Paris, 1914. La traduction francaise du Manuel d’Epictéte d’André de Rivaudeau, etc. Paris, 1914.

E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III. 1 (Leipzig, 1909), 765-81; III. 2 (1902), 910-14,

Th.

-

There have been three notable translations into XXXVi

BIBLIOGRAPHY

English of Epictetus ; a vigorous and idiomatic repro- duction by Elizabeth Carter (1758, and often there- after), a learned and exact rendition by George Long (1877, and frequently reproduced), and a most fluent and graceful version by P. E. Matheson (1916). To all of these, but especially to the last mentioned, I have been indebted upon occasion.

XXXxvii

SYMBOLS

S = Cod. Bodleianus Misc. Graec. 251, s. xi/xii.

Sa, Sb, Sc, Sd = corrections of different periods, as discriminated by Schenkl.

5 = one or more copies of δ.

In general only the important deviations from 8 have been recorded in the apparatus criticus. All substantial emendations, when made by modern scholars, are recorded, but the obvious corrections made by Greek scholars themselves, either on 8 itself or in its numerous copies, have generally been passed over in silence, since the number of these is so large (for S is full of errors of all kinds) that they would seriously clutter up the page without adding anything important to our knowledge. For details of the MS. tradition the reader is referred to the elaborate apparatus in Schenkl’s second ed. (Leipzig, 1916), upon which the present text is dependent, although I have not hesitated to depart from his reading or his punctuation in a number of passages.

W. A. OLDFATHER, Urbana, Illinois. March 6, 1925.

XXXViii

OF EPICTETUS

POLAR TOT ALTARS

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APPIANOY TON EMIKTHTOY AIATPIBON ABTA?

A

KESAAAIA TOY A BIBAIOT

. Περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμὶν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. . Πῶς ἄν τις σῴζοι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐν παντί; . Πῶς ἄν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸν θεὸν πατέρα εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ

τὰ ἑξῆς ἐπέλθοι;

. Περὶ προκοπῆς.

. Πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Ακαδημαικούς.

. Περὶ προνοίας.

. Περὶ τῆς χρείας τῶν μεταπιπτόντων καὶ ὑποθετικῶν καὶ τῶν

ὁμοίων.

. Ὅτι αἱ δυνάμεις τοῖς ἀπανδεύτοις οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς. . Πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ συγγενεῖς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τῷ θεῷ ἐπέλθοι ἄν τις ἐπὶ

τὰ ἑξῆς;

. Πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τάς ἐν Ῥώμῃ mpoaywyas ἐσπουδακότας. . Περὶ φιλοστοργίας.

. Περὶ εὐαρεστήσεως.

΄, Πῶς ἕκαστα ἔστι ποιεῖν ἀρεστῶς θεοῖς ;

“Ori πάντας ἐφορᾷ τὸ θεῖον.

1 The whole title supplied by Schenk.

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

IN FOUR BOOKS

BOOK I

Chapters of-the First Book

Of the things which are under our control and not under our control.

How may a man preserve his proper character upon every occasion ?

From the thesis that God is the Father of man- kind, how may one proceed to the consequences ?

Of progress.

Against the Academics.

Of providence.

Of the use of equivocal premisses, hypothetical arguments, and the like.

That the reasoning faculties, in the case of the uneducated, are not free from error.

How from the thesis that we are akin to God may one proceed to the consequence ?

To those who have set their hearts upon prefer- ment at Rome.

Of family affection.

Of contentment.

How may each several thing be done acceptably to the gods?

That the Deity oversees all men.

bo

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ιε΄. Ti ἐπαγγέλλεται φιλοσοφία;

ix’. Περὶ προνοίας.

1". Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖα τὰ λογικά.

ιη΄. Ὅτι οὐ δεῖ χαλεπαίνειν τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις.

ιθ΄, Πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους ;

κ΄. Περὶ τοῦ λόγου πῶς αὑτοῦ θεωρητικός ἐστιν.

ka’, Πρὸς τοὺς θαυμάζεσθαι θέλοντας.

κβ΄. Περὶ τῶν προλήψεων.

κγ΄. Πρὸς ᾿Επίκουρον.

xd’, Πῶς πρὸς τὰς περιστάσεις ἀγωνιστέον ;

ke’. Πρὸς τὸ αὐτό.

Ks’. Τίς ὁ βιωτικὸς νόμος ;

κζ΄. Ποσαχῶς αἱ φαντασίαι γίνονται καὶ τίνα πρόχειρα πρὸς αὐτὰς βοηθήματα παρασκευαστέον ;

κη΄. Ὅτι οὐ δεῖ χαλεπαίνειν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τίνα τὰ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

κθ΄. Περὶ εὐσταθείας.

λ΄, Τί δεῖ πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς περιστάσεσιν ;

᾿Αρριανὸς Λουκίῳ Teddi χαίρειν

Οὔτε συνέγραψα ἐγὼ τοὺς ᾿Επικτήτου λόγους οὕτως ὅπως ἄν τις συγγράψειε τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε ἐξήνεγκα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αὐτός, ὅς γε οὐδὲ συγ- γράψαι φημί. ὅσα δὲ ἤκουον αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ταῦτα αὐτὰ ἐπειράθην αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν ws οἷόν τε ἦν γραψάμενος ὑπομνήματα εἰς ὕστερον ἐμαυτῷ διαφυλάξαι τῆς ἐκείνου διανοίας καὶ παρρησίας. ἔστι δὴ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ὁποῖα ἄν τις αὐτόθεν ὁρμηθεὶς εἴποι πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐχ ὁποῖα ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ ὕστερον ἐντυγχάνειν τινὰς αὐτοῖς συγγράφοι. τοιαῦτα δ᾽ ὄντα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως οὔτε ἑκόντος ἐμοῦ οὔτε εἰδότος ἐξέπεσεν εἰς

1 The contrast intended is between γράφω, ‘‘ write,” § 2, and συγγράφω, ‘‘ compose.” Arrian had in mind, no doubt, the works of Plato and Xenophon, which, although they pur- ported to reproduce the words of Socrates, were in fact highly finished literary compositions.

4

ee ee ee ee ee ee

BOOK I . What does philosophy profess ?

ΧΥ XVL Of providence. XVII. That the art of reasoning is indispensable.

XVII. That we ought not to be angry with the erring. XIX. How ought we to bear ourselves towards tyrants? XX. How foe the reasoning faculty contemplate itself? XXI. To those who would be admired. XXII. Of preconceptions. XXIIL._ In answer to Epicurus. XXIV. How should we struggle against difficulties ? XXV. Upon the same theme. XXVI. hat is the rule of life? XXVIL In how many ways do the external impressions arise, and what aids should we have ready at hand to meet them?

XXVIII. That we ought not to be with men; and what are the little things and the great among men?

XXIX. Of steadfastness.

XXX. What aid ought we have at hand in difficulties?

Arrian To Lucius GELtivus, greeting:

I Have not composed these Words of Epictetus as one might be said to “compose” books of this kind, nor have I of my own act published them to the world; indeed, I acknowledge that I have not “composed” them at allt. But whatever I heard him say I used to write down, word for word, as best I could, endeavouring to preserve it as a memorial, for my own future use, of his way of thinking and the frankness of his speech. They are, accordingly, as you might expect, such remarks as one man might make off-hand to another, not such as he would compose for men to read in after time. This being their character, they have fallen, I know not how, without my will or knowledge, into the hands

5

-

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀνθρώπους. ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοί ye ov πολὺς λόγος, εἰ οὐ

ἱκανὸς φανοῦμαι συγγράφειν, Emictynt@ τε οὐδ ὀλίγος, εἰ καταφρονήσει τις αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων, ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγων αὐτοὺς οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δῆλος ἣν ἐφιέμενος ὅτε μὴ κινῆσαι τὰς γνώμας τῶν ἀκου- όντων πρὸς τὰ βέλτιστα. εἰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτό γε αὐτὸ διαπράττοιντο οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι, ἔχοιεν ἂν οἶμαι ὅπερ χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγους" εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἴστωσαν οἱ ἐντυγ ἄνοντες ὅτι, αὐτὸς ὁπότε ἔλεγεν αὐτούς, ἀνάγκη ἣν τοῦτο πάσχειν τὸν ἀκροώμενον αὐτῶν ὅπερ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν παθεῖν ἠβούλετο. εἰ δ᾽ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοὶ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῶν τοῦτο οὐ διαπράττονται, τυχὸν μὲν ἐγὼ αἴτιος, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν. ἔρρωσο.

α΄. Ilept τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν

Τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσετε αὐτὴν αὑτῆς θεωρητικήν, οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ δοκιμαστικὴν ἢ ἀποδοκιμαστικήν. ἡ γραμματικὴ μέχρι τίνος κέκτηται τὸ θεωρητικόν ; μέχρι τοῦ διαγνῶναι τὰ γράμματα. ἡ μουσική ; μέχρι τοῦ διαγνῶναι τὸ μέλος. αὐτὴ οὖν “αὑτὴν θεωρεῖ τις αὐτῶν ; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε μέν, ἄν τι γράφῃς τῷ ἑταίρῳ, δεῖ τούτων τῶν γραπτέων, ἡ γραμματικὴ ἐρεῖ: πότερον δὲ γραπτέον τῷ ἑταίρῳ ἢ οὐ γραπτέον, ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐκ ἐρεῖ. καὶ περὶ τῶν μελῶν

1 δυνάμεις includes arts as well as faculties, and both are dealt with in this context.

6

BOCK I. τ 1-3

of men. Yet to me it is a matter of small concern if I shall be thought incapable of “composing’’ a work, and to Epictetus of no concern at all if anyone shall despise his words, seeing that even when he uttered them he was clearly aiming at nothing else but to incite the minds of his hearers to the best things. If, now, these words of his should produce that same effect, they would have, I think, just that success which the words of the philosophers ought to have; but if not, let those who read them be assured of this, that when Epictetus himself spoke them, the hearer could not help but feel exactly what Epictetus wanted him to feel. If, however, the words by themselves do not produce this effect, perhaps I am at fault, or else, perhaps, it cannot well be otherwise. Farewell.

CHAPTER I

Of the things which are under our control and not under our control

Amone the arts and faculties! in general you will find none that is self-contemplative, and therefore none that is either self-approving or self-disapproving. How far does the art of grammar possess the power of contemplation? Only so far as to pass judgement upon what is written. How far the art of music? Only so far as to pass judgement upon the melody. Does either of them, then, contemplate itself? Not at all. But if you are writing to a friend and are at a loss as to what to write, the art of grammar will tell you; yet whether or no you are to write to your friend at all, the art of grammar will not tell. The

7

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ε ΄ ε ͵ ͵ > ὦ , a AN ὡσαύτως ἡ μουσική: πότερον δ᾽ ἀστέον νῦν καὶ θ » > , » θ Ἔν, » κιθαριστέον ἢ οὔτε ἀστέον οὔτε κιθαριστέον οὐκ

lal - “ ‘ ἐρεῖ. τίς οὖν ἐρεῖ; ἡ καὶ αὑτὴν θεωροῦσα καὶ τἄλλα πάντα. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ tis; ἡ δύναμις ἡ / 4 ef ‘ ie he A, 4 λογική" μόνη yap αὕτη καὶ αὑτὴν κατανοήσουσα , / / > \ 7] 4 Ἀ παρείληπται, τίς τέ ἐστε καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πόσου ἀξία οὖσα ἐλήλυθεν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἅπά- ’ὔ σας. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τὸ λέγον ὅτε χρυσίον καλόν ἐστιν; αὐτὸ γὰρ οὐ λέγει. δῆλον ὅτε ἡ - / ”. χρηστικὴ δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις. τί ἄλλο \ , / \ Ν / TO μουσικήν, γραμματικήν, τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις διακρῖνον, δοκιμάξον τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν Kal τοὺς καιροὺς παραδεικνύον ; οὐδὲν ἄλλο. ad = 2 ΝΜ \ , ς ΄ Ὥσπερ οὖν ἣν ἄξιον, τὸ κράτιστον ἁπάντων ᾿ a « \ t 3.4}. Φ' δον , \ καὶ κυριεῦον οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν, τὴν a a a χρῆσιν τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. apd γε ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελον ; ἐγὼ μὲν fal a / δοκῶ ὅτι, εἰ ἠδύναντο, κἀκεῖνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπέ- \ fol Tpewav' ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐκ ἠδύναντο. ἐπὶ γῆς γὰρ ὄντας καὶ σώματι συνδεδεμένους τοιούτῳ καὶ a “ nr e \ κοινωνοῖς τοιούτοις πῶς οἷόν T ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐμποδίζεσθαι ; , ᾿Αλλὰ τί λέγει ὁ Leds; “᾿Εᾷπίκτητε, εἰ οἷόν [4 τε ἣν, καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον ἄν σου καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον

, “΄ ΄ ll ἐποίησα ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον. νῦν δέ, 8

BOOK I..1 3-11

same holds true of the art of music with regard to melodies; but whether you are at this moment to sing and play on the lyre, or neither sing nor play, it will not tell. What art or faculty, then, will tell? That one which contemplates both itself and every- thing else. And what is this? The reasoning faculty ; for this is the only one we have inherited which will take knowledge both of itself—what it is, and of what it is capable, and how valuable a gift it is to us—and likewise of all the other faculties. For what else is it that tells us gold is beautiful? For the gold itself does not tell us. Clearly it is the faculty which makes use of external impressions. What else judges with discernment the art of music, the art of grammar, the other arts and faculties, passing judgement upon their uses and pointing out the seasonable occasions for their use? Nothing else does,

As was fitting, therefore, the gods have put under our control only the most excellent faculty of all and that which dominates the rest, namely, the power to make correct use of external impressions, but all the others they have not put under our control. Was it indeed because they would not? I for one think that had they been able they would have entrusted us with the others also; but they were quite unable to do that. For since we are upon earth and trammelled by an earthy body and by earthy associates, how was it possible that, in respect of them, we should not be hampered by external things?

But what says Zeus? “Epictetus, had it been possible I should have made both this paltry body and this small estate of thine free and unhampered.

9

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

μή σε λανθανέτω, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν σόν, ἀλλὰ 12 πηλὸς κομψῶς πεφυραμένος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἠδυνάμην ἐδώκαμέν. σοι μέρος τι ἡμέτερον, τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τὴν ὁρμητικήν τε καὶ ἀφορ- μητικὴν καὶ ὀρεκτικήν τε καὶ ἐκκλιτικὴν καὶ ἁπλῶς τὴν χρηστικὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἧς ἐπι- μελούμενος καὶ ἐν ἧ τὰ σαυτοῦ τιθέμενος οὐδέποτε κωλυθήσῃ, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐμποδισθήσῃ, οὐ στενάξεις, 13 οὐ μέμψῃ, οὐ κολακεύσεις οὐδένα. τί οὖν; μή τι μικρά σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ; ἢ" “μὴ γένοιτο." “ἀρκῇ οὖν αὐτοῖς ;" “εὔχομαι δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς.᾿ Ι4 Νῦν δ᾽ ἑνὸς δυνάμενοι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἑνὶ προσηρτηκέναι ἑαυτοὺς μᾶλλον θέλομεν πολλῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς προσδεδέσθαι καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ κτήσει καὶ ἀδελφῷ καὶ φίχῳ καὶ 15 τέκνῳ καὶ δούλῳ. ἅτε οὖν πολλοῖς προσδεδε- μένοι βαρούμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ καθελκόμεθα. 16 διὰ τοῦτο, ἂν ἄπλοια ἦ, καθήμεθα σπώμενοι καὶ παρακύπτομεν συνεχῶς" “τίς ἄνεμος πνεῖ; βορέας. “τί ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτῷ; πότε ὁ ζέφυρος πνεύσει; "ἢ ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ. σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ταμίαν τῶν 17 ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἴολον. “τί οὗν ; ᾽ δεῖ τὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν βέλτιστα κατασκευάξειν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι ὡς πέφυκεν. “πῶς οὖν πέφυκεν ;” ὡς ἂν ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ. 18. “Ἐμὲ οὖν νῦν τραχηλοκοπεῖσθαι μόνον ; ες τί οὖν ; ἤθελες πάντας τραχηλοκοπηθῆναι, ἵνα σὺ 19 παραμυθίαν ἔ ἔχης ; οὐ θέλεις οὕτως ἐκτεῖναι τὸν τράχηλον, ὡς Λατερανός τις ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ κελευ-

1 Compare I. ii. 38. 2 The exact meaning of σπώμενοι is uncertain.

Io

BOOK Lt II-19

But as it is—let it not escape thee—this body is not thine own, but only clay cunningly compounded. Yet since I could not give thee this, we have given thee a certain portion of ourself, this faculty of choice and refusal, of desire and aversion, or, in a word, the faculty which makes use of external impressions ; if thou care for this and place all that thou hast therein, thou shalt never be thwarted, never hampered, shalt not groan, shalt not blame, shalt not flatter any man. What then? Are these things small in thy sight?” “Far be it from me!” * Art thou, then, content with them?” “I pray the Gods I may be.’’+

But now, although it is in our power to care for one thing only and devote ourselves to but one, we choose rather to care for many things, and to be tied fast to many, even to our body and our estate and brother and friend and child and slave. Where- fore, being tied fast to many things, we are burdened and dragged down by them. That is why, if the weather keeps us from sailing, we sit down and fidget? and keep constantly peering about. ‘* What wind is blowing?” we ask. Boreas. ‘‘ What have we to do with it? When will Zephyrus blow?”’ When it pleases, good sir, or rather when Aeolus pleases. For God has not made you steward of the winds,

but Aeolus. “What then?” We must make the

best of what is under our control, and take the rest as its nature is. ‘“‘ How, then, is its nature?”’ As God wills.

“Must I, then, be the only one to be beheaded now?” Why, did you want everybody to be be- headed for your consolation? Are you not willing to

3 Alluding to Homer, Odyssey, X. 21. It

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

σθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Νέρωνος ἀποκεφαλισθῆναι; : ἐκτείνας γὰρ τὸν τράχηλον καὶ πληγεὶς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πληγὴν ἀσθενῆ γενομένην ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον συνεὰλ- 20 κυσθεὶς πάλιν ἐξέτεινεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον προσελθόντι τις ᾿Επαφροδίτῳ τῷ ᾿ἀπελευθέρῳ τοῦ Νέρωνος καὶ ἀνακρίνοντι αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ συγκρουσθῆναι “Ἂν tt θέλω," φησίν, “ ἐρῶ σου τῷ κυρίῳ. ΟῚ, ὡς ἐν Τί οὖν δεῖ ; πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ; ; τί γὰρ ἄχλο ἢ τί ἐμὸν καὶ τί οὐκ ἐμὸν καὶ τί μοι 22 ἔξεστιν καὶ τί μοι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ; ἀποθανεῖν με δεῖ" μή τι οὖν καὶ στένοντα ; δεθῆναι" μή τι καὶ θρηνοῦντα ; φυγαδευθῆναι" “μή τις οὖν κωλύει γελῶντα καὶ εὐθυμοῦντα καὶ εὐροοῦντα ; “εἰπὲ 23 τὰ ἀπόρρητα. οὐ λέγω" τοῦτο yap ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί ἐστιν. “ ἀλλὰ δήσω σε. ἄνθρωπε, τί λέγεις ; ἐμέ; τὸ σκέλος μου δήσεις, τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ 24 οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ζεὺς νικῆσαι δύναται. “εἰς φυλακήν σε βαλῶ." τὸ σωμάτιον. “ ἀποκεφαλίσω σε. πότε οὖν σοι εἶπον, ὅτι μόνου ἐμοῦ ὁ τράχηλος ἀναπό- 25 τμητός ἐστιν; i ταῦτα ἔδει μελετᾶν τοὺς φιλο- σοφοῦντας, ταῦτα καθ᾽ ἡμέραν γράφειν, ἐν τούτοις γυμνάξεσθαι. 26 Θρασέας εἰώθει λέγειν “Σήμερον ἀναιρεθῆναι 27 θέλω μᾶλλον ἢ αὔριον φυγαδευθῆναι." τί οὖν αὐτῷ Ῥοῦφος εἶπεν ; x Ὁ μὲν ὡς βαρύτερον ἐκλέγῃ, τίς ἡ μωρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς ; ; εἰ δ᾽ ὡς κουφότερον, τίς σοι δέδωκεν ; οὐ θέλεις μελετᾶν ἡ ἀρκεῖσθαι τῷ δεδομένῳ ; ἢ

1 For all ordinary proper names the reader is referred to the Index.

2 The point of the retort lies in the defiance of the officious but all-powerful freedman.

12

; πῶ ee * rie DPT «ἘΠ ΥΩ

Seg οὐδ eS I ME EIT

BOOK I. & 19-27

stretch out your neck as did a certain Lateranus? at Rome, when Nero ordered him to be beheaded? For he stretched out his neck and received the blow, but, as it was a feeble one, he shrank back for an instant, and then stretched out his neck Yes, and before that, when Epaphroditus, a freedman of Nero, approached a certain man and asked about the ground of his offence, he answered, “If I wish anything, I will speak to your master.””?

“ What aid, then, must we have ready at hand in such circumstances?”” Why, what else than the knowledge of what is mine, and what is not mine, and what is permitted me, and what is not per- mitted me? I must die: must I, then, die groaning too? I must be fettered: and wailing too? I must go into exile: does anyone, then, keep me from going with a smile and cheerful and serene? “Tell your secrets.” I say not a word; for this is under my control. “ But I will fetter you.” What is that you say, man? fetter me? My leg you will fetter, but my moral purpose not even Zeus himself has power to overcome. “I will throw you into prison.” My paltry body, rather! ‘I will behead you.” Well, when did 1 ever tell you that mine was the only neck that could not be severed? These are the lessons that philosophers ought to rehearse, these they ought to write down daily, in these they ought to exercise themselves.

Thrasea used to say: “I would rather be killed to-day than banished to-morrow.” What, then, did Rufus say to him? “If you choose death as the heavier of two misfortunes, what folly of choice! But if as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Are you not willing to practise contentment with what has been given you?”

13

28

29

30

31

32

no =

i)

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Διὰ τοῦτο yap ᾿Αγριππῖνος τί ἔλεγεν ; ὅτι “᾿Ἐπὼ ἐμαυτῷ ἐμπόδιος οὐ γίνομαι." ἀπηγγέλη

ΓᾺΡ eee > , | ¢g? Pe es αὐτῷ ὅτι “ κρίνῃ ἐν συγκλήτῳ."--““᾿Αγαθῇ τύχῃ. ἀλλὰ ἦλθεν ἡ πέμπτη " (ταύτῃ δ᾽ εἰώθει γυμνα- σάμενος ψυχρολουτρεῖν)" ““ ἀπέλθωμεν καὶ γυ- μνασθῶμεν." γυμνασαμένῳ λέγει τις αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν 4 “ / ΕΣ] « a” ld «ἃ ὅτι “ Kataxéxpica. —“ Φυγῇ," φησίν, “ἢ θα-

/ ” “ce ay” ςς ε 4 , ” νάτῳ ;"-—“ Φυγῆ."--“ Τὰ ὑπάρχοντα th; —

» “Οὐκ ἀφῃρέθη.᾽--“ His ᾿Αρίκειαν οὖν ἀπελθόντες ᾽ “ “-“

ἀριστήσωμεν."--- Τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι μεμελετηκέναι ἃ δεῖ μελετᾶν, ὄρεξιν ἔκκλισιν ἀκώχλυτα ἀπερίπτωτα παρεσκευακέναι. ἀποθανεῖν με δεῖ. εἰ ἤδη, ἀπο- θνήσκω: κἂν} μετ᾽ ὀλίγον, νῦν ἀριστῷῶ τῆς ὥρας ἐλθούσης, εἶτα τότε τεθνήξομαι. πῶς ; ὡς προ- σήκει τὸν τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀποδιδόντα.

lal ΕΣ ‘ ‘ \ / > β΄. Πῶς ἂν τις σῴζοι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐν παντί; -“ -“ /

Τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ μόνον ἀφόρητόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλο- γον, τὸ δ᾽ εὔλογον φορητόν. πληγαὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀφόρητοι τῇ φύσει.--- Τἵνα τρόπον ;--Ὁρα ras"

’ n Λακεδαιμόνιοι μαστιγοῦνται μαθόντες ὅτι εὔλογόν > \ » » 7 > ΝΜ > , ἐστιν.---- Τὸ δ᾽ ἀπάγξασθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀφόρητον ;— ΓΙ lol / “ ΝΜ > Ν Οταν γοῦν πάθῃ τις ὅτι εὔλογον, ἀπελθὼν

1 ©. Schenkl: καὶ 3,

1 The idea seems to be: By disregarding externals I do not hinder the natural course of my mind and character, that is, my true self.

2 The word πρόσωπον carries something of the figurative meaning ‘‘réle” from the language of drama,

3 Referring to the scourging of Spartan youths before the altar of Artemis.

14

BOOK I. 1. 28-11. 3

|

Wherefore, what was it that Agrippinus used to

remark? “I am not standing in my own way.”} Word was brought him, “ Your case is being tried in the Senate.’”-—*“ Good luck betide! But it is the fifth hour now” (he was in the habit of taking his exercise and then a cold bath at that hour); “let us be off and take our exercise.” After he had finished his exercise someone came and told him, “You have been condemned.’—*“To exile,’ says he, “or to death?”—“To exile.”—“* What about my property?’’—*“It hes not been confiscated.” — ** Well then, let us go to Aricia and take our lunch there.” This is what it means to have rehearsed the lessons one. ought to rehearse, to have set desire and aversion free from every hindrance and made them proof against chance. I must die. If forthwith, I die; and if a little later, I will take lunch now, since the hour for lunch has come, and afterwards I will die at the appointed time. How? As becomes the man who is giving back that which was another's.

CHAPTER II

How may a man preserve his proper character® upon every occasion ?

To the rational being only the irrational is un- endurable, but the rational is endurable. Blows are not by nature unendurable-—How so?— Observe how: Lacedaemonians take a scourging * once they have learned that it is rational.—But is it not unendurable to be hanged ?>—Hardly ; at all events whenever a man feels that it is rational he goes and

15

.

we

10

ll

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀπήγξατο. ἁπλῶς ἐὰν προσέχωμεν, ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς οὕτως εὑρήσομεν τὸ ζῷον θλιβόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ πάλιν ἐπ᾽ οὐδὲν οὕτως ἑλκόμενον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ εὔλογον.

ἼΛλλῳ δ᾽ ἄλλο προσπίπτει τὸ εὔλογον καὶ ἄλογον, καθάπερ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο ἄλλῳ καὶ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον. διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα παιδείας δεόμεθα, ὥστε μαθεῖν τοῦ ev- λόγου καὶ ἀλόγου πρόληψιν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους" οὐσίαις ἐφαρμόζειν συμφώνως τῇ φύσει. εἰς δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὐλόγου καὶ ἀλόγου κρίσιν οὐ μόνον ταῖς τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίαις συγχρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος. τῷ γάρ τινι εὔλογον τὸ ἁμίδαν παρακρατεῖν αὐτὸ μόνον Bré- TOVTL, OTL μὴ παρακρατήσας μὲν πληγὰς λήψεται καὶ τροφὰς οὐ λήψεται, παρακρατήσας δ᾽ οὐ πείσεταί TL τραχὺ ἢ ἀνιαρόν: ἄλλῳ δέ τινι οὐ μόνον τὸ αὐτὸν παρακρατῆσαι ἀφόρητον δοκεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἄλλου παρακρατοῦντος ἀνασχέσθαι. ἂν οὖν μου πυνθάνῃ “ παρακρατήσω τὴν ἁμίδαν ἢ μή; ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι μείζονα ἀξίαν ἔχει τὸ λα- βεῖν τροφὰς τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν καὶ μείζονα ἀπαξίαν τὸ δαρῆναι τοῦ μὴ δαρῆναι: ὥστ᾽ εἰ τούτοις παραμετρεῖς τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἀπελθὼν παρακράτει. “ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν κατ᾽ ἐμέ." τοῦτο σὲ δεῖ συνεις- φέρειν εἰς τὴν σκέψιν, οὐκ ἐμέ. σὺ yap εἶ ὁ σαυτὸν εἰδώς, πόσου ἄξιος εἶ σεαυτῷ καὶ πόσου σεαυτὸν πιπράσκεις: ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλων πιπράσκουσιν.

Wolf: μέρος 8.

16

EN IEE I Ἢ

Prana ny ἢ Caer ρον

BOOK I. a. 3-11

hangs himself. In short, if we observe, we shall find mankind distressed by nothing so much as by the irrational, and again attracted to nothing so much as to the rational.

Now it so happens that the rational and the irrational are different for different persons, pre- cisely as good and evil, and the profitable and the unprofitable, are different for different persons. It is for this reason especially that we need education, so as to learn how, in conformity with nature, to adapt to specific instances our preconceived idea of what is rational and what is irrational. But for determining the rational and the irrational, we employ not only our estimates of the value of external things, but also the criterion of that which is in keeping with one’s own character. For to one man it is reasonable to hold a chamber-pot for another, since he considers only that, if he does not hold it, he will get a beating and will not get food, whereas, if he does hold it, nothing harsh or painful will be done to him; but some other man feels that it is not merely unendurable to hold such a pot him- self, but even to tolerate another's doing so. If you ask me, then, “Shall I hold the pot or not?” I will tell you that to get food is of greater value than not to get it, and to be flayed is of greater detriment than not to be; so that if you measure your interests by these standards, go and hold the pot. “Yes, but it would be unworthy of me.” That is an additional consideration, which you, and not I, must introduce into the question. For you are the one that knows yourself, how much you are worth in your own eyes and at what price you sell yourself. For different men sell themselves at different prices.

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Διὰ τοῦτο ᾿Αγριππῖνος Φλώρῳ σκεπτομένῳ, aA > > , εἰ καταβατέον αὐτῷ ἐστιν eis Νέρωνος Oewpias, » “ ‘ S inf, a » “ ΄ ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν τι λειτουργῆσαι, ἔφη “ Κατά- > J a βηθι." πυθομένου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ “ Διὰ ti σὺ οὐ κατα- βαίνεις ;” ἔφη ὅτι “᾿Εγὼ οὐδὲ βουλεύομαι." ὁ γὰρ ἅπαξ εἰς τὴν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σκέψιν καὶ \ fal Tas τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίας συγκαθεὶς καὶ ψηφίξων 4 fal ἐγγύς ἐστι τῶν ἐπιλελησμένων τοῦ ἰδίου προ- σώπου. τί γάρ μου πυνθάνῃ; “θάνατος αἱρε- , , > x LSet. | 7 7 e / a τώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ζωή ;" λέγω ζωή. “πόνος ἢ 55 / »” / 55 Ns oc. sak. | \ ὃ & ἡδονὴ; λέγω noovn. “ἀλλά, ἂν μὴ τραγῳδήσω, τραχηλοκοπηθήσομαι." ἄπελθε τοίνυν καὶ τρα- γῴδει, ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐ τραγῳδήσω. “διὰ τί; ὅτι σὺ σεαυτὸν ἡγῇ μίαν τινὰ εἶναι κρόκην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χιτῶνος. τί οὖν; σὲ ἔδει φροντίζειν πῶς ἂν a ’ > ὅμοιος! ἧς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ οὐδ ἡ κρόκη πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κρόκας θέλει τι ἔχειν ἐξαίρετον. ἐγὼ δὲ πορφύρα εἶναι βούλομαι, τὸ ὀλίγον ἐκεῖνο καὶ στιλπνὸν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον τοῦ εὐπρεπῆ φαίνεσθαι καὶ καλά. τί οὖν μοι a an_y? rn λέγεις ὅτε “ ἐξομοιώθητι τοῖς πολλοῖς"; Kal πῶς ἔτι πορφύρα ἔσομαι ; a « Ταῦτα εἶδεν καὶ IIpicxos ᾿Ελουίδιος καὶ ἰδὼν ἐποίησε. προσπέμψαντος αὐτῷ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ, ἵνα ᾽ μὴ εἰσέλθῃ εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον, ἀπεκρίνατο “Εἰπὶ a , σοί ἐστι μὴ ἐᾶσαί με εἶναι συγκλητικόν" μέχρι LA . a ayes LL RP > Sees: δὲ ἂν ὦ, δεῖ με εἰσέρχεσθαι. ἄγε ἀλλ᾽ εἰσ-

1 ἀνόμοιος Schenkl, after Blass.

1 This was clearly the contribution to Nero’s festival which Florus was expected to make.

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BOOK IL. tm. 12-20

Wherefore, when Florus was debating whether he should enter Nero’s festival, so as to make some personal contribution to it, Agrippinus said to him, “Enter.” And when Florus asked, “Why do you not enter yourself?” he replied, “I? why, I do not even raise the question.” For when a man once stoops to the consideration of such questions, I mean to estimating the value of externals, and calculates them one by one, he comes very close to those who have forgotten their own proper character. Come, what is this you ask me? “Is death or life preferable?”’ I answer, life. “Pain or pleasure?” I answer, pleasure. “ But unless I take a part in the tragedy! I shall be beheaded.” Go, then, and take a part, but I will not take a part. “Why not?” Because you regard yourself as but a single thread of all that go to make up the gar- ment. What follows, then? This, that you ought to take thought how you may resemble all other men, precisely as even the single thread wants to have no point of superiority in comparison with the other threads. But J want to be the red,” that small and brilliant portion which causes the rest to appear comely and beautiful. Why, then, do you say to me, “ Be like the majority of people?” And if I do that, how shall I any longer be the red?

This is what Helvidius Priscus also saw, and, having seen, did. When Vespasian sent him word not to attend a meeting of the Senate, he answered, “It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the Senate, but so long as I am one I must attend its meetings.” “Very well then, but

3 The reference is to the band of bright red (commonly called ‘‘ purple ”) woven into the hem of the toga praetexta.

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εχθών," φησίν, “ σιώπησον.᾽ “μή p ἐξέταζε καὶ n > ᾿ ἢ σιωπήσω. “ἀλλὰ δεῖ με ἐξετάσαι. “κἀμὲ -“ > εἰπεῖν TO φαινόμενον δίκαιον." “ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν εἴπῃς, > a et τ κά ay By - Ψ sae ἀποκτενῶ σε. πότε οὖν σοι εἶπον, OTL ἀθά- νατός εἰμι; καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ποιήσεις κἀγὼ τὸ ἐμόν. σόν ἐστιν ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐμὸν ἀποθανεῖν μὴ vA Ν “ > \ ᾿ - ‘ τρέμοντα: σὸν φυγαδεῦσαι, ἐμὸν ἐξελθεῖν μὴ - Ψ λυπούμενον." τί οὖν ὠφέλησε Πρῖσκος εἷς ὧν ; “ ΝΜ τί δ᾽ ὠφελεῖ ἡ πορφύρα τὸ ἱμάτιον ; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ax ΄ 2) > A ε 4 ad ” ἢ διαπρέπει ἐν αὐτῷ ws πορφύρα Kal τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ καλὸν παράδειγμα ἔκκειται; ἄλλος δ᾽ ἂν εἰπόντος αὐτῷ Καίσαρος ἐν τοιαύτῃ περιστάσει Lo θ a > ͵΄ 3 Pree ΄ “ μὴ ἐλθεῖν εἰς σύγκλητον εἶπεν “᾿ἔχω χάριν, OTL / ” \ -“ 507 x > , > μου φείδῃ." τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐκώλυεν εἰσ- ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδει, ὅτι ἢ καθεδεῖται ὡς κεράμιον ἢ λέγων ἐρεῖ, ἃ οἷδεν ὅτι ὁ Καῖσαρ θέλει, καὶ προσεπισωρεύσει ἔτι πλείονα. Τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ἀθλητής τις κινδυνεύων ἀποθανεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἀπεκόπη τὸ αἰδοῖον, ἐπελθόντος na fol “-“ a / αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ (ἣν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνος φιλόσοφος) καὶ εἰπόντος “ ἄγε, ἀδελφέ, τί μέλλεις ποιεῖν ; ἀπο- κόπτομεν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ ἔτι εἰς γυμνάσιον > προερχόμεθα ;” οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγκαρτερήσας ἀπέθανεν. πυθομένου δέ τινος" Πῶς τοῦτο ἐποί- ΄ c > ησεν ; ws ἀθλητὴς ἢ ws φιλόσοφος ; ‘Os! ἀνήρ, , \ ἔφη, ἀνὴρ δ᾽ ᾿Οολύμπια κεκηρυγμένος Kal ἠγωνισ-

1 Added by 8. 20

9 (i συν Pe Ξον ριυ“ τι τίσ

“συ νον τὰν νυν Δ ΑΡ ῊΑ Ν

1} BOOK I. 1. 20-26

when you attend, hold your peace.” ‘Do not ask for my opinion and I will hold my peace.” “But I must ask for your opinion.” “And I must answer what seems to me right.” ‘But if you speak, I shaJl put you to death.” “Well, when did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your part and I mine. It is yours to put me to death, mine to die without 4 tremor; yours to banish, mine to leave without sorrow.’’ What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single individual? And what good does the red do the mantle? What else than that it stands out conspicuous in it as red, and is displayed as a goodly example to the rest? But had Caesar told another man in such circumstances not to attend the meetings of the Senate, he would have said, “I thank you for excusing me.” A man like that Caesar would not even have tried to keep from attending, but would have known that he would either sit like a jug, or, if he spoke, would say what he knew Caesar wanted said, and would pile up any amount more on the top of it.

In like manner also a certain athlete acted, who was in danger of dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother (and he was a philosopher) came to him and said, “ Well, brother, what are you going to do? Are we going to cut off this member, and step forth once more into the gym- nasium?” He would not submit, but hardened his heart and died. And as someone asked, “‘ How did he do this? As an athlete, or as a philosopher?” As a man, replied Epictetus ; and as a man who had been proclaimed at the Olympic games and had striven in them, who had been at home in such

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μένος, ἐν τοιαύτῃ τινὶ χώρᾳ ἀνεστραμμένος, οὐχὶ παρὰ τῷ Βάτωνι! ἀλειφόμενος. ἄλλος δὲ κἂν τὸν τράχηλον ἀπετμήθη, εἰ Sip ἠδύνατο δίχα τοῦ τρα- χήλου. τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον' οὕτως ἰσχυρὸν παρὰ" τοῖς εἰθισμένοις. αὐτὸ συνεισφέρειν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσιν. “ἄγε οὖν, ᾿Επίκτητε, διαξύρησαι." ἂν ὦ φιλόσοφος, λέγω, “οὐ διαξυ- ρῶμαι." “ “ἀλλ᾽ ἀφελῶ σου τὸν τράχηλον." εἰ σοὶ ἄμεινον, ἄφελε.

᾿Επύθετό τις" Πόθεν οὖν αἰσθησόμεθα τοῦ κατὰ

πρόσωπον ἕκαστος ;---ἰ]όθεν δ᾽ ὁ ταῦρος, ἔφη, λέοντος ἐπελθόντος μόνος αἰσθάνεται τῆς αὑτοῦ παρασκευῆς καὶ προβέβληκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀγέλης πάσης; ἢ δῆλον ὅ ὅτι εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἔχειν ἀπαντᾷ καὶ συναίσθησις αὐτῆς; καὶ ἡμῶν τοίνυν ὅστις ἂν ἔχῃ τοιαύτην παρα- σκευήν, οὐκ ἀγνοήσει αὐτήν. ἄφνω δὲ ταῦρος οὐ γίνεται οὐδὲ γενναῖος ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ χειμασκῆσαι, “παρασκευάσασθαι καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ προσπηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα.

Μόνον σκέψαι, πόσου πωλεῖς τὴν σεαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν. ἄνθρωπε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, μὴ ὀλίγου αὐτὴν πωλήσῃς. τὸ δὲ μέγα καὶ ἐξαίρετον ἄλλοις τάχα “προσήκει, Σωκράτει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις .--- Διὰ τί οὖν, εἰ πρὸς τοῦτο πεφύκαμεν, οὐ πάντες

1 Scaliger: βάτωι S.

1 Bato seems to have been a well-known athletic trainer of the time. At least one, and possibly two gladiators at Rome bore this name. 0.1.1. I. 718, VI. 10188.

® Philosophers, especially Stoics and Cynics, regularly wore beards in antiquity. See I. 16, 9 ff.

22

BOOK I. π. 26-34

places, and had not merely been rubbed down with oil in Bato’s! wrestling school. But another would have had even his neck cut off, if he could have lived without his neck. This is what we mean by

for one’s proper character; and such is its strength with those who in their deliberations habitually make it a personal contribution, “Come then, Epictetus, shave off your beard.”? If Iam a philosopher, I answer, “ I will not shave it off.” “ But I will take off your neck.” If that will do you any good, take it off.

Someone inquired, “‘ How, then, shall each of us become aware of what is appropriate to his own proper character?’’ How comes it, replied he, that when the lion charges, the bull alone is aware of his own prowess and rushes forward to defend the whole herd? Or is it clear that with the possession of the prowess comes immediately the consciousness of it also? And so, among us too, whoever has such prowess will not be unaware of it. Yet a bull does not become a bull all at once, any more than a man becomes noble, but a man must undergo a winter training? he must prepare himself and must not plunge recklessly into what is inappropriate for

im.

Only consider at what price you sell your freedom of will. If you must sell it, man, at least do not sell it cheap. But the great and pre-eminent deed, perhaps, befits others, Socrates and men of his stamp.—Why then, pray, if we are endowed by nature for such

3 Ancient armies generally disbanded or went into permanent quarters during the winter. To continue military training throughout the winter months was indic- ative of a sincere and strenuous endeavour.

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἤ πολλοὶ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι ;--Ἵπποι yap ὠκεῖς ἅπαντες γίνονται, κύνες γὰρ ἰχνευτικοὶ πάντες ; τί οὖν ; ἐπειδὴ ἀφυής εἰμι, ἀποστῶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τούτου ἕνεκα; μὴ γένοιτο. ᾿Επίκτητος κρείσ- σων Σωκράτους οὐκ ἔσται" εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ χείρων, τοῦτό μοι ἱκανόν ἐστιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τοῦ σώματος" οὐδὲ Κροῖσος καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τῆς κτήσεως" οὐδ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἄλλου τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας διὰ τὴν cope saw τῶν ἄκρων ἐπ see tag

, a ΝΜ b \ n Ν \ / “. γ΄. Πῶς dv τις ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸν θεὸν πατέρα εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἐπέλθοι;

Ei τίς τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθῆσαι κατ᾽ ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως καὶ ὁ θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν T ᾽ ΄ A ~ nr 2 oe > > A ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οἶμαι ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀγεννὲς

OX \ > / ee a > ? οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. ἀλλ

a , ἂν μὲν Καῖσαρ εἰσποιήσηταί σε, οὐδείς σου τὴν 5 r / x δὲ fol oe an \ ey ὀφρῦν βαστάσει: ἂν δὲ γνῷς, ὅτε τοῦ Διὸς vids s > > / “ 3 > nr > > el, οὐκ ἐπαρθήσῃ; viv δ᾽ ov ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ ἐπειδὴ δύο ταῦτα ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡμῶν ἐγκατα- lal \ fol

μέμικται, TO σῶμα μὲν κοινὸν πρὸς τὰ ζῷα, ὁ λόγος δὲ καὶ ἡ γνώμη κοινὸν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ” \ > \ ΄ > / \

ἄλλοι μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀποκλίνουσιν τὴν συγ-

a ’

γένειαν τὴν ἀτυχῆ καὶ νεκράν, ὀλίγοι δέ τινες ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν καὶ μακαρίαν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν

24

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BOOK I. π΄ 34-11. 4

greatness, do not all men, or many, become like him ? - What, do all We te become pee all dogs

keen to follow the scent? What then? Because I _ have no natural gifts, shall I on that account give up

my discipline? Far be it from me! Epictetus will not be better than Socrates; but if only I am not worse, that suffices me. For I shall not be a Milo, either, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property ; nor, in a word, is there any other field in which we give up the appropriate discipline merely from despair of attaining the highest.

CHAPTER III

From the thesis that God is the father of mankind how may one proceed to the consequences ?

Ir a man could only subscribe heart and soul, as he ought, to this doctrine, that we are all primarily begotten of God, and that God is the father of men

_ as well as of gods, I think that he will entertain no

ignoble or mean thought about himself. Yet, if Caesar adopts you no one will be able to endure your conceit, but if you know that you are a son of Zeus, will you not be elated? As it is, however, we are not, but inasmuch as these two elements were comingled in our begetting, on the one hand the body, which we have in common with the brutes, and, on the other, reason and intelligence, which we

_ have in common with the gods, some of us incline

toward the former relationship, which is unblessed by fortune and is mortal, and only a few toward that

_which is divine and blessed. Since, then, it is inevit-

VOL. 1.- ς ἔς

σ:

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀνάγκη πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν οὕτως ἑκάστῳ χρῆσθαι ὡς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβῃ, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οἱ ὀλίγοι, ὅσοι πρὸς πίστιν οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς αἰδῶ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαν- τασιῶν, οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννὲς ἐνθυμοῦνται περὶ αὑτῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τἀναντία. “Ti γὰρ εἰμί; ταλαίπωρον ἀνθρωπάριον ᾽" καὶ “τὰ δύστηνά μου σαρκίδια." τῷ μὲν ὄντι δύστηνα, ἀλλὰ ἔχεις τι καὶ κρεῖσσον τῶν σαρκιδίων. τί οὖν ἀφεὶς ἐκεῖνο τούτοις προστέτηκας ;

Διὰ ταύτην τὴν συγγένειαν οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι καὶ BraBepol, οἱ δὲ λέουσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι, οἱ πλείους δ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες καὶ ὡς ἐν ζῴοις ἀτυχήματα. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο λοί- δορος καὶ κακοήθης ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἀλώπηξ ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀτυχέστερον καὶ ταπεινότερον ; ὁρᾶτε οὖν καὶ προσέχετε, μή TL τούτων ἀποβῆτε τῶν ἀτυ-

χημάτων. δ΄, Περὶ προκοπῆς ὋὉ προκόπτων μεμαθηκὼς παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὄρεξις ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἔκκλισις πρὸς κακά, μεμαθηκὼς δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως TO εὔρουν καὶ ἀπαθὲς περιγίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἐν ὀρέξει μὲν μὴ ἀποτυγχώνοντι, ἐν ἐκκλίσει δὲ

1 Sd: καλὰ S.

1 The characteristic moral achievement which the Stoics sought. The metaphor in the first expression, τὸ εὔρουν, is admirably rendered by Seneca, Zpist. 120. 11, beata vita, secundo defluens cursu.

26 ὺ

BOOK I. mt. 4-1v. 1

able that every man, whoever he be, should deal with each thing according to the opinion which he forms about it, these few, who think that by their birth they are called to fidelity, to self-respect, and to unerring judgement in the use of external impressions, cherish no mean or ignoble thoughts about them- selves, whereas the multitude do quite the oppo- site. “For what am ὃ A miserable, paltry man,” say they, and, “Lo, my wretched, paltry flesh!” Wretched indeed, but you have also something better than your paltry flesh. Why then abandon that and cleave to this?

It is because of this kinship with the flesh that those of us who incline toward it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and hurtful, and others like lions, wild and savage and untamed ; but most of us become foxes, that is to say, rascals of the animal kingdom. For what else is a slanderous and malicious man but a fox, or something even more rascally and degraded? Take heed, there- fore, and beware that you become not one of these

rascally creatures,

CHAPTER IV

Of progress

He who is making progress, having learned of the ἡ philosophers that desire is for things good and aversion is toward things evil, and having also learned that serenity and calm! are not attained by a man save as he succeeds in securing the objects of desire and as he avoids encountering the objects of

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

4 / \ ἈΝ ν Φ > J -" μὴ περιπίπτοντι, τὴν μὲν ὄρεξιν ἦρκεν ἐξ αὑτοῦ > ’ a 1 e 4 -“ > , δὲ a ie εἰσάπαν ἢ ὑπερτέθειται, TH ἐκκλίσει προς μόνα χρῆται τὰ προαιρετικά. τῶν γὰρ ἀπροαιρέ- , a , των ἄν τι ἐκκλίνῃ, oldev OTL περιπεσεῖταί ποτέ \ a τινι Tapa τὴν ἔκκλισιν THY αὑτοῦ Kal δυστυχήσει. 8. ER Φὼν \ 4 4 \ 2 , > εἰ δ᾽ ἡ ἀρετὴ ταύτην ἔχει THY ἐπαγγελίαν evdat- μονίαν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπάθειαν καὶ εὔροιαν, πάντως : \ καὶ ἡ προκοπὴ ἡ πρὸς αὐτὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον τού- Ν ἃ , των ἐστὶ προκοπή. ἀεὶ yap πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἡ τελειότης Ν τινὸς καθάπαξ ἄγῃ, πρὸς αὐτὸ ἡ προκοπὴ συνεγ- γισμός ἐστιν. Πῶς οὖν τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν τοιοῦτόν TL ὁμολο- ca) > -“ γοῦμεν, τὴν προκοπὴν δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλοις ζητοῦμεν καὶ ἐπιδείκνυμεν ; τί ἔργον ἀρετῆς ; εὔροια. τίς οὖν προκόπτει; ὃ πολλὰς Χρυσίππου συντάξεις a , ἀνεγνωκώς ; μὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστε Χρυσίπ- fal € Tov νενοηκέναι; εἰ yap TOUT ἔστιν, ὁμολογου- μένως ἡ προκοπὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ πολλὰ. = ,ὕ “ “ > ” , A τῶν Χρυσίππου νοεῖν. viv δ᾽ ἄλλο μέν τι τὴν lal Ν ἀρετὴν ἐπιφέρειν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸν συν- , εγγισμόν, τὴν προκοπήν, aTopatvouev. “ οὗτος," , “cc "ὃ \ ὃ ? ε κ ὃ / 6 4 φησίν, ““ἤδη καὶ δι' αὑτοῦ δύναται Χρύσιππον 4 ’ ἀναγιγνώσκειν." εὖ, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, προκόπτεις, ἄνθρωπε: ποίαν προκοπήν. “τί ἐμπαίξζεις αὐτῷ ; τί δ᾽ ἀπάγεις αὐτὸν τῆς συναισθήσεως τῶν αὑτοῦ a Lal lol Net oe an κακῶν ; ov θέλεις δεῖξαι αὐτῷ TO ἔργον τῆς ape-

1 Koraes: καὶ 3.

28

BOOK IL. ry. 1-10

aversion—such a one has utterly excluded desire from himself, or else deferred it to another time, and feels aversion only toward the things which involve freedom of choice. For if he avoids anything that is not a matter of free choice, he knows that some time he will encounter something in spite of his aversion to it, and will come to grief. Now if it is virtue that holds out the promise thus to create happiness and calm and serenity, then assuredly progress toward virtue is progress toward each of these states of mind. For it is always true that whatsoever the goal toward which perfection in anything definitely leads, progress is an approach thereto.

How comes it, then, that we acknowledge virtue to be a thing of this sort, and yet seek progress and make a display of it in other things? What is the work? of virtue? Serenity. Who, then, is making progress? The man who has read many treatises of Chrysippus? What, is virtue no more than this—to have gained a knowledge of Chrysippus? For if it is this, progress is confessedly nothing else than a knowledge of many of the works of Chrysippus. But now, while acknowledging that virtue produces one thing, we are declaring that the approach to virtue, which is progress, produces something else. ** So-and-so,”” says someone, “is already able to read Chrysippus all by himself.” It is fine headway, by the gods, that youare making, man! Great progress this! “Why do you mock him? And why do you try to divert him from the consciousness of his own shortcomings? Are you not willing to show him the

1 See the Encheiridion, 11. 2: ‘‘ But for the present totally

make way with desire.” 2 i.e, the result at which virtue aims.

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τῆς, ἵνα μάθῃ ποῦ τὴν προκοπὴν ξητῇ ; ἐκεῖ ζήτησον αὐτήν, ταλαίπωρε, ὅπου σου τὸ ἔργον. ποῦ δέ σου τὸ ἔργον ; ἐν ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, ἵν᾽ ἀναπότευκτος ἧς καὶ ἀπερίπτωτος, ἐν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἀφορμαῖς, ἵν᾽ ἀναμάρτητος, ἐν προσθέσει καὶ ἐποχῇ, ἵν ἀνεξαπάτητος. | πρῶτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πρῶτοι τόποι καὶ ἀναγκαιότατοι. ἂν δὲ τρέμων καὶ πενθῶν ζητῇς ἀπερίπτωτος εἶναι, ἄρα πῶς προκόπτεις ;

Σὺ οὖν ἐνταῦθά μοι δεῖξόν σου τὴν προκοπήν. καθάπερ εἰ ἀθλητῇ διελεγόμην “ δεῖξόν μοι τοὺς ὦμους," εἶτα ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος “ἴδε μου τοὺς ἀλ- τῆρας." ἄπιθι σὺ καὶ οἱ ἁλτῆρες, ἐγὼ τὸ ἀπο- τέλεσμα τῶν ἁλτήρων ἰδεῖν βούλομαι. “ λάβε τὴν περὶ ὁρμῆς σύνταξιν καὶ γνῶθι πῶς αὐτὴν ἀνέγνω- ka. ἀνδράποδον, οὐ τοῦτο ζητῶ, ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁρμᾷς καὶ ἀφορμᾷς, πῶς ὀρέγῃ καὶ ἐκκλίνεις, πῶς ἐπιβάλ- An? καὶ προτίθεσαι καὶ παρασκευάζῃ, πότερα συμφώνως τῇ φύσει ἢ ἀσυμφώνως. εἰ γὰρ συμ- φώνως, τοῦτό μοι δείκνυε καὶ ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι προ- κόπτεις. εἰ δ᾽ ἀσυμφώνως, ἄπελθε καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐξηγοῦ τὰ βιβλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφε αὐτὸς τοι-

1 ἄπιθι (οὗ, ἄπελθε ὃ 15) Capps: ὄψει 3. 2 Schweighauser: ἐπιβάλλεις 5. 5. Salmasius and Upton’s ‘codex’: προστίθεσαι S.

1 These are the three spheres or fields (τόποι) of human activity, inclination, choice, and intellectual assent, upon which the Stoics laid great stress. For a fuller discussion see below III. 2, 1 ff.

3 Broad-jumpers in antiquity carried weights which on being thrust backwards while the jumper was in mid-air seem to have added materially to the distance covered.

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BOOK I. tv. ro-15

work of virtue, that he may learn where to look for his progress?” Look for it there, wretch, where your work lies. And where is your work ἢ In desire and aversion, that you may not miss what you desire and encounter what you would avoid; in choice and in refusal, that you may commit no fault therein; in giving and withholding assent of judgement, that you may not be deceived.! But first come the first and most necessary points. Yet if you are in a state of fear and grief when you seek to be proof against encountering what you would avoid, how, pray, are you making progress?

Do you yourself show me, therefore, your own progress in matters like the following. Suppose, for example, that in talking to an athlete I said, “Show me your shoulders,’ and then he answered, “ Look at my jumping-weights.”2 Go to, you and your jumping-weights! What I want to see is the effect of the jumping-weights. “Take the treatise Upon Choice * and see how I have mastered it.’ It is not that | am looking into, you slave, but how you act in your choices and refusals, your desires and aversions, how you go at things, and apply yourself to them, and prepare yourself, whether you are acting in harmony with nature therein, or out of harmony with it. For if you are acting in harmony, show me that, and I will tell you that you are making progress; but if out of harmony, begone, and do not confine yourself to expounding your books, but go and write These same weights were also used like our dumb-bells for

the development of the arm and trunk muscles, as is apparently the case here. * The title, apparently, of a short work by Chrysippus, but

known only from this passage. Zeno and Cleanthes wrote also on the subject.

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“ / αῦτα. καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος ; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὅλον \ ,ὔ ΄ , Φ yy} τὸ βιβλίον πέντε δηναρίων ἐστίν ; ὁ οὖν ἐξηγού- a / μενος αὐτὸ δοκεῖ ὅτι πλείονος ἄξιός ἐστιν ἢ πέντε / δηναρίων ; μηδέποτε οὖν ἀλλαχοῦ τὸ ἔργον ζη- τεῖτε, ἀλλαχοῦ τὴν προκοπήν. Ποῦ οὖν προκοπή; εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀποστὰς τῶν Ν \ / a ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ THY προαίρεσιν ἐπέστραπται τὴν αὑτοῦ, ’ 3 / > ° [2 4 ταύτην ἐξεργάζεσθαι καὶ ἐκπονεῖν, ὥστε σύμ- φωνον ἀποτελέσαι τῇ φύσει, ὑψηλὴν ἐλευθέραν / ἀκώλυτον ἀνεμπόδιστον πιστὴν αἰδήμονα: με- μάθηκέν τε, ὅτε ὁ τὰ μὴ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ ποθῶν ἢ φεύγων οὔτε πιστὸς εἶναι δύναται οὔτ᾽ ἐλεύθερος, > > ? ΄ / \ 4 ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη μεταπίπτειν καὶ μεταρριπίζεσθαι e ? / > 4 > 4 \ ἅμα ἐκείνοις καὶ αὐτόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ὑποτετα- lA Υ ¢ / “-“ > n a aA χέναι ἄλλοις ἑαυτόν, τοῖς ἐκεῖνα περιποιεῖν ἢ ͵ / \ Ν σ΄ > 4 κωλύειν δυναμένοις" Kal λοιπὸν ἕωθεν ἀνιστάμενος fa lal \ / ΄ ες w e ταῦτα τηρεῖ Kal φυλάσσει, λούεται ὡς πιστός, ὡς >? 7 > / ε 4 > \ a > lA αἰδήμων ἐσθίει, ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τῆς ἀεὶ παραπιπτού- σης ὕλης τὰ προηγούμενα ἐκπονῶν, ὡς ὁ δρομεὺς a / δρομικῶς καὶ ὁ φώνασκος φωνασκικῶς: οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ προκόπτων ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ ὁ μὴ εἰκῇ » \ eld > 2 - et ΞΟ Ὶ ») > a ἀποδεδημηκὼς οὗτός ἐστιν. εἰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ THY ἐν τοῖς ’ὔ “ / \ 4 > -" Ν βιβλίοις ἕξιν τέταται καὶ ταύτην ἐκπονεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐκδεδήμηκε, λέγω αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν πο- ρεύεσθαι εἰς οἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀμελεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ" τοῦτο 32

BOOK I. wv. 15-23

some of the same kind yourself. And what will you gain thereby? Do you not know that the whole book costs only five denarii? Is the expounder of it, then, think you, worth more than five denarii? And so never look for your work in one place and your progress in another.

Where, then, is progress? If any man among you, withdrawing from. external things, has turned his attention to the question of his own moral purpose, cultivating and perfecting it so as to make it finally harmonious with nature, elevated, free, unhindered, untrammelled, faithful, and honourable ; and if he has learned that he who craves or shuns the things that are not under his control can be neither faithful nor free, but must himself of necessity be changed and tossed to and fro with them, and must end by subordinating himself to others, those, namely, who are able to procure or prevent these things that he craves or shuns; and if, finally, when he rises in the morning he proceeds to keep and observe all this that he has learned; if he bathes as a faithful man, eats as a self-respecting man,— similarly, whatever the subject matter may be with which he has to deal, putting into practice his guiding principles, as the runner does when he applies the principles of running, and the voice- trainer when he applies the principles of voice- training,—this is the man who in all truth is making progress, and the man who has not travelled at random is this one. But if he has striven merely to attain the state which he finds in his books and works only at that, and has made that the goal of his travels, I bid him go home at once and not neglect his concerns there, since the goal to which

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yap ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἀποδεδήμηκεν οὐδέν ἐστιν" ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, μελετᾶν ἐξελεῖν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου πένθη καὶ οἰμωγὰς ΕΥ ἈΝ 1 77 ” ” \ ἂν ἐδ in é \ 99 ὶ ὃ καὶ TO? “ οἴμοι" καὶ τὸ “ τάλας ἐγὼ" καὶ δυστυ- χίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν καὶ μαθεῖν, τί ἐστι θάνατος, τί φυγή, τί δεσμωτήριον, τί κώνειον, ἵνα δύνηται λέγειν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ “ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω," καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖνα “τάλας ἐγώ, γέρων ἄνθρωπος, ἐπὶ ταῦτά μου τὰς πολιὰς ἐτήρησα." τίς λέγει ταῦτα ; δοκεῖτε ὅτι a a / ὑμῖν ἄδοξόν twa ἐρῶ καὶ ταπεινόν ; Πρίαμος αὐτὰ οὐ λέγει; Οἰδίπους οὐ λέγει ; ἀλλ᾽ ὁπόσοι βασιλεῖς λέγουσιν ; τί γάρ εἰσιν ἄλλο τραγῳδίαι ἢ ἀνθρώπων πάθη τεθαυμακότων τὰ ἐκτὸς διὰ μέτρου τοιοῦδ᾽ ἐπιδεικνύμενα ; εἰ γὰρ ἐξαπατη- θέντα τινὰ ἔδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς Kal? ἀπρο- , ὑδέ > \ € cal > \ x » αἱρέτων οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον εὐρόως καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ὄψεσθ᾽ αὐτοὶ τί θέλετε. Te = econ / / cc 7 a ” i οὖν ἡμῖν παρέχει Χρύσιππος ; “ἵνα γνῷς, ’ὔ “ Lid > δῇ nr ‘ > > Φ € φησίν, “ὅτι ov ψευδῆ ταῦτα ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ εὔροιά ἐστι καὶ ἀπάθεια ἀπαντᾷ, λάβε μου τὰ βιβλία καὶ ps ἀκολουθά 8 b σύμ- γνωσῃ ὡς ἀκολουθάϑ τε καὶ σύμ φωνά ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὰ ἀπαθῆ με ποιοῦντα." ὦ μεγάλης εὐτυχίας, ὦ μεγάλου εὐεργέτου τοῦ δεικνύοντος τὴν ὁδόν. εἶτα Τριπτολέμῳ μὲν ἱερὰ

1 Added by Schweighauser. 2 Supplied by Upton. 5 Supplied by Schenkl.

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BOOK I. rv. 23-30

he has travelled is nothing; but not so that other goal—to study how a man may rid his life of sorrows and lamentations, and of such cries as ‘* Woe is me!” and “Wretch that I am!” and of mis- fortune and failure, and to learn the meaning of death, exile, prison, hemlock ;+ that he may be able to say in prison, “ Dear Crito, if so it pleases the gods, so be it,” 5 rather than, “ Alas, poor me, an old man, it is for this that I have kept my grey hairs!” Who says such things? Do you think that I will name you some man held in small esteem and of low degree? Does not Priam say it? Does not Oedipus? Nay more, all kings say it! For what are tragedies but the portrayal in tragic verse of the sufferings of men who have admired things external? If indeed one had to be deceived* into learning that among things external and independent of our free choice none concerns us, I, for my part, should consent to a deception which would result in my living thereafter serenely and without turmoil ; but as for you, you will yourselves see to your own preference.

What, then, does Chrysippus furnish us? ‘“ That you may know,” he says, “that these things are not false from which serenity arises and tranquillity comes to us, take my books and you shall know how conformable and harmonious with nature are the things which render me tranquil.” O the great good fortune! O the great benefactor who points the way! To Triptolemus, indeed, all men have

1 The poison with which Socrates was put to death.

5 Plato, Crito, 43d.

* Probably by witnessing tragedies, the plots of which, although fictitious, may teach moral lessons.

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\ \ καὶ βωμοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἀνεστάκασιν, ὅτι , A a a \ Tas ἡμέρους τροφὰς ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν, τῷ δὲ τὴν > 7 7 \ , > yelp ἀλήθειαν εὑρόντι καὶ φωτίσαντι καὶ εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐξενεγκόντι, οὐ τὴν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ \ Ν ν ha “ / « fal 9X & 7 x τὴν πρὸς TO εὖ ζῆν, Tis ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ βωμὸν ἱδρύσατο ἢ ναὸν ἢ ἄγαλμα ἀνέθηκεν ἢ τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσκυνεῖ; GAN ὅτε μὲν ἄμπέλον gS x 4 > tA 4 σ΄ Ἁ ἔδωκαν ἢ πυρούς, ἐπιθύομεν τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι δὲ “ > , \ > > 7 ΄ τοιοῦτον ἐξήνεγκαν καρπὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ, δι’ οὗ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας δείξειν ἡμῖν ἤμελλον, τούτου δ᾽ ἕνεκα οὐκ εὐχαριστή-

σωμεν τῷ θεῷ;

ε΄. Πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Ακαδημαικούς

“ , ΜΡ \ \ v > Av τις, φησίν, ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν éx- φανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥᾷδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν λόγον, δι’ οὗ μεταπείσει τις αὐτόν. τοῦτο δ᾽ οὔτε παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γίνεται δύναμιν οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ / ve / > 7 Ψ > \ > διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἀπαχθεὶς ἀπο- σι a 7 a \ λιθωθῇ, πῶς ἔτι χρήσηταί τις αὐτῷ διὰ λόγου ;

1 The phrase is from Plato, Crito, 48 Β.

2 Referring probably to the mind of Chrysippus.

3 See also II. 20. 4. Epictetus condemns the exaggerations of the Academic principle of suspended judgement, which

36

BOOK L. vw. 30-v. 2

established shrines and altars, because he gave us as food the fruits of cultivation, but to him who has discovered, and brought to light, and imparted to all men the truth which deals, not with mere life, but with a good life,~—who among you has for that set up an altar in his honour, or dedicated a temple or a statue, or bows down to God in gratitude for him? But because the gods have given us the vine or wheat, for that do we make sacrifice, and yet because they have brought forth such a fruit in a human mind,? whereby they purposed to show us the truth touching happiness, shall we fail to render thanks unto God for this?

CHAPTER V Against the Academics*

Ir a man, says Epictetus, resists truths that are all too evident, in opposing him it is not easy to find an argument by which one may cause him to change his opinion. The reason for this is neither the man's ability nor the teacher's weakness; nay, when a man who has been trapped in an argument hardens to stone, how shall one any longer deal with him by argument?

was based on the doctrine that nothing could be actually known. Cf. Cicero Acad. I. 45: Arcesilas (a prominent Academic) negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset . . . sic omnia latere in occullo: neque esse quidguam quod cerni aut intellegi posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione approbare, etc.

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~1

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

᾿Απολιθώσεις δ᾽ εἰσὶ διτταί: ἡ μὲν τοῦ von- τικοῦ ἀπολίθωσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐντρεπτικοῦ, ὅταν τις παρατεταγμένος ἦ μὴ ἐπινεύειν τοῖς ἐναργέσι μηδ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων ἀφίστασθαι. οἱ δὲ \ \ \ \ > 4 πολλοὶ THY μὲν σωματικὴν ἀπονέκρωσιν φοβού- μεθα καὶ πάντ᾽ ἂν μηχανησαίμεθα ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ περιπεσεῖν τοιούτῳ τινί, τῆς Ψυχῆς δ᾽ ἀπονεκρου- / OX ¢ a / X 7 > A μένης οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει. καὶ νὴ Δία ἐπὶ αὐτῆς a fol “ τῆς ψυχῆς ἂν μὲν ἦ οὕτως διακείμενος, ὥστε δενὶ 1 θεῖν μηδὲ é δέ ὶ μηδενὶ ; παρακολουθεῖν μηδὲ συνιέναι μηδέν, καὶ τοῦτον κακῶς ἔχειν οἰόμεθα: ἂν δέ τινος τὸ ἐν- τρεπτικὸν καὶ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν. Καταλαμβάνεις ὅτι ἐγρήγορας ; “ov,” φησίν' «,δθλχ aE > a of ͵ “ οὐδὲ γάρ, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις φαντάζωμαι, ὅτι > t ” 2OX 3 7 LA Ξε , ἐγρήγορα." οὐδὲν οὖν διαφέρει αὕτη ἡ φαντασία $e RIOT Oe ΄ ΄ \ ἐκείνης ; οὐδέν" ἔτι τούτῳ διαλέγομαι; καὶ ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον σίδηρον προσαγάγω, ἵν᾽ αἴσθηται ὅτι νενέκρωται ; αἰσθανόμενος οὐ προσποιεῖται" ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ. μάχην οὗτος οὐ συνορᾷ' κακῶς ἔχει. συνορῶν οὗτος οὐ κινεῖται οὐδὲ προκόπτει: ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον ἔχει. ἐκτέτμηται τὸ αἰδῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ \ Ν > > , > > > θ τὸ λογικὸν οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, ἀλλ ἀποτεθη- ρίωται. ταύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν εἴπω ; μὴ γένοιτο, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῶν κιναίδων, καθ᾽ ἣν πᾶν τὸ 3 \ > ὕ \ a ,ὔ ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι.

1 Salmasius: μηδὲν J. 38

BOOK I. v. 3-10

Now there are two kinds of petrifaction: one is the petrifaction of the intellect, the other of the sense of shame, whena man stands in array, prepared neither to assent to manifest truths nor to leave the fighting line. Most of us dread the deadening of the body and would resort to all means so as to avoid falling into such a state, but about the deadening of the soul we care not at all. Indeed, by Zeus, even in the case of the soul itself, if a man be in such a state that he cannot follow an argument step by step, or even understand one, we regard him too as being in a bad way; but ifa man’s sense of shame and self- respect be deadened, this we go so far as to call strength of character!

Do your senses tell you that you are awake? “ No,” he answers, ‘“‘ any more than they do when in dreams | have the impression that I am awake.” Is there, then, no difference between these two impressions? “None.” Can I argue with this man any longer? And what cautery or lancet shall I apply to him, to make him realize that he is deadened? He does realize it, but pretends that he does not; he is even worse than a corpse. One man does not notice the contradiction—he is in a bad way; another man notices it, indeed, but is not moved and does not improve—he is in a still worse state. His self-respect and sense of shame have been lopped off, and his reasoning faculty has been—I will not say cut away, but brutalized. Am I to call this strength of character? Far from it, unless I am so to describe the strength that lewd fellows have, which enables them to say sone in public anything that comes into their

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ς΄. Περὶ προνοίας 1 Ad’ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων

ς

ῥᾷάδιόν ἐστιν ἐγκωμιάσαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, ἂν δύο »

ἔχῃ τις ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ, δύναμίν τε συνορατικὴν

2 τῶν γεγονότων ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ εὐχάριστον. εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ὄψεται τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ εὐχαριστήσει ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐδ᾽

3 ἂν tidy. χρώματα ὁ θεὸς ex? πεποιήκει, δύνα- μιν δὲ θεατικὴν. αὐτῶν μὴ πεποιήκει, τί. ἂν ἢ ἦν

4 ὄφελος ;--Οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν..--- ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν εἰ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν πεποιήκει, τὰ ὄντα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα οἷα ὑ ὑποπίπτειν τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ὁρατικῇ, καὶ οὕτως

5 τί ὄφελος ;--Οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν. 3. Τί δ᾽, εἰ καὶ ,ἀμφό-

6 τερα ταῦτα πεποιήκει, φῶς δὲ μὴ “πεποιήκει ;-- Οὐδ᾽ οὕτως τι dpedos.—Tis οὖν ὁ sees τοῦτο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κἀκεῖνο πρὸς τοῦτο; τίς μόσας τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸ κολεὸν καὶ τὸ χὴν πρὸς

7 τὴν πάχαιραν ; οὐδείς; καὶ μὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς κατασκευῆς τῶν ἐπιτετελεσμένων ἀποφαίνεσθαι εἰώθαμεν, ὅτι τεχνίτου τινὸς πάντως τὸ ἔργον, οὐχὶ δ᾽ εἰκῇ κατεσκευασμένον.

8 “Ap οὖν τούτων μὲν ἕκαστον ἐμφαίνει τὸν τεχνίτην, τὰ δ᾽ ὁρατὰ καὶ ὅρασις καὶ φῶς οὐκ ἐμφαίνει ; τὸ δ᾽ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ ἡ προ- θυμία ἡ ἡ πρὸς τὴν συνουσίαν ἑκατέρου καὶ δύναμες ἡ χρηστικὴ τοῖς μορίοις τοῖς κατεσκευασμένοις οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐμφαινει τὸν τεχνίτην ; ; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα

10 μὲν οὕτω" ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη τῆς διανοίας κατασκευή, 1 Added by Meineke (εἰδῇ Stobaeus). 2 Stobaeus: an erasure in 3.

3 Here follows in S an erasure of about 110 letters. 4 Stobaeus: omitted by S.

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BOOK I. vi. 1-10

CHAPTER VI Of providence

From everything that happens in the universe it is easy for a man to find occasion to praise providence, if he has within himself these two qualities: the faculty of taking a comprehensive view of what has happened in each individual instance, and the sense of gratitude. Otherwise, one man will not see the usefulness of what has happened, and another, even if he does see it, will not be grateful therefor. If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of seeing them, of what good had it been ?—None at all —But, conversely, if He had made the faculty, but in making objects, had made them incapable of falling under the faculty of vision, in that case also of what good had it been?—None at all.—What then, if He had even made both of these, but had not made light ?—-Even thus it would have been of no use.—Whao is it, then, that has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword ? No one? Assuredly from the very structure of all made objects we are accustomed to prove that the work is certainly the product of some artificer, and has not been constructed at random.

Does, then, every such work reveal its artificer, but do visible objects and vision and light not reveal him? And the male and the female, and the passion of each for intercourse with the other, and the faculty which makes use of the organs which have been con- structed for this purpose, do these things not reveal their artificer either ? Well, admit it for these things ; but the marvellous constitution of the intellect

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καθ᾽ ἣν οὐχ ἁπλῶς brorimtovtes! τοῖς αἰσθη- τοῖς τυπούμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκλαμβάνο- μέν τι καὶ ἀφαιροῦμεν καὶ προστίθεμεν καὶ συντίθεμεν τάδε τινὰ δι’ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία μετα- βαίνομεν ar ἄλλων ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα Twa? οὕτω πως παρακείμενα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ κινῆσαί τινας καὶ διατρέψαι πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην ; ἢ ἐξηγησάσθωσαν ἡμῖν τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἐστιν ἕκα- στον τούτων ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε τὰ οὕτω θαυμαστὰ καὶ τεχνικὰ εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι. Τί οὖν ; ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν μόνων γίνεται ταῦτα ; πολλὰ μὲν ἐπὶ μόνων, ὧν ἐξαιρέτως χρείαν εἶχεν τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον, πολλὰ δὲ κοινὰ εὑρήσεις ἡμῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα. ap οὖν καὶ παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς γινομένοις ἐκεῖνα; οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι χρῆσις καὶ ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. ἐκείνων χρείαν εἶχεν ὁ θεὸς χρωμένων ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἡμῶν δὲ παρακολουθούντων τῇ χρήσει. διὰ τοῦτο ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ὀχεύειν καὶ τἄλλ᾽ ὅσα ἐπιτελεῖ τῶν αὑτῶν ἕκαστον, ἡμῖν δ᾽, οἷς καὶ τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν, οὐκέτι ταῦτ᾽ ἀπαρκεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν μὴ κατὰ τρόπον καὶ τεταγμένως καὶ ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑκάστου φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ πράττωμεν, οὐκέτι τοῦ τέλους τευξόμεθα τοῦ ἑαυτῶν. ὧν γὰρ αἱ κατασκευαὶ διάφοροι, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ τέλη. οὗ τοίνυν ἡ κατασκευὴ μόνον χρηστική, τούτῳ χρῆ-ς

1 Meineke: ἐπιπίπτοντες 8,

2 Schenkl: τὰ 5,

42

BOOK I. vi. 10-17

whereby, when we meet with sensible objects, we do not merely have their forms impressed upon us, but also make a selection from among them, and subtract and add, and make these various combina- tions by using them, yes, and, by Zeus, pass from some things to certain others which are in a manner related to them—is not even all this sufficient to stir our friends and induce them not to leave the artificer out of account? Else let them explain to us what it is that produces each of these results, or how it is possible that objects so wonderful and so workmanlike should come into being at random and spontaneously.

What then? Is it in the case of man alone that these things oceur? You will, indeed, find many things in man only, things of which the rational animal had a peculiar need, but you will also find many

by us in common with the irrational animals. Dotheyalso,then,understand what happens? No! for use is one thing, and understanding another. God had need of the animals in that they make use of external impressions, and of usin that we understand the use of external impressions. And so for them it is sufficient to eat and drink and rest and procreate, and whatever else of the things within their own province the animals severally do; while for us, to whom He has made the additional gift of the faculty of understanding, these things are no longer sufficient, but unless we act appropriately, and methodically, and in conformity each with his own nature and constitution, we shall no longer achieve our own ends. For of beings whose constitutions are different, the works and the ends are likewise different. So for the being whose constitution is adapted to use

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σθαι ὁπωσοῦν ἀπαρκεῖ: οὗ δὲ καὶ παρακολουθη- τικὴ τῇ χρήσει, τούτῳ τὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν μὴ προσῇ οὐδέποτε τεύξεται τοῦ τέλους. τί οὗν; éxeivwv ἕκαστον κατασκευάζει τὸ μὲν ὥστ᾽ ἐσθίεσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ὥστε ὑπηρετεῖν εἰς γεωργίαν, τὸ δ᾽ ὥστε τυρὸν φέρειν, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῃ χρείᾳ παραπλησίῳ, πρὸς ἃ τίς χρεία τοῦ παρακολου- θεῖν ταῖς φαντασίαις καὶ ταύτας διακρίνειν δύ- νασθαι; τὸν 8 ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον θεατήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν. διὰ τοῦτο αἰσχρόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ κατα- λήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔνθεν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δὲ ἐφ᾽ ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις. κατέληξεν δ᾽ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν καὶ παρακολούθησιν καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν τῇ φύσει. ὁρᾶτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέατοι τούτων ἀπο- θάνητε.

"AAN εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν μὲν ἀποδημεῖτε, tv’ ἴδητε τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Φειδίου, καὶ ἀτύχημα ἕκαστος ὑμῶν οἴεται τὸ ἀνιστόρητος τούτων ἀποθανεῖν: ὅπου δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀποδημῆσαι χρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἤδη καὶ πάρεστιν τοῖς ἔργοις, ταῦτα δὲ θεάσασθαι καὶ κατανοῆσαι οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσετε; οὐκ αἰσθήσεσθε τοΐνυν, οὔτε τίνες ἐστὲ οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τί γεγόνατε οὔτε τί τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐφ᾽ οὗ τὴν θέαν παρείληφθε ;--- ᾿Αλλὰ γίνεταί τινα ἀηδῆ καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ.----ν ᾿Ολυμπίᾳ δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται; οὐ καυμα- τίζεσθε; οὐ στενοχωρεῖσθε; οὐ κακῶς λούεσθε;

1 Schweighiuser: εἰδῆτε S.

44

᾿ BOOK I. νι. 17-26

only, mere use is sufficient, but where a being has also the faculty of understanding the use, unless the principle of propriety be added, he will never attain hisend. Whatthen? Each of the animals God con- stitutes, one to be eaten, another to serve in farming, another to produce cheese, and yet another for some other similar use ; to perform these functions what need have they to understand external impressions and to be able to differentiate between them? But God has brought man into the world to be a spectator of Himself and of His works, and not merely a

tor, but also an interpreter. Wherefore, it is shameful for man to begin and end just where the irrational animals do; he should rather begin where they do, but end where nature has ended in dealing with us. Now she did not end until she reached contemplation and understanding and a manner of life harmonious with nature. Take heed, therefore, lest you die without ever having been spectators of these things.

But you travel to Olympia to behold the work 1 of Pheidias, and each of you regards it as a misfortune to die without seeing such sights; yet when there is no need to-travel at all, but where Zeus is already, and is present in his works, will you not yearn to behold these works and know them? Will you decline, therefore, to perceive either who you are, or for what you have been born, or what that purpose is for which you have received sight?—But some un- pleasant and hard things happen in life——And do they not happen at Olympia? Do you not swelter? Are you not cramped and crowded? Do you not

1 The famous gold and ivory statue of Zeus. 45

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ov καταβρέχεσθε, ὅταν βρέχῃ ; θορύβου δὲ καὶ βοῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χαλεπῶν οὐκ ἀπολαύετε; ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ἀντιτιθέντες πρὸς τὸ ἀξιόλογον τῆς θέας φέρετε καὶ ἀνέχεσθε. ἄγε δυνάμεις δ᾽ οὐκ εἰλήφατε, καθ᾽ ἃς οἴσετε πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον ; μεγαλοψυχίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; ἀν- δρείαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; καρτερίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; καὶ τί ἔτε μοι μέλει μεγαλοψύχῳ ὄντι τῶν ἀπο- βῆναι δυναμένων ; τί μ᾽ ἐκστήσει ἢ ταράξει ἢ τί ὀδυνηρὸν φανεῖται; οὐ χρήσομαι τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς ἃ εἴληφα αὐτήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποβαίνουσιν πενθήσω καὶ στενάξω ;

“Nai: ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσιν." τίνος οὖν ἕνεκα χεῖρας ἔχεις, ἀνδράποδον ; οὐχ ἵνα καὶ ἀπομύσσῃς σεαυτόν ;—Todto οὖν εὔλογον μύξας γίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ;--ΚΚαὶ πόσῳ κρεῖττον

. ἀπομύξασθαί σε ἢ ἐγκαλεῖν ; ἢ τί οἴει ὅτε ὁ

33

34

Ἡρακλῆς ἂν ἀπέβη, εἰ μὴ λέων τοιοῦτος ἐγένετο \ “ Ν Ν \ -“ νΝ VA καὶ ὕδρα καὶ ἔλαφος καὶ σῦς καὶ ἄδικοί τινες ἄνθρωποι καὶ θηριώδεις, ods ἐκεῖνος ἐξήλαυνεν καὶ ἐκάθαιρεν ; καὶ τί ἂν ἐποίει μηδενὸς τοιού- του γεγονότος ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντετυλιγμένος ἂν ἐκάθευδεν ; οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο c cal > nr ΄ e ld / Ηρακλῆς ἐν τρυφῇ τοιαύτῃ καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ νυστάζων cA XA / > > »” \ > / 7 ες ὅλον τὸν βίον" εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο, τί ὄφελος αὐτοῦ ; τίς δὲ χρῆσις τῶν βραχιόνων τῶν ἐκεί- νου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀλκῆς καὶ καρτερίας καὶ γενναιότητος, εἰ μὴ τοιαῦταί τινες αὐτὸν περι- στάσεις καὶ ὗλαι διέσεισαν καὶ ἐγύμνασαν ; τί

46

BOOK I. vi. 26-35

bathe with discomfort? Are you not drenched when- ever it rains? Do you not have your fill of tumult and shouting and other annoyances? But I fancy that you hear and endure all this by balancing it off against the memorable character of the spectacle. Come, have you not received faculties that enable you to bear whatever happens? Have you not received magnanimity? Have you not received courage? Have you not received endurance? And what care I longer for anything that may happen, if I be magnanimous? What shall perturb me, or trouble me, or seem grievous to me? Shall I fail to use my faculty to that end for which I have received it, but grieve and lament over events that occur?

“ Yes, but my nose is running.’ What have you hands for, then, slave? [5 it not that you may wipe yournose? “Is it reasonable, then, that there should be running noses in the world?”—And how much better it would be for you to wipe your nose than to find fault! Or what do you think Heracles would have amounted to, if there had not been a lion like the one which he encountered, and a hydra, and a stag, and a boar, and wicked and brutal men, whom he made it his business to drive out and clear away ? And what would he have been doing had nothing of the sort existed? Is it not clear that he would have rolled himself upin a blanket andslept? In the first place, then, he would never have become Heracles by slumbering away his whole life in such luxury and ease; but even if he had, of what good would he ‘have been? What would have been the use of those arms of his and of his prowess in general, and his steadfastness and nobility, had not such circumstances and occasions roused and exercised him? What

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2 a οὖν ; αὑτῷ ταύτας ἔδει κατασκευάζειν καὶ ζητεῖν ποθεν λέοντα εἰσαγαγεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ σῦν καὶ ὕδραν ; μωρία τοῦτο καὶ ’ , μανία. γενόμενα δὲ καὶ εὑρεθέντα εὔχρηστα ἦν πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι καὶ γυμνάσαι τὸν Ἡρακλέα. "Aye οὖν καὶ σὺ τούτων αἰσθόμενος ἀπόβλεψον > \ ὃ 4 a Ψ \ 2 δὰ > X κε eis τὰς δυνάμεις ἃς ἔχεις καὶ ἀπιδὼν εἰπὲ “ φέρε lel Φ a / / Μ νῦν, ὦ Ζεῦ, ἣν θέλεις περίστασιν: ἔχω γὰρ \ > nr / 4 > παρασκευὴν ἐκ σοῦ μοι δεδομένην καὶ ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὸ κοσμῆσαι διὰ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐμαυ- ΄ » Ν > \ / \ \ \ lol TOV. ov ἀλλὰ κάθησθε τὰ μὲν μὴ συμβῇ τρέ- μοντες, τῶν δὲ συμβαινόντων ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες" εἶτα τοῖς θεοῖς ἐγκα- λεῖτε. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο ἀκόλουθον τῇ τοιαύτῃ BJ , a \ > / / “ ἈΝ » ἀγεννείᾳ ἢ καὶ ἀσέβεια ; καίτοι ὅ γε θεὸς ov μόνον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, καθ᾽ ἃς οἴσομεν πᾶν τὸ ἀποβαῖνον μὴ ταπεινούμενοι μηδὲ e > > rn > 7A > cal συγκλώμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἦν ἀγαθοῦ βασι- λέως καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πατρός, ἀκώλυτον τοῦτο ἔδωκεν, ἀνανάγκαστον, ἀπαραπόδιστον, ὅλον αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐποίησεν οὐδ᾽ αὑτῷ τινα πρὸς τοῦτο ἰσχὺν ἀπολιπών, ὥστε κωλῦσαι ἢ ἐμπο- a / Sica. ταῦτα ἔχοντες ἐλεύθερα καὶ ὑμέτερα μὴ a > “- > > / / > ¢ χρῆσθε αὐτοῖς μηδ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθε τίνα εἰλήφατε καὶ παρὰ τίνος, ἀλλὰ κάθησθε πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες οἱ μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν δόντα ἀποτε- \ / τυφλωμένοι μηδ᾽ ἐπιγινώσκοντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, \ > ἊΨ οἱ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀγεννείας εἰς μέμψεις καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα

43 τῷ θεῷ ἐκτρεπόμενοι. καίτοι πρὸς μεγαλοψυ-

48

BOOK I. vi. 35-43

then? Ought he to have prepared these for himself, and sought to bring a lion into his own country from somewhere or other, and a boar, and a hydra? This would have been folly and madness. But since they did exist and were found in the world, they were serviceable as a means of revealing and exercising our Heracles.

Come then, do you also, now that you are aware of these things, contemplate the faculties which you have, and, after contemplating, say: “Bring now, O Zeus, what difficulty Thou wilt; for I have an equipment given to me by Thee, and resources wherewith to distinguish myself by making use of the things that come to pass.” But no, you sit trembling for fear something will happen, and lamenting, and grieving, and groaning about other things that are happening. And then you blame the gods! For what else can be the consequence of so ignoble a spirit but sheer impiety? And yet God has not merely given us these faculties, to enable us to bear all that happens without being degraded or crushed thereby, but—as became a good king and in very truth a father—He has given them to us free from all restraint, compulsion, hindrance ; He has put the whole matter under our control without reserving even for Himself any power to prevent or hinder. Although you have these facul- ties free and entirely your own, you do not use them, nor do you realize what gifts you have received, and from whom, but you sit sorrowing and groaning, some of you blinded toward the giver himself and not even acknowledging your benefactor, and others, —such is their ignoble spirit—turning aside to fault-finding and complaints against God. And yet,

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χίαν μὲν καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐ ἐγὼ σοὶ δείξω ὅ ὅτε ἀφορμὰς καὶ παρασκευὴν ἔχεις, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέμφεσθαι καὶ ἐγκαλεῖν ποίας ἀφορμὰς ἔχεις σὺ δ᾽ ἐμοὶ δείκνυε.

a / lal ζ΄. Περὶ τῆς χρείας τῶν μεταπιπτόντων Kal lal -“ € ὑποθετικῶν καὶ TOV ὁμοίων

« \ \ , ΄ » ν 1 Ἡ περὶ τοὺς μεταπίπτοντας καὶ ὑποθετικούς, ἔτι δὲ τῷ ἠρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντας καὶ πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους πραγματεία λαν- θάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς ' περὶ καθήκοντος οὖσα. 2 ξητοῦμεν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης πῶς ἂν eb por? ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν διέξοδον. καὶ ἀναστροφὴν 8 τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ καθήκουσαν. οὐκοῦν ἢ τοῦτο λεγέ- τωσαν, ὅτι οὐ συγκαθήσει εἰς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἢ ὅτι συγκαθεὶς οὐκ ἐπιμελήσεται τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ μηδ᾽ ὡς ἔτυ ev ἐν 4 ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἢ 2 τού- των μηδέτερον προσδεχομένοις ἀναγκαῖον ὁμολο- γεῖν, ὅτε ἐπίσκεψίν τινα ποιητέον τῶν τόπων τούτων, περὶ ods μάλιστα στρέφεται ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις. 5 Τί γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται ἐν χλόγῳ; τἀληθῆ τι-

ι Meibom : εὐροοῖ S. 2 Schenkl: μὴ S.

1 With the Stoics, whose sole standard of judgement in problems of conduct was the appeal to reason, the proper training of the reasoning faculties was an indispensable pre- requisite to the good life. Three modes of sophistical reasoning are here differentiated. ‘‘ Equivocal premisses ”

5°

BOOK I. νι. 43-vn. 5

though I can show you that you have resources and endowment for magnanimity and courage, do you, pray, show me what resources you have to justify faultfinding and complaining!

CHAPTER VII

Of the use of equivocal premisses, hypothetical arguments and the like

Most men are unaware that the handling of argu- ments which involve equivocal and hypothetical pre- misses, and, further, of those which derive syllogisms by the process of interrogation, and, in general, the handling of all such arguments, has a bearing upon the duties of life. For our aim in every matter of inquiry is to learn how the good and excellent man may find the appropriate course through it and the appropriate way of conducting himself init. Let them say, then, either that the good man will not enter the contest of question and answer, or that, once he has entered, he will be at no pains to avoid con- ducting himself carelessly and at haphazard in question and answer ; or else, if they accept neither of these alternatives, they must admit that some investigation should be made of those topics with which question and answer are principally concerned.

For what is the professed object of reasoning?

(μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι) are those that contain ambiguities in terms which are intended to mean one thing at one step in. the argument, another at another. ‘‘ Hypothetical pre- misses ” involve assumptions, or conditions. The last class proceeds by drawing unexpected conclusions from the answers to questions.

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/ fol θέναι, τὰ ψευδῆ αἴρειν, πρὸς ra ἄδηλα ἐπέχειν. 6 ἄρ᾽ οὖν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο μόνον μαθεῖν ;---Ἀρκεῖ, ΄, > on \ a , 2 ΣΧ ΔῚ φησίν.--Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ἐν χρήσει νομίσματος μὴ διαπίπτειν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο ἀκοῦσαι, διὰ τί τὰς μὲν δοκίμους δραχμὰς παραδέχῃ, τὰς 78 ἀδοκίμους ἀποδοκιμάξεις ;---Οὐκ apxet.—Ti οὖν δεῖ τούτῳ προσλαβεῖν ; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ δύναμιν δοκιμαστικήν τε καὶ διακριτικὴν τῶν 8 δοκίμων τε καὶ ἀδοκίμων δραχμῶν ; οὐκοῦν καὶ > \ , > > a \ tA > ? > 4 ἐπὶ λόγου οὐκ ἀρκεῖ TO λεχθέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη δοκιμαστικὸν γενέσθαι καὶ διακριτικὸν τοῦ ἀλη- 9 θοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ τοῦ ἀδήλου ;— Ἀνάγκη. -Ἐπὶ τούτοις τί παραγγέλλεται ἐν λόγῳ ; τὸ ἀκόλουθον τοῖς δοθεῖσιν ὑπὸ σοῦ καλῶς παραδέ- 10 you. ἄγε ἀρκεῖ οὖν κἀνταῦθα γνῶναι τοῦτο; οὐκ ἀρκεῖ, δεῖ δὲ μαθεῖν πῶς τί τισιν ἀκόλουθον ’ \ \ \ a = τ >’ θ tad \ γίνεται καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἕν ἑνὶ ἀκολουθεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ 11 πλείοσιν κοινῇ. μή ποτε οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη a \ , > , “ προσλαβεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν λόγῳ συνετῶς > / \ Ε} ‘ δ ν8 ὃ Pe “ ἀναστραφήσεσθαι καὶ αὐτόν τ᾽ ἀποδείξειν ἕκαστα ἀποδόντα καὶ τοῖς ἀποδεικνύουσι παρακολου- θήσειν pnd ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιζομένων διαπλανη- 12 θήσεσθαι ὡς ἀποδεικνυόντων ; οὐκοῦν ἐλήλυθεν ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν συναγόντων λόγων καὶ τρόπων πραγματεία καὶ γυμνασία καὶ ἀναγκαία πέφηνεν. 13 ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ ἔστιν ἐφ᾽ ὧν δεδώκαμεν ὑγιῶς τὰ

1 Added by Meibom. 52

a ee eo

ἀν ν δα αν»...

φ' ἄς

ΟΡ

BOOK I. vu. 5-13

To state the true, to eliminate the false, to suspend judgement in doubtful cases. Is it enough, then, to learn this alone ?>—It is enough, says one.—lIs it, then, also enough for the man who wants to make no mistake in the use of money to be told the reason why you accept genuine drachmas and reject the counterfeit ?—It is not enough.—What, then, must be added to this? Why, what else but the faculty that tests the genuine drachmas and the counterfeit and distinguishes between them? Where- fore, in reasoning also the spoken word is not enough, is it? On the contrary, is it not necessary to develop the power of testing the true and the false and the uncertain and of distinguishing between them ?—It is necessary.—What else besides this is proposed in reasoning? Pray accept the conse- quence of what you have properly granted. Come, is it enough, then, in this case also merely to know that this particular thing is true? It is not enough, but one must learn in what way a thing follows as a consequence upon certain other things, and how sometimes one thing follows upon one, and at other times upon several conjointly. Is it not, then, neces- sary that a man should also acquire this power, if he is to acquit himself intelligently in argument, and is himself not only to prove each point when he tries to prove it, but also to follow the argument of those who are conducting a proof, and is not to be misled by men who quibble as though they were proving something? There has consequently arisen among us, and shown itself to be necessary, a science which deals with inferential arguments and with logical figures and trains men therein.

But of course there are times when we have

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

λήμματα Kal συμβαίνει τουτὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν: ψεῦδος δὲ ὃν οὐδὲν ἧττον συμβαίνει. τί οὖν μοι κα- θήκει ποιεῖν; προσδέχεσθαι τὸ Ψεῦδος ; καὶ n , > 2 ὰ 4 “ “ > e lal πῶς οἷόν τ᾽; ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὅτι “οὐχ ὑγιῶς παρεχώρησα τὰ ὡμολογημένα; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι “ov συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν / ” > > >. \ lol , Tapaxeywpynuévav”; adr οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται. τί οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων ποιητέον; ἢ μή ποτε ὡς οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ δανείσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἔτι ὀφείλειν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προσεῖναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ δανείου Ν \ 4 > / «“ 3 > val καὶ μὴ διαλελύσθαι αὐτό, οὕτως οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ δεῖν παραχωρεῖν τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον τὸ δεδωκέναι τὰ λήμματα, δεῖ δ᾽ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τῆς παρα- χωρήσεως αὐτῶν; καὶ δὴ μενόντων μὲν αὐτῶν εἰς τέλος ὁποῖα παρεχωρήθη πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τῆς παραχωρήσεως ἐπιμένειν καὶ τὸ ἀκό- λουθον αὐτοῖς προσδέχεσθαι"... οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμῖν ” >O\ > ¢ cal / a ἘΝ! ἔτι οὐδὲ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς συμβαίνει τοῦτο TO ἐπιφερόμε- νον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς συγχωρήσεως τῶν λημμάτων ἀπέστημεν. δεῖ οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν λημμά- των ἱστορῆσαι καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολήν τε καὶ μετάπτωσιν αὐτῶν, καθ᾽ ἣν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ an ΄ ἐρωτήσει ἢ τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἢ τῷ συλλελογίσθαι ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ λαμβάνοντα τὰς μετα-

1 At this point Upton introduced from his ‘codex’ a sentence intended to express fully the transition in the argument (§18): μὴ μενόντων δὲ αὐτῶν ὁποῖα mapexwphOn, καὶ ἡμᾶς πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τῆς παραχωρήσεως ἀφίστασθαι καὶ {τοῦ Schw.» τὸ ἀνακόλουθον αὐτοῖς λόγοις προσδέχεσθαι. “If, however, they do not remain as they were granted, we are also bound to abandon our concession and our acceptance of what is

54

de iii σὸ

BOOK I. vu. 13-20

with sound reasoning granted the premisses, and the inference from them is so-and-so; and, in spite of its being false, it is none the less the inference. What, then, should I do? Accept the fallacy? And how is that possible? Well, should I say, “ It was not sound reasoning for me to grant the pre- misses’? Nay, but this is not permissible either. Or, “This does not follow from what has been

ted”? But that is not permissible, either. What, then, must be done in these circumstances ? Is it not this, that the fact of having borrowed is not enough to prove that one is still in debt, but we must add the cireumstance that one abides by the loan—that is, has not paid it—and just so our having once granted the premisses is not enough to compel us to accept the inference, but we must abide by our acceptance of the premisses? And what is more, if the premisses remain until the end what they were when they were granted, there is every neces- sity for us to abide by our acceptance of them, and to allow the conclusion that has been drawn from them; . . . for from our point of view and to our way of thinking this inference does not now result from the premisses, since we have withdrawn from our previous assent to the premisses. It is necessary, therefore, to enquire into premisses of this kind and into such change and equivocal modification of them, whereby, at the very moment the question is put, or the answer made, or the deduction drawn, or at some other similar stage in the argument, the pre- misses take on modified meanings and give occasion

inconsistent with the premisses.” Schenk] indicates a lacuna.

55

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25

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πτώσεις ἀφορμὴν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνοήτοις τοῦ ταράσσεσθαι μὴ βλέπουσι τὸ ἀκόλουθον. τίνος ἕνεκα; ἵν᾿ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ μὴ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον μηδ᾽ εἰκῇ μηδὲ συγκεχυμένως ἀνα- στρεφώμεθα. al τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπί τε τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν λόγων. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτ᾽ αἰτῆσαί τινα ὑπόθεσιν ὥσπερ ἐπιβάθραν τῷ ἑξῆς λόγῳ. πᾶσαν οὖν τὴν δοθεῖσαν παραχωρητέον ἢ οὐ πᾶσαν; καὶ εἰ οὐ πᾶσαν, τίνα ; 1 πα- ραχωρήσαντι δὲ ᾿μενετέον εἰς ἅπαν ἐπὶ τῆς τηρήσεως ἢ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποστατέον, τὰ δ᾽ ἀκόλουθα προσδεκτέον καὶ τὰ μαχόμενα οὐ προσδεκτέον ;--- Ναί.---Αλλὰ λέγει τις ὅτε “ ποιήσω σε δυνατοῦ δεξάμενον ὑπόθεσιν ἐπ᾽’ ἀδύνατον ἀπαχθῆναι." πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ συγκαθήσει ὁ φρόνιμος, ἀλλὰ φεύξεται ἐξέτασιν καὶ κοινολογίαν ; καὶ τίς ἔτι ἄλλος ἐστὶ λόγῳ χρηστικὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει καὶ νὴ Δία ἀνεξαπάτητός τε καὶ ἀσόφιστος; ἀλλὰ συγκαθήσει μέν, οὐκ ἐπι- στραφήσεται δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀναστρέφεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ; καὶ πῶς ἔτι ἔσται τοιοῦτος οἷον αὐτὸν ἐπινοοῦμεν ; ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ τινὸς τοιαύτης γυμνασίας καὶ παρασκευῆς φυλάττειν οἷός τ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἑξῆς ; τοῦτο δεικνύτωσαν καὶ παρέλκει τὰ θεωρήματα ταῦτα πάντα, ἄτοπα ἦν καὶ ἀνακόλουθα τῇ προλήψει τοῦ σπου- δαίου. ; Τί ἔτι ἀργοὶ καὶ ῥάθυμοι καὶ νωθροί ἐσμεν

‘

1 The words περὶ τίνος 4 σκέψις; wept καθήκοντος at this point were deleted by Wolf.

56

πος τ le δ i en ὦ Ἤν.

Ὡ ee

BOOK I. vu. 20-30

to the unthinking to be disconcerted, if they do not see what follows in consequence. Why is it neces- sary? In order that in this matter we may not behave unsuitably, nor at haphazard, nor confusedly.

And the same holds true of hypotheses and hypo- thetical arguments. For it is necessary at times to postulate some hypothesis as a sort of stepping-stone

τ for the subsequent argument. Are we, therefore, to

grant any and every hypothesis that is proposed, or not every one? And if not every one, what one? And when a man has granted an hypothesis, must he abide for ever by it and maintain it, or are there times when he should abandon it and accept only the consequences which follow from it without accept- ing those which are opposed to it?—Yes.—But some- one says, “If you once admit an hypothesis that involves a possibility, I will compel you to be drawn on to an impossibility.” Shall the prudent man refuse to engage with this person, and avoid enquiry and discussion with him? Yet who but the pru- dent is capable of using argument and skilful in question and answer, and, by Zeus, proof against deceit and sophistic fallacies? But shall he argue, indeed, and then not take pains to avoid conducting himself recklessly and at haphazard in argument? And if he does not, how will he any longer be the sort of man we think he is? But without some such exercise and preparation in formal reasoning, how will he be able to maintain the continuity of the argument? Let them show that he will be able, and all these speculations become mere superfluity ; they were absurd and inconsistent with our =e conception of the good man,

Why are we still indolent and easy-going and

VOL. 1. D 57

31

32

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, a Ψ aA > / καὶ προφάσεις ξητοῦμεν, καθ᾽ ἃς οὐ πονήσομεν ᾽ , a οὐδ᾽ ἀγρυπνήσομεν ἐξεργαζόμενοι τὸν αὑτῶν , ” nr λόγον ;— Av οὖν ἐν τούτοις πλανηθῶ, μή τι / τὸν πατέρα, ἀπέκτεινα ; "τ Ανδράποδον, ποῦ γὰρ ἐνθάδε πατὴρ ἦν, ἵν᾽ αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνῃς ; τί οὖν ἐποίησας ; ὃ μόνον ἣν κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἁμάρτημα, τοῦτο ἡμάρτηκας. ἐπεί ToL τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγὼ «ς ,ὔ “ > lal / Ὁ Ν Ῥούφῳ εἶπον ἐπιτιμῶντί μοι ὅτι τὸ παραλει- πόμενον ἕν ἐν συλλογισμῷ τινι οὐχ εὕρισκον. “Οὐχ οἷον μέν," φημί, “ εἰ3 τὸ Καπιτώλιον κατέ- ε καυσα," ὃ ὁ δ᾽ “᾿Ανδράποδον,᾽ ἔφη, “ἐνθάδε τὸ , , / > ” n παραλειπόμενον Καπιτώλιόν ἐστιν ἢ ταῦτα μόνα ἁμαρτήματά ἐστι τὸ Καπιτώλιον ἐμπρῆσαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀποκτεῖναι, τὸ δ᾽ εἰκῇ καὶ μάτην καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις ταῖς e a \ \ a , , αὑτοῦ Kal μὴ παρακολουθεῖν λόγῳ μηδ᾽ ἀποδείξει \ , ᾽ ς an , - \ . μηδὲ σοφίσματι μηδ᾽ ἁπλῶς βλέπειν τὸ καθ αὑτὸν καὶ οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀπο. κρίσει, τούτων δ᾽ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημα ;

“ e ὃ / “ > ὃ Γι. > η΄. Ὅτε ai δυνάμεις τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς Καθ᾿ ὅσους τρόπους μεταλαμβάνειν ἔστι τὰ ἰσοδυναμοῦντα ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ τοσούτους καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων τε καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων Ἶ βρη Ἂ

2 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐκποιεῖ μεταλαμβάνειν. οἷον φέρε

1 Salmasius: αὐτὸν 8, 2 Added by Blass. 3 Schenkl: κατεσκεύασα 8.

58

BOOK I. vn. 30~vu. 2

sluggish, seeking excuses whereby we may avoid toiling or even late hours, as we try to perfect our own reason ?—If, then, I err in these matters, I have not murdered my own father, have 1?—Slave, pray where was there in this case a father for you to murder? What, then, have you done, you ask? You have committed what was the only possible error in the matter. Indeed this is the very remark I made to Rufus when he censured me for not dis- covering the one omission in a certain syllogism. “Well,” said 1, “it isn’t as bad as if I had burned down the Capitol.” But he answered, “Slave, the omission here is the Uapitol.”” Or are there no other errors than setting fire to the Capitol and murdering one’s father? But to make a reckless and foolish and haphazard use of the external impressions that come to one, to fail to follow an argument, or demon- stration, or sophism—in a word, to fail to see in question and answer what is consistent with one’s position or inconsistent—is none of these things an error? CHAPTER VIII

That the reasoning faculties, in the case of the uneducated, are not free from error

In as many ways as it is possible to vary the mean- ing of equivalent terms, in so many ways may a man also vary the forms of his controversial arguments and of his enthymemes?! in reasoning. Take this

1 An enthymeme is defined by Aristotle (het. 1. i. 11) as

“ἐᾷ rhetorical demonstration,” that is, an argument expressed in ordinary literary style, not in the formal fashion of a

syllogism. It is thus called an ‘‘ incomplete syllogism” (ὃ 3

below), as falling short of the ‘definite proof” accorded by the syllogism.

59

ΩΡ:

oO

a

~I

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τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον" εἰ ἐδανείσω καὶ μὴ ἀπέδωκας, ὀφείλεις μοι τὸ ἀργύριον" οὐχὶ ἐδανείσω. μὲν καὶ οὐκ ἀπέδωκας" οὐ μὴν ὀφείλεις μοι τὸ ἀργύριον. καὶ τοῦτο οὐδενὶ μᾶλλον 1 βεο ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἐμπείρως ποιεῖν. εἴπερ Ὑ ρ ἀτελὴς συλλογισμός ἐστι τὸ ἐνθύμημα, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ περὶ τὸν τέλειον συλλογισμὸν γεγυμνασμένος οὗτος ἂν ἱκανὸς εἴη καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀτελῆ οὐδὲν ἧττον.

Τί mor οὖν οὐ γυμνάξομεν αὑτούς τε καὶ ἀλλήλους τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ; ὅτι νῦν καίτοι μὴ γυμναζόμενοι, περὶ ταῦτα μηδ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τοῦ ἤθους ὑπό γε ἐμοῦ περισπώμενοι. ὅμως οὐδὲν ἐπιδίδομεν εἰς καλοκἀγαθίαν. τί οὖν χρὴ προσδοκᾶν, εἰ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀσχολίαν προσλά- βοιμεν ; ; καὶ μάλισθ᾽, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἀσ ολία τις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων αὐτὴ προσγ our’ ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰήσεως ἀφορμὴ καὶ τύφου οὐχ ἡ τυχοῦσα. μεγάλη γάρ ἐστι δύναμις ἡ emt χειρητικὴ καὶ πιθανολογική, καὶ “μάλιστ᾽ εἰ τύ οι γυμνασίας ἐπιπλέον καί τινα καὶ εὐπρέπειαν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων προσλάβοι. ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ καθόλου πᾶσα δύναμις ἐπισφαλὴς τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις καὶ ἀσθενέσι προσγενομένη πρὸς τὸ ἐπᾶραι καὶ χαυνῶσαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ. ποίᾳ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔτι μηχανῇ πείσαι τὸν νέον τὸν ἐν τούτοις διαφέροντα, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ προσθήκην αὐτὸν ἐκείνων γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνα αὐτῷ προσθεῖναι ; οὐχὶ δὲ πάντας τοὺς λόγους τούτους καταπατήσας ἐπηρμένος ἡμῖν καὶ πεφυσημένος περιπατεῖ μηδ᾽ ἀνεχόμενος, ἄν τις ἅπτηται" αὐτοῦ ὑπομιμνήσκων, τίνος ἀπολελειμ- μένος ποῦ ἀποκέκλικεν ;

1 τι after ἅπτηται deleted in 5. 60

- iil: Gt ga

re πο

δ μἹ

νον ΣῪΝ

BOOK I. vim. 2-10

syllogism, for instance: If you have borrowed and have not repaid, you owe me the money; now you have not borrowed and have not repaid ; therefore you do not owe me the money. And no man is better fitted to employ such variations skilfully than the philosopher. For if, indeed, the enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism, it is clear that he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism would be no less competent to deal with the imperfect also.

Why, then, do we neglect to exercise ourselves and one another in this way? Because, even now, without receiving exercise in these matters, or even being, by me at least, diverted from the study of morality, we nevertheless make no progress toward the beautiful and the good. What, therefore, must we expect, if we should take on this occupation also? And especially since it would not merely be an additional occupation to draw us away from those which are more necessary, but would also be an exceptional excuse for conceit and vanity. For great is the power of argumentation and persuasive reason- ing, and especially if it should enjoy excessive exercise and receive likewise a certain additional ornament from language. The reason is that, in general, every faculty which is acquired by the uneducated and the weak is dangerous for them, as being apt to make them conceited and puffed up over it. For by what device might one any longer persuade a young man who excels in these faculties to make them an appendage to himself instead of his becoming an appendage to them? Does he not trample all these reasons under foot, and strut about in our presence, all conceited and puffed up, much less submitting if any one by way of reproof reminds him of what he lacks and wherein he has gone astray ?

61

ll

1

bo

13

14

15 16

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

,

Τί οὖν; Πλάτων φιλόσοφος οὐκ ἦν; Ἵππο- κράτης γὰρ ἰατρὸς οὐκ ἦν; ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾷς πῶς / ts / , ΚΙ : «ε , § [2 φράζει Ἱπποκράτης. μή τι οὖν Ἱπποκράτης οὕτω φράζει, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστιν ; τί οὖν μιγνύεις πρά-

Μ » \ n > [ον > vA

γματα ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων συνδρα-

, > \ \ 7 > La Μ μόντα ; εἰ δὲ καλὸς ἣν Πλάτων καὶ ἰσχυρός, ἔδει κἀμὲ καθήμενον ἐκπονεῖν, ἵνα καλὸς γένωμαι ἢ 7 a a iva ἰσχυρός, ὡς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς φιλο- σοφίαν, ἐπεί τις φιλόσοφος ἅμα καὶ καλὸς ἣν καὶ φιλόσοφος ; οὐ θέλεις αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διακρῖναι

\ / ΝΣ ,ὔ , ᾿ς

κατὰ τί οἱ ἄνθρωποι γίνονται φιλόσοφοι καὶ τίνα ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ; ἄγε εἰ δ᾽ ἐγὼ φιλόσοφος ἤμην, ἔδει ὑμᾶς καὶ χωλοὺς γενέσθαι; τί οὖν ; αἴρω" τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας ; μὴ γένοιτο' οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ὁρατικήν. ὅμως δ᾽, ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ τί ? > Ἂ ow te ΄ > Ψ ΝΜ ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔχω σοι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν ἢ ὅτι ποιὰ προαίρεσις.

θ΄. ἸΠῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ συγγενεῖς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τῷ θεῷ > , ΝΜ 2% \ then ἐπέλθοι ἄν τις ἐπὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ; Ei ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ τὰ περὶ τῆς συγγενείας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φιλο- ͵ , ΜΝ > , “ > , A σόφων, τί ἄλλο ἀπολείπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, μηδέποτε πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον , ᾽ > a oe ; a Δ , ποδαπός ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ᾿Αθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι κόσμιος ; διὰ τί ve λέγεις ᾿Αθηναῖον 1 Schenkl: ἐρῶ S.

2 φαντασιῶν after προαίρεσις deleted by Schenkl. 62

“αν

ΣΝ ΜΒ ΔΝ es «ἐδ

BOOK I. vii. 11-1x. 2

What then? Was not Platoa philosopher? Yes, and was not Hippocrates a physician? But you see how eloquently Hippocrates expresses himself. Does Hippocrates, then, express himself so eloquently by virtue of his being a physician? Why, then, do you confuse things that for no particular reason have been combined in the same man? Now if Plato was handsome and strong, ought I to sit down and strive to become handsome, or become strong, on the assumption that this is necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was at the same time both handsome and a philosopher? Are you not willing to observe and distinguish just what that is by virtue of which men become philosophers, and what qualities pertain to them for no particular reason? Come now, if I were a philosopher, ought you to become lame like me? What then? Am I depriving you of these faculties? Far be it from me! No more than I am depriving you of the faculty of sight. Yet, if you enquire of me what is man’s good, 1 can give you no other answer than that it is a kind of moral purpose.

CHAPTER IX

How from the thesis that we are akin to God may a man proceed to the consequences ?

Ir what is said by the philosophers regarding the kinship of God and men be true, what other course remains for men but that which Socrates took when asked to what country he belonged, never to say “T am an Athenian,” or “I am a Corinthian,” but “T am a citizen of the universe”? For why do you

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εἶναι σεαυτόν, οὐχὶ δ᾽ ἐξ ἐ ἐκείνης μόνον τῆς γωνίας, 3 els ἣν ἐρρίφη γεννηθέν σου τὸ σωμάτιον ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ κυριωτέρου καὶ περιέχοντος ¢ οὐ μόνον αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν γωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλην σου τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅθεν σου τὸ γένος τῶν προγόνων εἰς σὲ κατέλήλυθεν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν 4 καλεῖς σεαυτὸν ᾿Αθηναῖον καὶ Κορίνθιον ; ὁ τοίνυν τῇ διοικήσει. τοῦ κόσμου πἀρηκολ ον θη ΩΝ καὶ μεμαθηκώς, ὅ ὅτι “ τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον καὶ περιεκτικώτατον πάντων τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σύστημα τὸ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων͵ καὶ θεοῦ, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου δὲ τὰ σπέρματα καταπέπτωκεν οὐκ εἰς τὸν πατέρα τὸν ἐμὸν μόνον οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὸν πάππον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἅπαντα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς γεννώμενά τε καὶ φυόμενα, προ- 5 ηγουμένως δ᾽ εἰς τὰ λογικά, ὅτι κοινωνεῖν μόνον ταῦτα πέφυκεν τῷ θεῷ τῆς Cun ΦΆΒΕΨΗΝΙ κατὰ 6 τὸν λόγον ἐπιπεπλεγμένα," διὰ τί μὴ εἴπη " αὑτὸν κόσμιον ; διὰ τί μὴ υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ; διὰ τί δὲ φοβηθήσεταί TL τῶν γιγνομένων ἐν ἀνθρώποις ; : 7 ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὸν Καίσαρα ἡ συγγένεια ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν μέγα δυναμένων ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἱ ἱκανὴ παρ- έχειν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ διάγοντας καὶ ἀκαταφρονήτους καὶ δεδοικότας μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, τὸ δὲ τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν ἔχειν καὶ πατέρα καὶ κηδεμόνα οὐκέτι ἡμᾶς ἐξαι- 8 ρήσεται λυπῶν καὶ φόβων ;---Καὶ πόθεν φάγω,

1 Added by Schenkl. 2 ris after εἴπῃ deleted by von Wilamowitz.

1 The terms ‘‘ Athenian,” ‘‘ Corinthian,” etc. *» characterize citizens of a country, not merely of a , locality, t.e., citizens of Attica or Corinthia. The ‘‘corner” in which one was born

64

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BOOK I. 1x. 2-8

say that you are an Athenian, instead of mentioning

that corner into which your paltry body was cast at birth? Or is it clear you take the place which has a higher degree of authority and compre- hends not merely that corner of yours, but also your family and, in a word, the source from which your race has come, your ancestors down to yourself, and from some such entity call yourself “ Athenian,” or “Corinthian”?! Well, then, anyone who has atten- tively studied the administration of the universe and has learned that “ the greatest and most authoritative and most comprehensive of all governments is this one, which is composed of men and God,? and that from Him have descended the seeds of being, not merely to my father or to my grandfather, but to all things that are begotten and that grow upon earth, and chiefly to rational beings, seeing that by nature it is theirs alone to have communion in the society of God, being intertwined with him through the reason,’’—why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the universe? Why should he not call him- self a son of God? And why shall he fear anything that happens among men? What! Shall kinship with Caesar or any other of them that have great power at Rome be sufficient to enable men to live securely, proof against contempt, and in fear of nothing whatsoever, but to have God as our maker, and father, and guardian,—shall this not suffice to deliver us from griefs and fears?—-And wherewithal might have been Marathon, Rhamnus, Lechaeum, Tenea, or the like.

3 This seems to be a quotation from Poseidonius (Diogenes Laertius, aes 138), Pat sis ascribed ἜΣΤΗΝ pees oie in general and especia rysippus (see Die i Beas 464, 20 and 465. 15, Seeepating SOF = μὰ

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eget ec μηδὲν & ἔχων ;—Kal πῶς οἱ δοῦλοι, πῶς οἱ ραπέταε, τίνι πεποιθότες ἐ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπαλλάττονται τῶν δεσποτῶν ; ; τοῖς ἀγροῖς ἢ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἢ τοῖς ἀργυρώμασιν ; οὐδενί, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς" καὶ ὅ ὅμως οὐκ ἐπιλείπουσιν αὐτοὺς τροφαί. τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον ἡμῖν δεήσει ἄλλοις θαρροῦντα καὶ ἐπαναπαυόμενον ἀποδημεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν θηρίων. τῶν ἀλόγων εἶναι “χείρονα καὶ δειλό- τερον, ὧν ἕκαστον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀρκούμενον οὔτε τροφῆς ἀπορεῖ τῆς οἰκείας οὔτε διεξαγωγῆς τῆς καταλλήλου καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ;

᾿Εγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὅτι ἔδει καθῆσθαι τὸν πρεσ- βύτερον ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοῦτο μηχανώμενον, ὅπως μὴ ταπεινοφρονήσητε μηδὲ ταπεινοὺς μηδ᾽ “ἀγεν- νεῖς τινας διαλογισμοὺς διαλογιεῖσθε αὐτοὶ περὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ μή, ἄν: τίνες ἐμπίπτωσιν τοιοῦτοι νέοι, ἐπιγνόντες τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συγγένειαν καὶ ὅτι δεσμά τινα ταῦτα προσηρτήμεθα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα ἀναγκαῖα ἡμῖν γίνεται εἰς οἰκονομίαν καὶ ἀνα- στροφὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὡς βάρη τινὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα ἀπορρῖψαι θέλωσιν καὶ ἀπελθεῖν πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς. καὶ τοῦτον ἔδει τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀγωνίξεσθαι τὸν διδάσκαλον ὑ ὑμῶν καὶ παιδευτήν, εἴ τις ἄρα ἦν" ὑμᾶς μὲν ἔρχεσθαι λέγοντας “᾿Επίκτητε, οὐκέτι ἀνεχόμεθα μετὰ τοῦ σωματίου

1 Added by Elter.

* Referring to himself. 3 There is less need of his urging them to regard them- selves as sons of God than of preventing them, if they are

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BOOK I. rm. 8-12

shall I be fed, asks one, if 1 have nothing >—And how of slaves, how of runaways, on what do they rely when they leave their masters? On their lands, their slaves, or their vessels of silver? No, on nothing but themselves; and nevertheless food does not fail them. And shall it be necessary for our philosopher, forsooth, when he goes abroad, to depend upon others for his assurance and his refreshment, instead of taking care of himself, and to be more vile and craven than the irrational animals, every one of which is sufficient to himself, and Jacks neither its own proper food nor that way of life which is appropriate to it and in harmony with nature?

As for me, I think that the elder man? ought not to be sitting here devising how to keep you from thinking too meanly of yourselves or from taking in your debates a mean or ignoble position regarding yourselves ;? he should rather be striving to prevent there being among you any young men of such a sort that, when once they have realized their kinship to the gods and that we have these fetters as it were fastened upon us,—the body and its possessions, and whatever things on their account are necessary to us for the management of life, and our tarrying therein,—they may desire to throw aside all these things as burdensome and vexatious and unprofitable and depart to their kindred. And this is the struggle in which your teacher and trainer, if he really amounted to anything, ought to be engaged ; you, for your part, would come to him saying: “ Epictetus, we can no longer endure to be

convinced of this, from acting as if the life of the body were a thing to throw aside, and so committing suicide,—a practice which was defended by many Stoics.

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τούτου δεδεμένοι καὶ τοῦτο τρέφοντες καὶ ποτί- ἕοντες καὶ ἀναπαύοντες καὶ καθαίροντες, εἶτα δι᾽ αὐτὸ συμπεριφερόμενοι τοῖσδε καὶ τοῖσδε. οὐκ ἀδιάφορα ταῦτα καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς; καὶ ὁ θάνατος οὐ κακόν ; καὶ συγγενεῖς τινες τοῦ θεοῦ ἐσμεν κἀκεῖθεν ἐληλύθαμεν ; ; ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἀπελθεῖν ὅθεν ἐληλύθαμεν, ἄφες λυθῆναί ποτε τῶν δεσμῶν τούτων τῶν ἐξηρτημένων καὶ βαρούντων. ἐνταῦθα λῃσταὶ καὶ κλέπται καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ οἱ καλού- μενοι τύραννοι δοκοῦντες ἔχειν τινὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐξουσίαν διὰ τὸ σωμάτιον καὶ τὰ τούτου κτήματα. ἄφες δείξωμεν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἔχουσιν ἐξου- σίαν" ἐμὲ δ᾽ ἐνταῦθα " λέγειν. ὅτι “ ἄνθρωποι, ἐκδέξασθε τὸν θεόν. ὅταν ἐκεῖνος σημήνῃ καὶ ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, τότ᾽ ἀπο- λύεσθε πρὸς αὐτόν" ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος ἀνά- σχεσθε ἐνοικοῦντες ταύτην τὴν χώραν, εἰς, ἣν ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς ἔταξεν. ὀλίγος ἄρα χρόνος οὗτος ὁ τῆς οἰκήσεως καὶ ῥᾷδιος τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις. ποῖος γὰρ ἔτι τύραννος ἢ ποῖος κλέπτης ἢ ποῖα δικαστήρια φοβερὰ τοῖς οὕτως παρ᾽ οὐδὲν πε- ποιημένοις τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου κτήματα; μείνατε, μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπέλθητε."

Τοιοῦτόν τι ἔδει γίνεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ παιδευτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τῶν νέων. νῦν δὲ τί γίνεται ; F νεκρὸς μὲν ὁ παιδευτής, νεκροὶ δ᾽ ὑμεῖς. ὅταν χορτασθῆτε σήμερον, κάθησθε κλάοντες περὶ τῆς αὔριον, πόθεν φάγητε. ἀνδράποδον, ἂν σχῆς, ἕξεις" ἂν μὴ σχῇς, ἐξελεύσῃ: ἤνοικται ἡ θύρα. τί πενθεῖς; ποῦ ἔτι τόπος δακρύοις ; τίς ἔτι

1 Reiske: κακὸς 8. 2 Capps: ἐν τῶι 8. 68

———————— π

BOOK I. rx. 12-20

imprisoned with this paltry body, giving it food and drink, and resting and cleansing it, and, to crown all, being on its account brought into contact with these people and those. Are not these things indifferent—indeed, nothing—to us? And is not death no evil? And are we not in a manner akin to God, and have we not come from Him? Suffer us to go back whence we came; suffer us to be freed at last from these fetters that are fastened to us and weigh us down. Here are despoilers and thieves, and courts of law, and those who are called tyrants; they think that they have some power over us because of the paltry body and its possessions. Suffer us to show them that they have power over no one.” And thereupon it were my part to say: “Men, wait upon God. When He shall give the signal and set you free from this service, then shall you depart to Him; but for the present endure to abide in this place, where He has stationed you. Short indeed is this time of your abiding here, and easy to bear for men of your convictions. For what tyrant, or what thief, or what courts of law are any longer formidable to those who have thus set at naught the body and its possessions? Stay, nor be so unrational as to depart.”

Some such instruction should be given by the teacher to the youth of good natural parts. But what happens now? A corpse is your teacher and corpses are you. As soon as you have fed your fill to-day, you sit lamenting about the morrow, where- withal you shall be fed. Slave, if you get it, you will have it; if you do not get it, you will depart; the door stands open. Why grieve? Where is there yet room for tears? What occasion longer

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κολακείας ἀφορμή; διὰ τί ἄλλος ἄλλῳ φθονήσει; διὰ τί πολλὰ κεκτημένους θαυμάσει ἢ τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει “τεταγμένους, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἰσχυροὶ ὦσιν καὶ ὀργίλοι ; ; "τί γὰρ ἡμῖν ποιήσουσιν ; δύνανται ποιῆσαι, τούτων οὐκ ἐπιστρεψόμεθα: ὧν ἡμῖν “μέλει, ταῦτα οὐ δύνανται. τίς οὖν ἔτι ἄρξει τοῦ οὕτως διακειμένου ; j

Πῶς “Σωκράτης εἶχεν πρὸς ταῦτα; πῶς γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ἔδει τὸν πεπεισμένον. ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν θεῶν συγγενής ; ; “Ἂν μοι λέγητε," φησίν, " “νῦν ὅτι ᾿ἀφίεμέν σε ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὅπως μηκέτι διαλέξῃ τούτους τοὺς λόγους οὺς μέχρι νῦν διελέγου

μηδὲ παρενοχλήσεις ἡμῶν τοῖς νέοις μηδὲ τοῖς

γέρουσιν, ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι γελοῖοί, ἐστε, οἵτινες ἀξιοῦτε, εἰ μέν με ὁ στρατηγὸς ὁ ὑμέτερος ἔταξεν εἴς τινα τάξιν, ὅτι ἔδει pe τηρεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ φυλάττειν καὶ μυριάκις “πρότερον αἱρεῖσθαι ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν αὐτήν, εἰ δ᾽ ὁ θεὸς ἔν τινι χώρᾳ καὶ ἀναστροφῇ κατατέταχεν, ταύτην δ᾽ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν δεῖ ἡ ἡμᾶς. τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ταῖς ἀληθείαις συγγενὴς τῶν θεῶν. ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς κοιλίαι, ὡς ἔντερα, ὡς αἰδοῖα, οὕτω περὶ αὑτῶν διανοούμεθα, ὅτι φοβούμεθα, ὅτι ἐπιθυ- μοῦμεν: τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα συνεργεῖν δυναμένους κολακεύομεν, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους δεδοίκαμεν. "Eye τις ἠξίωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γράψαι εἰς τὴν Ρώμην ὡς ἐδόκει τοῖς πολλοῖς ἠτυχηκὼς καὶ πρότερον μὲν ἐπιφανὴς ὧν καὶ πλούσιος, ὕστερον ἐκπεπτωκὼς ἁπάντων καὶ διάγων ἐνταῦθα.

1 A very free paraphrase of Plato, Apology, 29 c and 28 Ε. 2 At Nicopolis.

7°

oes “πὰ νων

BOOK I. rx. 20-27

for flattery? Why shall one man envy another? Why shall he admire those who have great posses- sions, or those who are stationed in places of power, especially if they be both strong and prone to anger? For what will they do tous? As for what they have power to do, we shall pay no heed thereto; as for the things we care about, over them they have no power. Who, then, will ever again be ruler over the man who is thus disposed?

How did Socrates feel with regard to these matters? Why, how else than as that man ought to feel who has been convinced that he is akin to the gods? “If you tell me now,” says he, “‘ We will acquit you on these conditions, namely, that you will no longer engage in these discussions which you have conducted hitherto, nor trouble either the young or the old among us,’ I will answer, ‘You make your- selves ridiculous by thinking that, if your general had stationed me at any post, I ought to hold and maintain it and choose rather to die ten thousand times than to desert it, but if God has stationed us in some place and in some manner of life we ought to desert ἐμαὶ. 1 This is what it means for a man to be in very truth a kinsman of the gods. We, however, think of ourselves as though we were mere bellies, entrails, and genitals, just because we have fear, because we have appetite, and we flatter those who have power to help us in these matters, and these same men we fear.

A certain man asked me to write to Rome in his behalf. Now he had met with what most men account misfortune: though he had formerly been eminent and wealthy, he had afterwards lost every- thing and was living μετα. And I wrote in humble

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κἀγὼ ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ταπεινῶς. ὁ δ᾽ ἀνα- γνοὺς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδωκέν μοι αὐτὴν καὶ ἔφη ὅτε “᾿Εγὼ βοηθηθῆναί τι ὑπὸ σοῦ ἤθελον, οὐχὶ ἐλεηθῆναι" κακὸν δέ μοι οὐθέν ἐστιν." οὕτως καὶ “Ῥοῦφος πειράξων μ᾽ ᾿ εἰώθει λέγειν “Συμβήσε- ταί σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου." κἀμοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκριναμένου ὅτι “᾿Ανθρώ- mwa, “Ti οὖν ; ἔτι ἐκεῖνον παρακαλῶ παρὰ σοῦ ταὐτὰ λαβεῖν δυνάμενος ; ἃ: τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, ὃ ἐξ αὑτοῦ τις ἔχει, περισσὸς καὶ μάταιος map ἄλλου λαμβάνων. ἐγὼ οὖν ἔχων ἐξ ἐ ἐμαυτοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ γενναῖον, ἀγρὸν παρὰ σοῦ λάβω καὶ ἀργύριον ἢ ἀρχήν τινα; μὴ γένοιτο. οὐχ οὕτως ἀναίσθητος ἔσομαι τῶν ἐμῶν κτημάτων. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν. τις ἦ δειλὸς καὶ ταπεινός, ὑ ὑπὲρ τούτου τί ἄλλο uv] ἀνάγκη γράφειν ἐπιστολὰς ὡς ὑπὲρ νεκροῦ " τὸ πτῶμα ἡμῖν χάρισαι τοῦ δεῖνος καὶ ξέστην αἱματίου᾽ ; τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πτῶμα ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστι καὶ ξέστης αἰμαρέδεη πλέον δ᾽ οὐδέν. εἰ δ᾽ ἣν πλέον τι, noOaver ἄν, ὅτι ἄλλος δι᾽ ἄλλον οὐ δυστυχεῖ.

ι΄. Πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἐν Ρώμῃ προαγωγὰς ἐσπουδακότας

Εἰ οὕτως σφοδρῶς συνετετάμεθα περὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ ἑαυτῶν ὡς οἱ ἐν Ῥώμῃ γέροντες περὶ ἃ

1 Schweighiuser: αὐτὰ S.

1 In his youth Epictetus had been a slave. 2 The thought seems to be: If the punishment can be

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BOOK L. 1x. 27-x. 1

terms in his behalf. But when he had read the letter he handed it back to me, and said, “I wanted your help, not your pity; my plight is not an evil one.” So likewise Rufus was wont to say, to test me, “ Your master! is going to do such-and-such a thing to you.” And when I would say in answer. «’Tis but the lot of man,” he would reply. “ What then? Am I to go on and petition him, when I can get the same result from you?”? For, in fact, it is foolish and superfluous to try to obtain from another that which one can get from oneself. Since, therefore, I am able to get greatness of soul and nobility of character from myself, am I to get a farm, and money, or some office, from you? Far from it! 1 will not be so unaware of what I myself possess. But when a man is cowardly and abject, what else can one possibly do but write letters in his behalf as we do in behalf of a corpse: “ Please to grant us the carcase of so-and-so and a pint of paltry blood?’’ For really, such a person is buat a carcase and a pint of paltry blood, and nothing more. But if he were anything more he would per- ceive that one man is not unfortunate because of another.

CHAPTER X

To those who have set their hearts on preferment at Rome

Ir we philosophers had applied ourselves to our own work as zealously as the old men at Rome humanly borne, I need not petition your master to remit it, for you have within yourself the power to endure it.

5 As when a friend might ask for the body of an executed criminal.

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ἐσπουδάκασιν, τάχα av τε ἠνύομεν καὶ αὐτοί. οἶδα ἐγὼ πρεσβύτερον ἄνθρωπον ἐμοῦ τὸν νῦν » rn ἐπὶ τοῦ σίτου ὄντα ἐν Ῥώμῃ, ὅτε ταύτῃ παρῆγεν > \ a a > / ἀπὸ τῆς φυγῆς ἀναστρέφων, ola εἶπέν μοι, κατατρέχων τοῦ προτέρου ἑαυτοῦ βίου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἑξῆς ἐπαγγελλόμενος, ὅτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἀναβὰς σπουδάσει ἢ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἀταραξίᾳ δάσει ἢ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ραξίᾳ “ Ν a f ΄ διεξαγαγεῖν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου! “ Πόσον γὰρ Μ > Ν > \ Ν ld ἐν» ’ ἂν a - 4 > fol ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐμοὶ τὸ λοιπόν ;"---Κ ἀγὼ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὅτι “Οὐ ποιήσεις, GAN ὀσφρανθεὶς μόνον τῆς «ε La e , 4 > 7 » » “Ῥώμης ἁπάντων τούτων ἐπιλήσῃ." ἂν δὲ καὶ εἰς αὐλὴν πάροδός τις δίδωται, ὅτι χαίρων καὶ a θ a > a ” «εὟ , ef 4» τῷ θεῷ εὐχαριστῶν ὥὦσεται.--““Ἂν pw εὕρῃς, ” ες , \ , > \ ὅπ \ ἔφη, “᾿Επίκτητε, τὸν ἕτερον πόδα εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν τιθέντα, ὃ βούλει ὑπολάμβανε." νῦν οὖν τί > , \ > a > \ € ’ 2 / ἐποίησεν; πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν “Ῥώμην, ἀπήντη- > n \ / , ς \ ‘ σαν αὐτῷ παρὰ Καίσαρος πινακίδες" ὁ δὲ λαβὼν / > / > / \ \ a > € Rd πάντων ἐκείνων ἐξελάθετο Kal λοιπὸν ἕν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπισεσώρευκεν. ἤθελον αὐτὸν νῦν παραστὰς ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν λόγων, ods ἔλεγεν παρερχόμενος, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι “ πόσῳ σοῦ ἐγὼ κομψότερος μάντις εἰμί."

Τί οὖν; ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτε ἄπρακτόν ἐστι τὸ an \ / > \ \ δου. “Ὁ > ? \ ζῷον ; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμὲν πρακτικοί; εὐθὺς ἐγὼ πρῶτος, ὅταν ἡμέρα γένηται, μικρὰ ὑπομιμνήσκομαι, τίνα ἐπανα-

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BOOK I. x. 1-8

have applied themselves to the matters on which they have set their hearts, perhaps we too should be accomplishing something. I know a man older than myself who is now in charge of the grain supply? at Rome. When he passed this place on his way back from exile, I recall what a tale he told as he inveighed against his former life and announced for the future that, when he had returned to Rome, he would devote himself solely to spending the remainder of his life in peace and quiet, “For how little is yet left to me!’—And I told him, “You will not do it, but when once you have caught no more than a whiff of Rome you will forget all this.” And if also admission to court should be granted, I added that he would rejoice, thank God and push his way in.—“‘If you find me, Epictetus,” said he, “ putting so much as one foot inside the court, think of me what you will.” Well, now, what did he do? Before he reached Rome, letters from Caesar met him; and as soon as he received them, he forgot all those resolutions of his, and ever since he has been piling up one property after another. I wish I could stand by his side now and remind him of the words that he uttered as he passed by here, and remark, “How much more clever a prophet I am than you!”

What then? Do I say ‘that man is an animal made for inactivity?* Far be itfrom me! But how can you say that we philosophers are not active in affairs? For example, to take myself first: as soon as day breaks I call to mind briefly what author

τ Praefectus annonae, a very important official during the Empire.

? As opposed in the ‘ active’ lives of business or politics.

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γνῶναί pe δεῖ. εἶτα εὐθὺς ἐμαυτῷ" “ τί δέ μοι καὶ μέλει πῶς ὁ δεῖνα ἀναγνῷ ; πρῶτόν ἐστιν, ἵνα ἐγὼ κοιμηθῶ." καίτοι τί ὅμοια τὰ ἐκεί- νων πράγματα τοῖς ἡμετέροις ; ἂν ἐπιστῆτε, τί ἐκεῖνοι ποιοῦσιν, αἰσθήσεσθε. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν Ψψηφίζουσιν, συζητοῦσι, συμβουλεύουσι περὶ σιταρίον, περὶ ἀγριδίου, περί τινων προκοπῶν τοιούτων ; ὅμοιον οὖν

> > ’ ΄ , , , ἐστιν ἐντευξίδιον παρά τινος λαβόντα ἀναγιγνώ-.

oKew ““παρακαλῶ σε ἐπιτρέψαι μοι σιτάριον ἐξαγαγεῖν" ἢ “παρακαλῶ σε παρὰ Χρυσίππου ἐπισκέψασθαι τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις καὶ ποίαν τινὰ χώραν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον: ἐπίσκεψαι δὲ καὶ τίς εἶ σὺ καὶ ποῖόν τι σοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὅμοιά ἐστιν ; ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίας σπουδῆς χρείαν ἔχοντα ; ἀλλ᾽ ὡσαύτως ἀμελεῖν αἰσχρὸν τούτων κἀκείνων ; τί οὖν ; ἡμεῖς μόνοι ῥᾳθυμοῦμεν καὶ νυστάζομεν ; οὔ: ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι. ἐπεί τοι καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ γέροντες, ὅταν παίζοντας ὁρῶμεν νέους, συμπροθυμούμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ συμπαίζειν. πολὺ δὲ πλέον, εἰ ἑώρων διεγηγερμένους καὶ συμπροθυμουμένους, προεθυμούμην ἂν συσπου- δάζειν καὶ αὐτός.

1 The passage is somewhat obscure, because the precise expression employed here occurs elsewhere only in Hnch. 49. Apparently Epictetus read over, or made special preparation upon a certain text, before meeting his pupils. In class then he would havea pupil read and interpret an assignment, some-

76

BOOK I. x. 8-13

I must read overt Then forthwith I say to myself: “And yet what difference does it really make to me how so-and-so reads? The first thing is that I get my sleep.” Even so, in what are the oecupa- tions of those other men comparable to ours? If you observe what they do, you will see. For what else do they do but all day long cast up accounts, dispute, consult about a bit of grain, a bit of land, or similar matters of profit? Is it, then, much the same thing to receive a little petition from someone and read: “I beseech you to allow me to export a small quantity of grain,” and this one: “I beseech you to learn from Chrysippus what is the administra- tion of the universe, and what place therein the rational animal has; and consider also who you are, and what is the nature of your good and evil”? Is this like that? And does it demand the like kind of study? And is it in the same way shame- ful to neglect the one and the other? What then? Is it we philosophers alone who take things easily and drowse? No, it is you young men far sooner. For, look you, we old men, when we see young men playing, are eager to join in the play our- selves. And much more, if I saw them wide-awake and eager to share in our studies, should I be eager to join, myself, in their serious pursuits.

what as in our ‘‘recitation,” and follow that by a readin and exposition of his own (ἐπαναγνῶναι), which was intend to set everything straight and put on the finishing touches. See Schweighauser’s note and especially Ivo Bruns, De Schola Epicieti (1897), 8f. By changing μέ to μοί, as Capps suggests, @ satisfactory sense is secured, i.c., ‘‘ what pupil must read to me,” but the ἐπί in the compound verb would thus be left without any particular meaning, and perhaps it is not necessary to emend.

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ta’. Περὶ φιλοστοργίας

1 ᾿Αφικομένου δέ τινος πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν τέλει πυθόμενος παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους ἠρώτησεν, 2 εἰ καὶ τέκνα εἴη αὐτῷ καὶ γυνή. τοῦ δ᾽ ὁμο- λογήσαντος προσεπύθετο' Ilas τι οὖν χρῇ τῷ > mpaypats; —'AOPXiws, ἔφη.---Καὶ ὅς: Τίνα 8 τρόπον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα γαμοῦσιν Μ \ fal “ Μ - ἄνθρωποι καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται, ὅπως ἄθλιοι ὦσιν, 4 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅπως εὐδαίμονες.---Αλλ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔφη, iA > / ΝΜ \ \ ΄ Ὁ , οὕτως ἀθλίως ἔχω περὶ τὰ παιδάρια, ὥστε πρῴην νοδοῦντός μου τοῦ θυγατρίου καὶ δόξαντος κινδυνεύειν οὐχ ὑπέμεινα οὐδὲ παρεῖναι αὐτῷ νοσοῦντι, φυγὼν δ᾽ ὠχόμην, μέχρις οὗ προσήγ- / 7 ΝΜ n = bd a γειλέ τις μοι OTL ἔχει Karta@s.—Ti οὖν ; ὀρθῶς δ φαίνει σαυτῷ ταῦτα πεποιηκέναι ;---Φυυσικῶς, ἔφη.---Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό με πεῖσον, ἔφη, σύ, διότι φυσικῶς, καὶ ἐγώ σε πείσω, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατὰ 6 φύσιν γινόμενον ὀρθῶς γίνεται.---οῦτο, ἔφη, πάντες ἢ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι πατέρες πάσχομεν .--- Οὐδ᾽ ἐγώ σοι ἀντιλέγω, ἔφη, ὅτι οὐ γίνεται, τὸ δ᾽ ἀμφισβητούμενον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, εἰ ὀρθῶς. > \ ᾽ὔ ry 4 \ \ 7 a / 7 ἐπεὶ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ φύματα δεῖ λέγειν ἐπ᾿ ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι τοῦ σώματος, ὅτι γίνεται,

ee

nee a \ ς ΄ > N 4 “ καὶ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, ὅτι

Ϊ»Ξ νων ee μμνα ννννν νιν

΄ Ἁ a [2 - ig / πάντες σχεδὸν ἢ οἵ ye πλεῖστοι ἁμαρτάνομεν.

—

78

BOOK I. xt. 1-7

CHAPTER XI Of family affection

Wuen an official came to see him, Epictetus, after making some special enquiries about other matters, asked him if he had children and a wife, and when the other replied that he had, Epictetus asked the further question, What, then, is your experience with marriage?—Wretched, he said—To which Epictetus, How so? For men do not marry and beget children just for this surely, to be wretched, but rather to be happy.—And yet, as for me, the other replied, I feel so wretched about the little children, that recently when my little daughter was sick and was thought to be in danger, I could not bear even to stay by her sick bed, but I up and ran away, until someone brought me word that she was well again.—What then, do you feel that you were acting right in doing this?—I was acting naturally, he said.—But really, you must first convince me of this, that you were acting naturally, said he, and then I will convince you that whatever is done in accord- ance with nature is rightly done.—This is the way, said the man, all, or at least most, of us fathers feel.—And I do not contradict you either, answered Epictetus, and say that it is not done, but the point at issue between us is the other, whether it is rightly done. For by your style of reasoning we should have to say of tumours also that they are produced for the good of the body, just because they occur, and in brief, that to err is in accordance with nature, just because prattically all of us, or at least most of us, do err. Do you show me, therefore, how your

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8 δεῖξον οὖν μοι σύ, πῶς κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν.---Οὐ

δύναμαι, ἔφη: ἀλλὰ σύ μοι μᾶλλον δεῖξον, πῶς

9 οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν οὐδ᾽ ὀρθῶς γίνεται.--- αἱ

10

ll

12

13

14

15

ds: ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ ἐζητοῦμεν, ἔφη, περὶ λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων, ποῖον ἂν κριτήριον παρεκαλοῦμεν πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτῶν;--- Τὴν ὅρασιν, ἔφη.----Τἰ δ᾽ εἰ περὶ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν καὶ μαλα-

κῶν, ποῖόν τι ;--- ὴν ἁφήν.---Οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ

τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς γινο- μένων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, ποῖον θέλεις κριτήριον παραλάβωμεν ; --- Οὐκ οἶδ᾽, ἔφη.---Καὶ μὴν τὸ

μὲν τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν, ἔτε δὲ χυλῶν

͵ὔ > lad Ν > / \ κριτήριον ἀγνοεῖν τυχὸν οὐ μεγάλη ζημία, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δοκεῖ σοι μικρὰ ζημία εἶναι τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι ;—H μεγίστη μὲν οὖν.-- Φέρε εἰπέ μοι, πάντα ἃ δοκεῖ τισιν εἶναι καλὰ καὶ προσήκοντα, ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ; καὶ νῦν ᾿Ιουδαίοις καὶ Σύροις καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις οἷόν τε πάντα τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ τροφῆς ὀρθῶς δοκεῖν ;—Kal πῶς οἷόν τε ;---Αλλ᾽ 3 a > , > 3 0 y > \ 1 Ag if οἶμαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὀρθά ἐστι Ta’ Αἰγυπτίων, Ν ? \ . nr ΝΜ > n ΝΜ ‘ μὴ ὀρθὰ εἶναι τὰ TOV ἄλλων, εἰ καλῶς ἔχει TA Ιουδαίων, μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.---Πῶς \ LA “ δ᾽ ” > bal \ > θί ‘ yap ov ;—Orrov δ᾽ ἄγνοια, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀμαθία Kai ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀπαιδευσία.---Συνεχώρει.--- Σὺ οὖν, ἔφη, τούτων αἰσθόμενος οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ

1 Added by Schweighauser.

ee

"τ ὦ.) ὦ “ὠὰ απ» ὍΝ τὰ

BOOK 1. xr. 7-15

conduct is in accordance with nature.—I cannot, said the man; but do you rather show me how it is not in accordance with nature, and not rightly done. And Epictetus said: Well, if we were enquiring about white and black objects, what sort of criterion should we summon in order to distinguish between them?—The sight, said the man.—And if about hot and cold, and hard and soft objects, what criterion?—The touch.—Very well, then, since we are disputing about things which are in accordance with nature and things which are rightly or not rightly done, what criterion would you have us take ?—I do not know, he said.—And yet, though it is, perhaps, no great harm for one not to know the criterion of colours and odours, and so, too, of flavours, still do you think that it is a slight harm for a man to be ignorant of the criterion of good and evil things, and of those in accordance with nature and those contrary to nature?—On the con- trary, it is the very greatest harm. Come, tell me, are all the things that certain persons regard as good and fitting, rightly so regarded? And is it possible at this present time that all the opinions which Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians and Romans hold on the subject of food are rightly held >And how can it be possible ?—But, I fancy, it is absolutely necessary, if the views of the Egyptians are right, that those of the others are not right; if those of the Jews are well founded, that those of the others are not.—Yes, certainly—Now where there is ignorance, there is also lack of knowledge and the lack of instruction in matters which are indispens- able.—He agreed.—You, then, said he, now that you perceive this, will henceforth study no other

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λοιποῦ σπουδάσεις οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλῳ τινὶ THY γνώμην ἕξεις ἢ ὅπως τὸ κριτήριον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καταμαθὼν τούτῳ προσχρώμενος διακρινεῖς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἕκαστον. "Eri δὲ τοῦ παρόντος τὰ τοσαῦτα ἔχω σοὶ πρὸς ὃ βούλει βοηθῆσαι. τὸ φιλόστοργον δοκεῖ σοι κατὰ φύσιν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ καλόν ;---Πῶς yap οὔ ;---Τ δέ; τὸ μὲν φιλόστοργον κατὰ φύσιν τ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ καλόν, τὸ δ᾽ εὐλόγιστον οὐ καλόν ;--- Οὐδαμῶς.---Μὴ τοίνυν μάχην ἔχει τῷ φιλο- στόργῳ τὸ εὐλόγιστον ;---Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι.---Εἰ δὲ μή, τῶν μαχομένων ἀνάγκη θατέρου κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος θάτερον εἶναι παρὰ φύσιν ; ἢ γὰρ οὔ ;— Οὕτως, ἔ η---Οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν εὑρίσκωμεν ὁμοῦ μὲν φιλόστοργον ὁμοῦ δ᾽ εὐλόγιστον, τοῦτο θαρροῦντες ἀποφαινόμεθα ὀρθόν τε εἶναι καὶ καλόν ;--ἰ ἔστω, ἔφη.--- Τί οὖν ; ἀφεῖναι νοσοῦν τὸ παιδίον καὶ ἀφέντα ἀπελθεῖν ὅτι μὲν οὐκ εὐλόγιστον οὐκ οἶμαί σ᾽ ἀντερεῖν. ὑπολείπεται δ᾽ ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖν εἰ φιλόστοργον.--- Σκοπῶμεν δή.--- ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν σὺ μὲν ἐπειδὴ φιλοστόργως διέκεισο πρὸς τὸ παιδίον, ὀρθῶς ἐποίεις φεύγων καὶ ἀπολείπων αὐτό; ἡ μήτηρ δ᾽ οὐ φιλοστοργεῖ τὸ παιδίον ;— Φιλοστοργεῖ μὲν οὖν.--Οὐκοῦν ἔδει καὶ τὴν / > o > \ x > Μ > ” 7 μητέρα ἀφεῖναι αὐτὸ ἢ οὐκ ἔδει ;---Οὐκ &der.—Ti δ᾽ ἡ τιτθή ; στέργει αὐτό ;---Στέργει, ἔφη.---Εδει οὖν κἀκείνην ἀφεῖναι αὐτὸ ;---Οὐδαμῶς..---Τ δ᾽ ὁ παιδαγωγός ; οὐ στέργει αὐτό ;--Στέργει.---" ἔδει

1 The course of thought is, ‘‘ You will have to do much studying before you have mastered this subject; but for the present,” etc. :

82

BOOK I. x1. 15-23

subject and will give heed to no other matter than

the problem of how, when you have learned the

criterion of what is in accordance with nature, you

shall apply that criterion and thus determine each ial case.

But for the present! I can give you the following assistance toward the attainment of what you desire. Does family affection seem to you to be in accord- ance with nature and good ?—Of course——What then? Is it possible that, while family affection is in accordance with nature and good, that which is reasonable is not good ?—By no means.—That which is reasonable is not, therefore, incompatible with family affection?—It is not, I think.—Otherwise, when two things are incompatible and one of them is in accordance with nature, the other must be contrary to nature, must it not >—Even so, said he.— Whatever, therefore, we find to be at the same time both affectionate and reasonable, this we confidently assert to be both right and good?—Granted, said he.—What then? I suppose you will not deny that going away and leaving one’s child when it is sick is at least not reasonable. But we have yet to consider whether it is affectionate.—Yes, let us consider that.—Were you, then, since you were affectionately disposed to your child, doing right when you ran away and left her? And has the mother no affection for her child ?—On the contrary, she has affection.— Ought then the mother also to have left her child, or ought she not?—She ought not.—What of the nurse? Does she love her child?—She does, he said.— Ought, then, she also to have left her ?—By no means.— What about the school attendant? Does not he love the child >—He does.—Ought, then, he

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οὖν κἀκεῖνον ἀφέντα ἀπελθεῖν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἔρημον καὶ ἀβοήθητον ἀπολειφθῆναι τὸ παιδίον διὰ τὴν

- πολλὴν φιλοστοργίαν τῶν γονέων ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν

περὶ αὐτὸ ἢ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν τῶν οὔτε στεργόντων οὔτε κηδομένων ἀποθανεῖν ;---Μὴ γένοιτο.---Καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε ἄνισον καὶ ἄγνωμον, 6 τις αὑτῷ 1 προσῆκον οἴεται διὰ τὸ φιλόστοργος εἶναι, τοῦτο

τοῖς ὁμοίως φιλοστοργοῦσιν μὴ ἐφιέναι;---

“Atotrov.—Aye, σὺ δ᾽ ἂν νοσῶν ἠβούλου φιλο- στόργους οὕτως ἔχειν τοὺς προσήκοντας τούς τ᾽ ἄλλους καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα, ὥστ᾽ ἀφεθῆναι μόνος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ ἔρημος ;— Οὐδαμῶς.---Εὔξαιο δ᾽ ἂν οὕτως στερχθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν σαυτοῦ, ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν αὐτῶν φιλο- στοργίαν ἀεὶ μόνος ἀπολείπεσθαι ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, ἢ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ δυνατὸν ἦν, φιλοστοργεῖσθαι ηὔχου, ὥστ᾽ ἀπολείπεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ; εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ὑπολεί- meTat μηδαμῶς ἔτι φιλόστοργον εἶναι τὸ πραχθέν.

Τί οὖν ; οὐδὲν ἦν τὸ κινῆσάν σε καὶ ἐξορμῆσαν πρὸς τὸ ἀφεῖναι τὸ παιδίον; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε; ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτόν τι Hv,” οἷον καὶ ἐν Ῥώμῃ τινὰ ἣν τὸ κινοῦν, ὥστ᾽ ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι τοῦ ἵππου τρέχοντος ᾧ ὃ ἐσπουδάκει, εἶτα νικήσαντός ποτε παραλόγως σπόγγων δεῆσαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀναληφθῆναι λιποψυχοῦντα. τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν; τὸ μὲν ἀκριβὲς οὐ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ τυχόν: ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἀπαρκεῖ πεισθῆναι, εἴπερ ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων λεγόμενον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω που

1 ὅτις ϑδ: αὑτῶι Sc: ὅτι σαντῶι S.

2 Bentley: ἄν S (ἦν or ἂν ἦν J. Β. Mayor). 3 Salmasius and Upton’s ‘ codex’: ὡς S.

A

BOOK I. x1. 23-28

as well to have gone away and left her, so that the child would thus have been left alone and helpless because of the great affection of you her parents and of those in charge of her, or, perhaps, have died in the arms of those who neither loved her nor cared for her?—Far from it!—And yet is it not unfair and unfeeling, when a man thinks certain conduct fitting for himself because of his affection, that he should not allow the same to others who have as much affec- tion as he has ?>—That were absurd.—Come, if it had been you who were sick, would you have wanted all your relatives, your children and your wife included, to show their affection in such a way that you would be left all alone and deserted by them?—By no means.—And would you pray to be so loved by your own that, because of their excessive affection, you would always be left alone in sickness? Or would you, so far as this is concerned, have prayed to be loved by your enemies rather, if that were possible, so as to be left alone by them? And if this is what you would have prayed for, the only conclusion left us is that your conduct was, in the end, not an act of affection at all.

What, then; was the motive nothing at all which actuated you and induced you to leave your child? And how can that be? But it was a motive like that which impelled a certain man in Rome to cover his head when the horse which he backed was running,—and then, when it won unexpectedly, they had to apply sponges to him to revive him from his faint! What motive, then, is this? The scientific explanation, perhaps, is not in place now ; but it is enough for us to be convinced that, if what the philosophers say is sound, we ought not to look

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val a / δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτό, GAN ἕν καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, τοῦ λέγειν τινὰ ἢ μὴ λέγειν, τοῦ ἐπαίρεσθαι ἢ συστέλλεσθαι ἢ φεύγειν τινὰ ἢ διώκειν, τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ γέγονεν αἴτιον, σοὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ «αθῆσθαι νῦν

᾿ a ἀκούοντα, ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν ταῦτα. τί δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦτο; apa γε ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ;--- a Υ͂ Οὐδέν.---Εἰὐ δ᾽ ἄλλως ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ δόξαν ἐπράττομεν ; οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ᾿Αχιλλεῖ

fol ΝΜ lal a > e a , τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ πενθεῖν, οὐχ ὁ τοῦ Πατρόκλου

/ ” / > / rn rn θάνατος (ἄλλος yap τις οὐ πάσχει ταῦτα τοῦ ἑταίρου ἀποθανόντος), ἅλλ᾽ ὅτι ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ. καὶ

\ , 7 -“ Si Ὁ. ὦ ΝΜ / \ σοὶ τότε φεύγειν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὅτι ἔδοξέν σοι" Kal

΄ > / μὴ Μ , \ a > πάλιν, ἐὰν μείνῃς, ὅτε ἔδοξέν σοι. καὶ viv ἐν “Ῥώμῃ avépyn, ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι" κἂν μεταδόξῃ, οὐκ ἂν ἀπελεύσῃ. καὶ ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε

Ν » / » Ψ lal ’ φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο TL τῶν τοιούτων -“ ‘ cr αἴτιόν ἐστι TOU πράττειν TL ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα.

Τοῦτό σε πείθω ἢ οὐχί ;---Πείθεις, ἔφη.---Οἷα δὴ τὰ αἴτια ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἀποτε- λούμενα. οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὴ ὀρθῶς τι πράττωμεν, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἰτιασόμεθα

ἢ τὸ δόγμα, ἀφ᾽ οὗ αὐτὸ ἐπράξαμεν, κἀκεῖνο

BOOK I. χι. 28-35

for the motive anywhere outside of ourselves, but that in all cases it is one and the same thing that is the cause of our doing a thing or of our not doing it, of our saying things, or of our not saying them, of our being elated, or of our being cast down, of our avoiding things, or of our pursuing them—the very thing, indeed, which has even now become a cause of my action and of yours; yours in coming to me and sitting here now listening, mine in saying these things. And what is that? Is it, indeed, anything else than that we wanted to do this ?— Nothing.—And supposing that we had wanted to do something else, what else would we be doing than that which we wanted to do? Surely, then, in the ease of Achilles also, it was this that was the cause of his grief—not the death of Patroclus (for other men do not act this way when their comrades die), but that he wanted to grieve. And in your case the other day, the cause of your running away was just that you wanted to do so; and another time, if you stay with her, it will be because you wanted to stay. And now you are going back to Rome, because you want to do so, and if you change your mind and want something else, you will not go. And, in brief, it is neither death, nor exile, nor toil, nor any such thing that is the cause of our doing, or of our not doing, anything, but only our opinions and the decisions of our will.

Do I convince you of this, or not >You convince me, said he.—Of such sort, then, as are the causes in each case, such likewise are the effects. Very well, then, whenever we do anything wrongly, from this day forth we shall ascribe to this action no other cause than the decision of our will which led us to

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ἐξαίρειν καὶ ἐκτέμνειν πειρασόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ φύματα καὶ τὰ ἀποστήματα ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς πραττομένων ταὐτὸν τοῦτο αἴτιον ἀποφανοῦμεν. καὶ οὔτ᾽ οἰκέτην ἔτι αἰτιασόμεθα οὔτε γείτονα οὔτε γυναῖκα οὔτε τέκνα ὡς αἴτιά. τινων κακῶν ἡμῖν γινόμενα πεπεισμένοι ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἡμῖν δόξῃ τοιαῦτά τινα εἶναι, οὐ πράττο- μεν τὰ ἀκόλουθα' τοῦ δόξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ δόξαι, ἡμεῖς κύριοι καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐκτός.---Οὕτως, ἔφη.---Απὸ τῆς σήμερον τοίνυν ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπισκοπήσομεν οὐδ᾽ ἐξετάσομεν, ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ πῶς ἔχει, οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν οὔτε τὰ ἀνδράποδα οὔτε τοὺς ἵππους ἢ κύνας, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα.---Ἐὔχομαι, épn.— Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτι σχολαστικόν σε δεῖ γενέσθαι, τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον οὗ πάντες καταγελῶσιν, εἴπερ ἄρα θέλεις ἐπίσκεψιν. τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων ποιεῖσθαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι μιᾶς ὥρας ἢ ἡμέρας οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπινοεῖς καὶ αὐτός.

ιβ΄. Περὶ εὐαρεστήσεως

Περὶ θεῶν οἱ μέν τινές εἰσιν οἱ λέγοντες μηδ᾽ “ \ a « ᾽ “ / 3 \ ‘ εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, οἱ δ᾽ εἶναι μέν, ἀργὸν δὲ καὶ ἀμελὲς καὶ μὴ προνοεῖν μηδενός" τρίτοι δ᾽ οἱ καὶ εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων καὶ cal fo) / / οὐρανίων, τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς μηδενός" τέταρτοι δ᾽

1 As, for example, good, or pleasant. 2 So Epicurus ; see Usener, Epicurea, frg. 368.

88

---τ-

BOOK I. xr. 35-xn. 2

do it, and we shall endeavour to destroy and excise that cause more earnestly than we try to destroy and excise from the body its tumours and abscesses And in the same way we shall declare the same thing to be the cause of our good actions. And we shall no longer blame either slave, or neighbour, or wife, or children, as being the causes of any evils to us, since we are persuaded that, unless we decide that things are thus-and-so,1 we do not perform the corre- sponding actions ; and of our decision, for or against something, we ourselves, and not things outside of ourselves, are the masters.—Even so, he said.—From this very day, therefore, the thing whose nature or condition we shall investigate and examine will be neither our farm, nor our slaves, nor our horses, nor our dogs, but only the decisions of our will.—I hope so, he said._You see, then, that it is necessary for you to become a frequenter of the schools,—that animal at which all men laugh,—if you really desire to make an examination of the decisions of your own will. And that this is not the work of a single hour or day you know as well as I do.

CHAPTER XII Of contentment

Concernine gods there are some who say that the divine does not so much as exist ; and others, that it exists, indeed, but is inactive and indifferent, and takes forethought for nothing; and a third set, that it exists and takes forethought, though only for great and heavenly things and in no case for terrestrial things; and a fourth set, that it also takes

VOL. 1. E 89

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οἱ; καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, εἰς κοινὸν δὲ μόνον καὶ οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ε / ͵ > e ν , ‘ ᾿ ἑκάστου" πέμπτοι δ᾽, ὧν ἐν καὶ ᾿Οδυσσεὺς καὶ Σωκράτης, οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι

i)

ovdé ce AHOw κινύμενος. ;

4 Πολὺ πρότερον οὖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι περὶ

ἑκάστου τούτων ἐπεσκέφθαι, πότερα ὑγιῶς ἢ 5 οὐχ ὑγιῶς λεγόμενόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἰσὶν θεοί, πῶς ἐστι τέλος ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς ; εἰ δ᾽ εἰσὶν μέν, μηδενὸς δ᾽ ἐπιμελούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως πῶς ὑγιὲς ἔσται ; ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ὄντων καὶ ἐπιμέλο- μένων εἰ μηδεμία διάδοσις εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία γε καὶ εἰς ἐμέ, πῶς ἔτι καὶ οὕτως ὑγιές ἐστιν; πάντα οὖν ταῦτα ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἐπεσκεμμένος τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχεν τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται τῷ νόμῳ τῆς. πόλεως. ὁ δὲ παιδευόμενος ταύτην ὀφείλει τὴν ἐπιβοχὴν ἔχων ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, “πῶς ἂν ἑποίμην ἐγὼ ἐν παντὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ πῶς ἂν εὐαρεστοίην τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ πῶς ἂν γε- νοίμην ἐλεύθερος ;” ἐλεύθερος γάρ ἐστιν, ᾧ γίνεται πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ὃν οὐδεὶς δύναται ι0 κωλῦσαι. τί οὖν ; ἀπόνοιά ἐστιν ἡ ἐλευθερία ;

μὴ γένοιτο. μανία γὰρ καὶ ἐλευθερία εἰς ταὐτὸν ll οὐκ ἔρχεται. “ ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ θέλω πᾶν τὸ δοκοῦν μοι 12 ἀποβαίνειν, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν δοκῇ." μαινόμενος εἶ,

παραφρονεῖς. οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι καλόν τι ἐλευθερία

for)

.1

ου

c

1 Schenk]: δὲ S, of Stobaeus. go

'T BOOK I. χη. 2-12

forethought for things terrestrial and the affairs of men, but only in a general way, and not for the individual in particular; and a fifth set, to which Odysseus and Socrates belonged, who say.

Nor when I move am I concealed from thee.+

_ We must, therefore, first of all enquire about each of these statements, to see whether it is sound or not sound. For if gods do not exist, how can it be an end to follow the gods? And if they exist, indeed, but care for nothing, how even thus will that conclusion be sound? But if, indeed, they both exist and exercise care, yet there is no com- munication from them to men,—yes, and, by Zeus, to me personally,—how even in this case can our conclusion still be sound? The good and excellent. man must, therefore, inquire into all these things, before he subordinates his own will to him who ad- ministers the universe, precisely as good citizens submit to the law of the state. And he that is being instructed ought to come to his instruction with this aim, “ How may I follow the gods in every- thing, and how may I be acceptable to the divine administration, and how may I become free?” Since he is free for whom all things happen accord- ing to his moral purpose, and whom none can restrain. What then? Is freedom insanity? Far from it; for madness and freedom are not con- sistent with one another. “ But I would have that which seems best to me happen in every case, no matter how it comes to seem so.’ You are mad; you are beside